The Problem with Sole Purpose and No First Use

Michael Rühle

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Introduction

As the security environment changes, so does the value of certain policies and concepts. What may have looked like a bad idea in the past may look much better once circumstances change and a re-evaluation occurs. However, some bad ideas remain bad ideas, irrespective of changing circumstances. This is because despite their intellectual consistency, they tend to create more problems than they claim to solve.

Two classic examples of such policy ideas are the proposals for adopting a “No First Use” policy (NFU) and a “Sole Purpose” declaration (SP).[2] Despite exerting a certain fascination on some defense intellectuals, both ideas made little sense in the past, and they continue to make little sense today. This is not to deny that some of the circumstances that once made them look reckless, such as the Soviet Union’s massive conventional superiority in the Cold War, have disappeared. However, the implicit assumption of its proponents, namely that today’s environment is more conducive for such policy changes, remains fundamentally flawed.

While a changing security environment does indeed require the persistent adjustment of strategies and force postures, these adaptations must support a country’s most urgent political and security priorities. Preventing an attack on the U.S. or its allies is such a top priority, as is alliance management through extended deterrence. Alas, neither NFU nor SP would sensibly contribute to these goals. On the contrary, they would needlessly complicate them. Indeed, many of the alleged positive effects ascribed to NFU and/or SP, such as reducing the salience of nuclear weapons or avoiding nuclear escalation, only occur in the abstract world of academia. However, once applied to the real-life context of the US and its allies coping with an increasingly competitive strategic environment, these ideas become outright counterproductive.

Nuclear Weapons and Extended Deterrence

Historically, the role of nuclear weapons in NATO has been gradually reduced, in line with US nuclear policy. In the late 1950s, NATO’s defense plans foresaw the early employment of a large number of tactical nuclear weapons; in the 1990 London Summit Declaration, nuclear weapons had become “weapons of last resort”.[3] The number of European-based nuclear weapons went down from 7,000 in the late 1960s to a few hundred today. All these changes were a reflection of a changing strategic environment, which reduced the salience of nuclear weapons.

However, while NATO’s nuclear posture changed significantly, the core principles underlying NATO’s nuclear policy did not. After the end of the Cold War, nuclear sharing arrangements remained in place, various (half-hearted) national NFU initiatives were quickly dismissed, as were proposals to withdraw all U.S. nuclear weapons from NATO-Europe. More recently, Allies strongly rejected the Nuclear Ban Treaty. In short, even while their nuclear posture was changing, Allies avoided anything that could be interpreted as challenging the principles of extended nuclear deterrence.

The fact that NATO, even with far fewer nuclear weapons, considers itself a “nuclear Alliance” is hardly surprising. Nuclear weapons may not be as central to the defense of the Allies as they were in the Cold War, yet their deterrent effect remains crucial.[4] Together with U.S. conventional forces stationed in Europe, nuclear weapons are the ultimate expression of NATO as a defense community in which even nuclear risks and burdens are being shared between nuclear and non-nuclear Allies. This is as close as sovereign nation states can get to handling nuclear matters collectively. The well-known credibility dilemmas of extended nuclear deterrence pale in comparison to the benefits of the deterrence message this policy sends: the defense of allies is a vital US interest. As Lawrence Freedman observed, nuclear weapons “can have a deterrent effect well beyond their logical limits”.[5]

Hence, any proposition to alter this policy – even if it were meant to be largely declaratory – would have to convince allies that their security would not suffer. Alas, many allies suspect that NFU and SP would ultimately result in a net loss of security, as it would symbolize a reduced U.S. commitment to European deterrence and defense.

Alliance Implications of No First Use and Sole Purpose

It is important to note that rejecting an NFU pledge does not equal a “first use” doctrine. Rather, by not ruling out the possibility of using nuclear weapons first, the defender seeks to keep the aggressor guessing about the response he has to expect. By contrast, a NFU commitment implies that the defender would rather lose a conventional war than employ nuclear weapons. If the aggressor stays below the nuclear threshold, so will the defender. Thus, in the Cold War, when the Soviet Union and its allies outgunned NATO conventionally, NFU was seen as counterproductive and thus had little political traction. However, even today, No First Use and Sole Purpose remain problematic:

First, due to the trappings of geography, Russia still enjoys a military advantage, for example against the Baltic States or in the Black Sea. The US and its allies thus continue to benefit from the deterrence effect of potential nuclear escalation – arguably the most powerful reason for why the nuclear age has not seen major wars between nuclear powers or their closest allies. An NFU or SP pledge would diminish this deterrent effect and encourage Russia to believe that it could regionalize and dominate a conventional conflict.[6]

Second, both NFU and SP appear out of touch with the nuclear emphasis in Russia’s military doctrine. Russia’s quasi-religious attachment to its nuclear status, its comprehensive nuclear modernization, as well as its exercise patterns, do not suggest that Moscow would harbor particular inhibitions from using nuclear weapons whenever it deems it necessary for securing its victory or survival in a war. This does not suggest that Russia is relentlessly aggressive or reckless; yet it should caution against any Western move to politically and military constrain oneself on nuclear matters. At least many observers in Central and Eastern Europe will interpret such nuclear self-restraint as another sign of the US trying to get out of a nuclear commitment that it finds too burdensome to maintain or to trade genuine security for the uncertain outcome and impact of arms control limitations.

Third, an NFU and/or SP pledge will lead to increased debate on possible structural changes in Western nuclear arsenals that will further diminish their deterrent value. A further reduced role for nuclear weapons would embolden those who argue that NATO Allies require fewer and less flexible nuclear capabilities. From a NATO perspective, this could lead to renewed questions from publics and parliaments about the requirement of the US to forward deploy weapons in Europe and for NATO Allies to support the mission. An NFU or a SP pledge would also be at loggerheads with French and British nuclear policy, and it could re-ignite a discussion on the wisdom of the Nuclear Ban Treaty – a Treaty that NATO allies have categorically rejected.

Fourth, while there is currently no intense discussion in Europe about other WMD, the use of chemical weapons in Syria and the use of a highly toxic nerve agent by Russian assassins have brought these weapons back into the limelight. Even more importantly, the Corona pandemic – the origins of which are still debated – should serve as a strong reminder of the tremendous damage that non-nuclear WMD can inflict. Taking nuclear deterrence out of this equation would appear counterproductive, as it would simply increase the attractiveness of other WMD for certain malign actors. Put differently: if the US Administration felt in 2010 that a “sole purpose” declaration was ill-advised with respect to biological weapons, a US Administration today, which is still struggling with the fallout of the pandemic as well as with the implications of Emerging Disruptive Technologies, should be even more wary of such acts of self-constraint.[7]

Fifth and finally, the political and military gains claimed by the supporters of NFU/SP do not appear significant enough to become mainstays of US security policy. In theory, reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in order to encourage progress in arms control or non-proliferation is logically sound. However, the current international environment is far more volatile than the period in which the Obama Administration’s Prague Agenda sought to achieve similar goals – and failed. The assumption that U.S. policies of nuclear restraint would convince others – even adversaries – to reciprocate, is the grand delusion of large parts of the Western nonproliferation community. In the current security environment, maintaining credible extended deterrence will be a greater boon for U.S. security than irritating its own allies with highly questionable policy changes. The West’s adversaries will closely watch how the U.S. will navigate the narrow straits between nuclear deterrence and nuclear risk reduction.