Dara Massicot
Much of the discussion on the geopolitical implications of the former Afghan government’s recent collapse has focused on what China may do next. However, Russia is the active regional influencer in the unfolding crisis, given its decades-old experience and networks in Afghanistan. In the weeks and months ahead, Russia can apply its diplomatic, intelligence, and military tools to prevent the spread of instability beyond Afghanistan. Some of Russia’s choices may conflict with U.S. goals for Afghanistan, but there are areas of alignment.
Russia’s Goals for Afghanistan
For many years, Russian officials predicted that the former Afghan government and its Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) would likely collapse without U.S. support. In 2017 Russia’s special representative to Afghanistan noted that “a whole set of factors makes the ANSF incapable of putting up resistance to the armed opposition on their own” and that a rapid U.S. pullout would likely prompt an unraveling of key institutions.
Moscow has spent the last few years developing a relationship with the Taliban and bolstering its force posture in Central Asia. Even though Moscow may not be surprised that the former Afghan government collapsed, the Kremlin considers the current situation to be dangerous. On August 24, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the growth of terrorist groups in Afghanistan is a “direct threat to our country, our allies.” He also clarified that Russia will not militarily involve itself in Afghanistan again, saying that “the former Soviet Union has its own experience in that country. We have learned the lesson.”
Moscow has two core interests related to Afghanistan: supporting its Central Asian allies during the regional instability that is likely to come and preventing international terrorism from spreading to the Russian homeland. Nikolai Patrushev, chair of the Russian Security Council, outlined Russia’s immediate goals for Afghanistan in August: 1) controlling migration flows from Afghanistan to Central Asia and Russia, 2) protecting Central Asia from terrorists pretending to be refugees, 3) preventing the spread of radical ideology beyond the borders of Afghanistan, and 4) protecting against arms smuggling and drug trafficking. Other goals articulated by senior Russian officials include preventing the United States from unilaterally negotiating military base access with Central Asian states and avoiding involvement in a military conflict in Afghanistan.
Russia’s Networks in Afghanistan
For several years, as part of a hedging strategy that entails engagement with all powerbrokers in Afghanistan, Moscow has provided overt political and intelligence support to the Taliban and was also accused of covertly assisting the group. Russia’s efforts have produced some early results. As the Taliban rapidly swept across the country this summer, its officials promised the Kremlin that the Taliban will contain instability and not allow anyone to use Afghanistan to attack Central Asia and Russia. The Taliban also quickly moved to control border crossings with Central Asian countries.
Russia officially considers the Taliban a terrorist group and, as of writing, has not recognized the group as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Removing the terrorist designation and recognizing the Taliban will be key signposts that Russia views the Taliban as its best long-term bet for stability.
Other parts of the Russian government, like the military and security services, are more skeptical of the Taliban’sability to govern the country and contain terrorist groups like ISIS-K, Al Qaeda, and the Islamic State-aligned Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Despite the Taliban’s recent promises, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu noted that Russia must still improve security along the border with Afghanistan “even though the Taliban leaders say they will not make any incursions across the border and attacks on neighbors.”
Shoigu is also concerned with the amount of weapons the Taliban seized during its takeover. In the past, including after the Taliban’s 2015 capture of Kunduz city, he has responded to the terrorist group’s gains by ordering force posture improvements in Tajikistan. The military is conducting frequent exercises with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan a few miles from the Afghan border, focusing on counterterrorism operations like airstrikes against vehicles or notional militant camps. Future exercises scheduled throughout the fall signal Russia’s commitment to its Central Asian allies.
Russia’s Intelligence, Security Service, and Military Options for Afghanistan
Russia has several options to support its core interests of stabilizing and reinforcing its position in Central Asia and preventing the spread of terrorism. These options are listed from the least resource-intensive to the most resource-intensive, not by order of likelihood.
Intelligence support to Central Asian States. The easiest step for Russia to take is to provide intelligence to Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan on border security and terrorist plans and activities. Intelligence support could come through the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), which likely has a presence inside Afghanistan and ties with Taliban networks. Russia’s counterdrug organization and Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Troops could also support these countries.
