Thomas G. Pledger
Applying Sun Tzu’s sage advice about knowing your enemy, the U.S. Army recently published ATP 7-100.3 Chinese Tactics. Unfortunately, rather than an honest assessment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), it appears the U.S. Army was looking at a dirty mirror and seeing a distorted version of itself. These include such simple misunderstandings of internal processes as stating the PRC is moving towards a capitalistic free market system.[i] Or more dangerous mirroring that the PRC wants to be a good neighbor endeavoring for cooperation with India and other neighbors.[ii] The 7-100.3 more dangerously discounts our shared history when the U.S. military fought the PLA during the Korean War. Although poor claims are made, the 7-100.3 cannot be wholly discounted; valuable insights exist. The 7-100.3’s failure to honestly represent the PRC and the PLA could have severe implications on the U.S. Army’s professional education, the design of training events, and leader development with the possibility of serious repercussions.[iii]
One aspect of a nation’s character extends from the interaction of its political and economic systems; these two systems influence everything from business and industry to international relations. ATP 7-100.3 alleges that the PRC is moving towards a capitalistic free market system.[iv] The 7-100.3’s claim that the PRC is moving towards a capitalistic free market system is outdated and harkens back to a misunderstanding and Western aspiration over thirty years old. The PRC instead established and operates under a system of state-directed capitalism.[v] State-directed capitalism is a system in which the government directs, influences, and resources the nations and business economic planning and development.[vi] Though the 7-100.3 bypasses a discussion on the PRC’s political structure, it does address the complex interplay between the PLA, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the PRC; reinforcing the PLA’s support of the CCP, with the PLA’s goal of maintaining the stability of the PRC.[vii] The interplay of the PLA support to the CCP and state-directed capitalism gives the CCP and arguably the PLA an immense amount of direct control in guiding and directing business.
Moving beyond misunderstanding internal systems of the PRC, the 7-100.3 makes misguided suppositions on the PRC's regional and international motivations and actions, stating that the PRC wants to be a good neighbor endeavoring for cooperation with India and other nations.[viii] This statement contradicts numerous actions by the PRC against its neighbors and the international community. Two examples are the ongoing disputes with India and the Philippines. The PRC and India claim the Ladakh’s Gogra region sustaining a steady-state low-level conflict.[ix] Even though both nations maintain “unarmed” military forces in the territory, occasionally hostilities occur, leading to injuries and even the death of Service members.[x] In addition to this border dispute, the PRC has aided Pakistan's procurement of nuclear weapons technology as a counter-balance to India.[xi] In another example, the Philippines filed an arbitration case against the PRC in the UN, involving the Chinese economic encroachment on the Philippines’ Scarborough Shoals. The PRC would reject the UN tribunal’s ruling, which ruled in the Philippines' favor. In response, the PRC actually increased the number of violations against the Philippines' and other neighbors' exclusive economic zones.[xii] Though concerning and with the possibility of escalation, the PRC/India conflict remain primarily local; the PRC economic actions are more problematic for not only does it show the PRC ignoring other nation's legitimate claims, it also demonstrates the PRC's dismissive attitude towards international organizations and intergovernmental treaties and agreements. Both actions show the PRC has no desire to be a good neighbor unless the other side is willing to consent to the PRC's activities or desires.
More dangerously than misunderstanding the PRC’s internal systems or international interactions, though, the 7-100.3 misremembers the U.S.’s dealings with the PLA during the Korean War. The 7-100.3 states that “the PLA had no expeditionary capability, minimal mechanization, low-technology systems, and a severe lack of professionalism.”[xiii] Though technically accurate at the beginning of the PLA’s direct involvement in the conflict, the battle-tested PLA fought the combined UN military force to a standstill by signing the Armistice.[xiv] Showing that the PLA is capable of rapidly adapting and improving while under the pressure and strain of combat. Though even this must be qualified as the PLA has not fought in an external conflict in over fifty years, it prevents the U.S. Army and the world from having a framework for analyzing the PLA’s fighting capability.
Examining one’s potential adversaries for potential strengths and weakness is crucial for any military service and government, leading to the publishing of training guidance that directs and supports resource management. Still, when the document is based on historically short-sighted analysis and false assumptions, danger exists. The West's desire for the PRC to develop a capitalist economy; missed or ignored the PRC’s establishment of state-directed capitalism. This system empowered the PRC to influence and dictate internal economic development and actions, which influenced Chinese industry to flout international organizations and treaties. Misunderstanding motivations is dangerous, disregarding capabilities is deadly. Continuing with the second part of Sun Tzu’s quote, “If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory you will also suffer a defeat.”[xv] Forgetting our history with the PLA sets a bad precedence. The 7-100.3 does acknowledge the improvements the PLA has made in technology deploying fifth-generation fighters, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and coordinated cyber operations. But by ignoring the interplay between technologies, the military's and government’s history of adaptation, and the government's internal controls and international interactions, the 7-100.3 creates a document that will design and develop poor training and leaders with a misunderstanding of a possible adversary.
Notes:
[i] ATP 7-100.3, 1-3
[ii] ATP 7-100.3, 1-1, 1-4
[iii] ATP 7-100.3, vii
[iv] ATP 7-100.3, 1-3
[v] https://time.com/5600363/china-tiananmen-30-years-later/
[vi] https://www.forbes.com/sites/gadyepstein/2010/08/31/the-winners-and-losers-in-chinese-capitalism/?sh=7e65ae6688b1
[vii] ATP 7-100.3, 2-1
[viii] ATP 7-100.3, 1-1, 1-4
[ix] https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/south-asia/article/3144162/china-india-border-dispute-both-countries-pull-back-soldiers
[x] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-56121781
[xi] https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/the-strategic-implications-chinas-nuclear-aid-pakistan
[xii] https://time.com/100417/china-vietnam-sino-vietnamese-war-south-china-sea/
[xiii] ATP 7-100.3, 1-3
[xiv] https://www.unc.mil/History/1950-1953-Korean-War-Active-Conflict/
[xv] https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/17976-if-you-know-the-enemy-and-know-yourself-you-need
No comments:
Post a Comment