IN THEIR VERY first exchange after 9/11, Pakistan’s most senior leaders urged their American counterparts not to invade Afghanistan. Instead, they said, consider targeted action against al-Qaeda. In several high-level meetings that I attended then as Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States, Pakistani officials gave warning that military action would not work. America should distinguish between al-Qaeda, the group responsible for the terror attacks, and the Taliban, who needed to be engaged.
Traumatised by the tragedy, leaders in Washington were in no mood to listen. Twenty years later, when America at last withdrew from Afghanistan, it had learned the hard way how to end its longest war. Doing so required negotiating a deal with the Taliban, but this came many years after al-Qaeda had been crushed.
Although close US-Pakistan co-operation achieved the shared goal of eliminating al-Qaeda, the course of the war strained a relationship already characterised by cyclical swings between intense engagement and deep estrangement. Long before the terror attacks of 2001, geopolitical concerns had shaped America’s regional alignments and its priorities. Bilateral ties passed through different phases. First, in the cold war, came the goal of containing communism. Pakistan became known as America’s “most allied ally”. Then came the pressing need, after 1979, to roll back the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. A subsequent phase involved defeating al-Qaeda in the “war on terror”.
The latest period has been the most challenging and, arguably, is the most consequential for future ties. The “forever war” waged by America in Afghanistan put a strain on relations with Pakistan. Leaders in Islamabad continued to call for the military strategy to give way to a political one, but those in Washington believed America’s powerful armed forces, along with their NATO allies, would defeat the Taliban.
America persisted with the war while pressing reluctant officials in Islamabad to “do more”. Americans ignored how the conflict had already spilled over to destabilise Pakistan and exact a heavy cost in lives, inflicting dire social and economic consequences, including terrorist attacks inside Pakistan. When America, during the administration of Barack Obama, came around to a fight-and-talk strategy, leaders in Islamabad again advised their counterparts to seek a negotiated end to the war.
As America’s war effort faltered, the strains in relations grew and trust eroded. Pakistan sought to keep its channel of communication open with the Taliban, believing that one day everyone would have to deal with them. Nor did Pakistan have the luxury of retreating to the other end of the world if things went wrong. Meanwhile, the American raid into Pakistan that killed Osama bin Laden in May 2011 plunged relations to an all-time low. Public fury erupted in Pakistan, and anger spread among military chiefs and government leaders, over America’s transgression into Pakistani territory.
Leaders in Islamabad protested strongly at being kept in the dark about the operation, though officials were privately relieved at bin Laden’s elimination. It took months for tensions to ease but the transactional nature of the bilateral relationship endured: those ties were a function of America’s interests in Afghanistan, and were not predicated on Pakistan’s intrinsic importance, much to the annoyance of its leaders.
Pakistan’s ties with the Taliban over the years enabled it to play a key role when the Trump administration sought a way out of the war and asked for help in coaxing the Taliban to the negotiating table. This eventually led to the Doha agreement in February 2020, America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan and the post-American era that has just begun in the region.
Even before America pulled out, geopolitical dynamics were shifting fundamentally as China stepped up its diplomatic and economic engagement, and launched its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and as Russia began to act more assertively. Regional states including Pakistan were beginning to sense a waning of both American interest and influence. Donald Trump’s “America First” foreign policy signalled gradual disengagement from the region.
At the same time, Pakistan’s longstanding and strategic ties with China grew more intense. Its pivotal role in the BRI symbolised this, as did the accompanying substantial Chinese investment in Pakistan’s infrastructure and development projects. Increasingly, America was seen as a self-absorbed and inconsistent partner as well as a reluctant regional player; China was perceived as having sufficient interest, money and growing global clout for a more constructive and enduring relationship.
Although China is Pakistan’s strategic priority, leaders in Islamabad also want a stable relationship with America. The United States remains Pakistan’s largest export market and a superpower with significant global influence, especially over international financial institutions whose assistance Pakistan’s fragile economy desperately needs. The government wants to avoid getting into the crossfire of an American-Chinese confrontation, but that is easier said than done.
For one reason, America has made no secret of its misgivings over the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a collection of Chinese-funded infrastructure and energy projects (linked to BRI) under way in Pakistan. For another, officials in Islamabad have lowered their expectations of ties with America: for after its exit from Afghanistan, the superpower will no longer be reliant on Pakistan to support its operations there. Another factor is that Pakistan’s old adversary, India, is seen as America’s strategic choice of partner in the region.
Nonetheless, the unsettled situation in Afghanistan also creates the imperative for co-operative ties, albeit within a narrow band. American officials have reached out to their counterparts in Pakistan for counter-terrorism collaboration and intelligence-sharing, for example when William Burns, the CIA director, has visited Pakistan. Pakistan shares American concerns about terrorist groups based in Afghanistan that include Islamic State Khorasan Province, known as ISIL-K (and also as ISKP), remnants of al-Qaeda and other violent organisations. Pakistan sees the greatest threat from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, which is responsible for deadly attacks in its border region.
Pakistan’s leaders share the international view that the Taliban must not let Afghan soil be used as a base for exporting violence. All of Afghanistan’s neighbours are worried about any spillover of instability. China sees a threat from the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, Russia from ISlL-K and central Asian states from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. All have stakes in Afghanistan’s stability and believe in engaging its new rulers.
The future of Afghanistan rests principally on whether the Taliban can govern. Public expectations there are very different from when the group last held power, from the 1990s until 2001. Their immediate challenge, other than consolidating power, is to avert an economic collapse. Foreign-currency assets have been frozen by America and funding from the IMF and the World Bank is suspended.
The financial crunch is compounding a humanitarian crisis. Together these could lead to state collapse with all its dangerous ramifications for the region. International recognition and legitimacy will be essential for the Taliban to access funds and assistance to keep the economy afloat. They, in turn, will have to meet their commitments to run an inclusive government, contain terror groups and respect human rights.
Pakistan has a vital interest in a peaceful and stable Afghanistan. Having borne the brunt of four decades of war and foreign military interventions in Afghanistan, which left the country with 3m refugees, destabilised its border areas and set back economic development, Pakistan has the most to gain from peace. An unstable western frontier only adds to Pakistan’s security anxieties given continuing tensions on the eastern front with India. Dialogue with India has remained suspended for many years. Relations sunk to a new low when India formally and illegally annexed the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019.
Despite back-channel contact between the two countries, there is little prospect of the peace process resuming. America’s policy bias towards India rules it out as a neutral arbiter to resolve the Pakistan-India standoff. This injects uncertainty and volatility into the uneasy dynamic between the nuclear neighbours, especially as the Taliban’s return to power has been a strategic setback for India, which had heavily supported the previous government in Afghanistan.
One result is that new opportunities are opening up for China to expand its influence. Another is that regional powers may look increasingly to themselves rather than to ones from beyond the region to resolve problems, such as the need for better regional economic integration. As for America, the administration of Joe Biden, having taken the bold step of ending its war in Afghanistan, must now accept that diplomacy and respecting other countries’ interests is the best way to win influence and advance its goals. Military coercion and sanctions do not pay off.
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