Intelligence support to the Taliban regarding terrorist groups inside Afghanistan. Russian intelligence has been actively tracking ISIS-K in Afghanistan since 2015, and officials have publicly admitted to sharing intelligence on ISIS-K with the Taliban since late 2016. Although Moscow and the Taliban have a complicated history, they are currently aligned in their objective to limit ISIS-K. From Moscow’s perspective, collaborating with the Taliban, which claims to hold few cross-border ambitions, is the lesser of two evils. Through this lens, Moscow could justify future collaboration with the Taliban.
Border security and humanitarian relief for Central Asia. Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have all said they do not wish to house permanent Afghan refugees. Turkmenistan and Tajikistan have had their own security problems at their Afghanistan borders in recent years, and in August defecting ANSF pilots flew into Uzbekistan and refugees attempted to cross by river. Tajikistan said it will seek assistance from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) if the refugee crisis worsens.
The borders of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan with Afghanistan are long—over 2,000 km, somewhat porous, and often mountainous. Russia could provide reconnaissance drones, remote sensing technology, and even FSB Border Troops to reinforce official border crossings or monitor unguarded areas.
For humanitarian assistance and border support, Russia can use its national guard Rosgvardiya, the military, and the Ministry of Emergency Situations, which manages humanitarian relief and disaster response. Rosgvardiya can support multiple types of operations given its subordinate agencies’ capabilities for crowd control, counterterrorism, counterdrug, and border security missions. On the Russian President’s orders, these forces can be used abroad.
Use of Russian mercenaries or Special Forces inside Afghanistan. There are no indications that Russia is currently considering direct military action against terrorists in Afghanistan, as the Taliban and the United States have ample motivation to neutralize ISIS-K. However, if ISIS-K or other extremist groups in Afghanistan grow and spill over into Central Asia, threatening the Russian homeland, then Moscow has several options to directly intervene.
The first option, and the choice that would give the Kremlin the best plausible deniability, is the use of skilled Russian mercenary groups. Russia could offer the use of mercenaries as a carrot to the Taliban; Russia has incorporated mercenaries into a blended package of support to unstable governments like the Central African Republic in the past.
Russia can also deploy small groups of special forces to border areas in Central Asia to combat worsening terrorist, drug, or arms trafficking flows. Although highly unlikely under current conditions, special forces could deploy into northern Afghanistan to spot terrorist targets or conduct covert counterterrorism operations. These forces have experience operating deep inside the ISIS-held territory in Syria and have far better training and resources than mercenaries. But Russian boots on the ground are an obvious political risk for Moscow.
Bolstering counterterrorism efforts inside Russia. Moscow appears less concerned with the Taliban exporting terrorism than it is with the prospect of a failed state providing safe harbor to terrorist groups with international objectives. Russia seeks to prevent the spread of these groups to Central Asia and the homeland, which suggests a Russian effort to bolster its counterterrorism capabilities, especially in the North Caucasus. Russia is concerned about its citizens from the North Caucasus region who are part of Imarat Kavkaz or other groups that previously pledged loyalty to the Islamic State and now want to return to Russia after fighting abroad. Thousands of militants left Russia to fight for ISIS or al-Nusra in Syria in recent years, and it is possible that some of these fighters ended up in Afghanistan.
Russia’s leaders have a lot of baggage when it comes to foreign fighters in Afghanistan. In the 1990s and 2000s, members of several terrorist groups, including Chechen militant leaders Ibn al-Khattab and Shamil Basaev, found safe haven there. During this time, the Taliban recognized Chechnya’s independence from Russia. Putin was the FSB director, prime minister, and a new president during some of the worst domestic terrorism incidents in this period and does not want these events repeated.
Military support for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. As mentioned previously, the Kremlin has signaled it does not want to militarily involve itself in Afghanistan. Military actions are highly unlikely in present conditions and would be a last resort for Moscow considered only after other levers have been exhausted. While Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said, “We will do everything, including using the capacity of the Russian military base on Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan, in order to prevent any aggressive moves against our allies,” the military reality is more complicated.
What resources could Russia bring to limited military operations in Afghanistan, perhaps to counter ISIS-K? Russia has the capacity to conduct focused air or ground strikes inside Afghanistan without endangering its other campaigns abroad. RAND published a report in 2020 looking at Russian power project scenarios. One of these scenarios was a limited counterterrorism operation from Tajikistan against ISIS-K in northern Afghanistan, which found that, even though Russia would benefit from the 201st Military Base in Tajikistan as a major logistics hub with a friendly local government and rail lines to transport forces to the area, the terrain in Tajikistan and northern Afghanistan is unforgiving.
The 3,000-km-plus rail route from Siberia would take roughly nine days, or a three-hour flight for personnel and some lighter equipment, to transit according to our analysis. From Dushanbe to the Afghan border, forces would be required to make a ground transit of about 160 to 500 km through occasionally mountainous terrain, narrow passes, and secondary roads. Russia could bolster its base in Tajikistan, which is currently equipped with a brigade of tanks, armored personnel carriers, multiple rocket launchers, light-to-medium Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and helicopters. For instability near Afghanistan, Russia could add longer-range UAVs like the Forpost with longer dwell times and higher maximum altitudes, additional armored vehicles, or ground strike systems.
Although unlikely, Russia can conduct limited airstrikes in Afghanistan and could forward-base aircraft in Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan. Russian tactical aviation and strategic bombers could support limited strikes in Afghanistan while continuing missions in Syria (Even at peak military strength in Syria, only three percent of Russia’s tactical aviation was deployed there). Currently, ISIS-K is present in Afghanistan’s eastern provinces of Nangarhar and Kunar. The distance from possible operating bases in southern Tajikistan to these provinces is around 400 to 500 km or more, much farther than Russian combat sorties in Syria, which are often made at shorter distances of 100 to 200 km. (Why Russia opts to fly combat sorties well below the combat radius of its fighter aircraft is unknown, as is the operational motivation to use strategic bombers to target sites in eastern Syria, rather than from its closer airbase in western Syria).
Russia’s Possible Next Steps and Implications for the United States
In the weeks and months ahead, Russia is mostly likely to provide intelligence and border security support to its Central Asian allies to cope with refugees. Moscow could presumably continue to supply intelligence to the Taliban on ISIS-K, the quality and quantity of which would probably depend on how serious it finds the threat. The use of Russian mercenaries, special forces, or limited military intervention is possible from a capacity perspective but does not appear likely anytime soon.
As my RAND colleagues have noted, Russia does not make the political decision to intervene in foreign countries lightly and would weigh multiple factors before considering military intervention. Short of an imminent adverse outcome with grave security implications for Russia—for example, the Taliban being unwilling or unable to stop the spread of terrorism into Central Asia, Russia failing to contain the spread of terrorism to the homeland, or Afghanistan plunging into another civil war with multiple terrorist safe havens—Russia is unlikely to consider a military operation in Afghanistan.
Neither the United States nor Russia wants to see Afghanistan become a haven for international terrorist groups. For now, Russia is taking a pragmatic approach to the Taliban in that it has a relationship with the group that the United States does not. Moscow could apply pressure on the Taliban in line with shared U.S.-Russian objectives: the Kremlin has already said it would like a more inclusive government and for the Taliban to disavow terrorism. But not all Russian goals align with U.S. goals. Russian officials have made it clear that they will oppose any unilateral U.S. attempts to secure basing rights in Central Asia. In the future, if Russia perceives a sharp deterioration in the security situation and feels intervention necessary, or if it judges that U.S. military presence in Central Asia would prevent the expansion of terrorism and stall Russia’s need to act, it may be more accepting of a limited U.S. military presence. In addition, if the United States seeks northern land evacuation routes for refugees through Central Asia, those negotiations will almost certainly need Moscow’s involvement.
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