Blood, Guts and Grease

Lex Oren

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Jon Mikolashek is a former United States Army Command and General Staff College historian, professor at the Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University, and published author of historical military works including General Mark Clark: Commander of U.S. Fifth Army and Liberator of Rome. Mikolashek goes beyond General George S. Patton’s well-known reputation as a military tactician and strict disciplinarian, notably portrayed by George C. Scott in the 1970 eponymous movie Patton. Blood, Guts, and Grease, to capture the younger, less known company and field grade officer before his daring exploits as a general officer in World War II.

Patton made informed and deliberate decisions as a young officer that steered his career to the ground floor of tank warfare.

Through historical research, Mikolashek captures the early experiences of the soldier and the lessons he learned during the Great War that influenced his character and leadership twenty years later during his World War II campaigning. In addition to descriptions of Patton’s early battlefield exploits, Mikolashek writes of the birth of tank warfare and the creation of the Army’s Tank Corps. From early success at the U. S. Military Academy at West Point to the transition to the newly formed Tank Corps, Patton made informed and deliberate decisions as a young officer that steered his career to the ground floor of tank warfare. Mikolashek references Patton's letter to his wife where he states “For the present I shall stay in the Tank Corps as I will thus probably keep my rank and besides I owe it to the Corps."[1] This decision shaped the future of the Armor branch of the U.S. Army as he helped to establish the first Armor School and develop tactics for a developing doctrine. Mikolashek probes into Patton's correspondence with his family and senior officers to show how they guide his ambitions for the glory and fame he so eagerly desired during the Great War, compared to many other works that focus on his Generalship in the Second World War.

Land Crabs

The text is chronological; it follows Patton’s career from lieutenant through colonel as he holds positions including General Pershing’s Staff Officer and the head of the American Army’s first tank school. Mikolashek provides details around procurement of early tanks, from design conception to weaponry. He writes of comparisons made between the early tank models, the British Mark I and the French Renault, discussed by the governments and the officers developing the capabilities. The concepts used for acquisition presaged the Planning, Programming, Budget, and Execution (PPBE) process in use today. Planning, Programming, Budget and Execution is the Department of Defense’s resource management system that aligns strategy with resources to allow the Department of Defense to execute actions supporting the national strategy.[2] Evaluations of speed and the tactical application revealed the French and American forces in 1918 preferred light tanks. The French Renault is better suited for offensive operations in trench warfare and muddy conditions in specific terrain.[3] Patton's cavalry experience helped achieve a maneuver capability that employs firepower in the offensive and defensive tactical missions. Patton revealed his insight in his correspondence to his wife, Beatrice: "The tanks are yet in an unsettled state, but they may have a great future."[4]

…the American manufacturing force could not meet the American Expeditionary Force requirements.

In November 1917, American officers, including George Patton, went to their first tank factory to gain a mechanical understanding of its capabilities and analyze its limitations.[5] The author explains how the U.S. War Department decided on the Mark VII to serve as its heavy tank. However, the American manufacturing force could not meet the American Expeditionary Force requirements.[6] The lack of manufacturing capabilities resulted in an agreement with the Supreme War Council and Allied Commander in Chief, Marshall Foch, for British and French tanks.[7] In the case of the British government's procurement of tanks, Mikolashek’s research reveals that a British Officer, Colonel Ernest D. Swinton, proposed tanks to Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty.[8] Churchill’s support for the “land cruisers," code-named "tank," led to the rapid development of England's prototype in 1916.[9]

The Tank School

By December of 1917, Patton was the head of the first light tank school in the nation's history.[10] Patton chose Bourg, France as the school's location, which placed it within the concentration of other U.S. Army schools five miles south of Langres.[11] Mikolashek reveals how the young officer’s development proved beneficial as Patton’s duties transitioned to an administrative and educational role at the tank school. Mikolashek describes the creation of tactics for employing tanks on the battlefield, problems associated with tank warfare, logistic constraints, and how to utilize tanks better to support more extensive operations.

In addition to basic tank theory and application, the book delves into Patton's character and mental health during his World War I years…

The organizational structure for the tanks had to be created since none already existed. The commander of the American Expeditionary Force, General Pershing had decided the organization of the Tank Corps would consist of five heavy battalions and twenty light tank battalions.[12] The author does not identify what processes General Pershing used to arrive at this decision; however, this method applied by General Pershing appears to be a distinct contrast to the force management model and the force development process of the modern Army.

In addition to basic tank theory and application, the book delves into Patton's character and mental health during his World War I years as he attempts to make a name for himself. His experiences shed light on whether he was a military genius, a megalomaniac, or both. Mikolashek reasons for the onset of depression and loneliness which Patton lived through during his time in the European Theatre.

Combat

Before the U.S. Armor school fielded a tank force capable of engaging the enemy, the British tanks had their chance. On September 15th, 1916, during the Battle of the Somme, 49 Mark I tanks moved to their attack positions; of those, seventeen broke down, and several more became stuck in the mud.[13] Almost two years later, at Cambrai, 378 tanks surprised German defenses and had a far more positive impact on the engagements that resulted in less catastrophic effects for the Allied tanks. The author identifies how British officers used three points to determine Cambrai as the engagement area. First, the terrain was perfect for tanks. Second, Cambrai afforded surprise, and third, tanks were used in mass attacks rather than as an adjunct to infantry.[14]

St. Mihiel and subsequent engagements led Patton to realize that American officers failed to understand how to operate and deploy tanks.

Allied command selected St. Mihiel as the primary Allied objective in September 1919 partly due to its proximity to Metz. The final plan called for Patton's 1st Tank Brigade to work in the American 4th Corps sector.[15] St. Mihiel and subsequent engagements led Patton to realize that American officers failed to understand how to operate and deploy tanks. Commanders did not understand the limitations associated with terrain or the interoperability of multiple maneuver elements. Patton summed up that American and Allied commanders did not understand the limitations of tank warfare. Mikolashek makes clear that tank doctrine was developing rapidly, and leaders did not share their tactics quickly enough to impact the complex maneuver of the infantry and armor due to the pace of warfare. Patton recognized at times the infantry failed to advance with the armor. Many of the improvements made in combined arms assaults came from lessons learned from previous engagements.

Mikolashek articulates Patton’s early experiences by gleaning information from Patton’s personal correspondence and professional writings during the second decade of the 20th century.

Joint Publication 5-0 states, "At the operational level, once strategic guidance is given, planning translates this guidance into specific activities aimed at achieving strategic and operational level objectives and attaining the military end state."[16] Although they probably did not know it at the time, those leaders were laying the groundwork for what would become joint planning for offensive operations. The understanding of new capabilities like the tank and airplane, of course, needed further doctrinal development. The author notes that the Meuse-Argonne offensive still demonstrated that key leaders lacked the institutional knowledge of employing tanks, albeit resulting in a successful Allied campaign inflicting over 150,000 enemy casualties.

Conclusion

Mikolashek, articulates Patton’s early experiences by gleaning information from Patton’s personal correspondence and professional writings during the second decade of the 20th century. The detailed footnotes and extensive bibliography with over 350 references make this book an intelligent and sequential read for any military scholar or any military scholar. Through the lens of an army staff officer, this book provides a less publicized historical look at the early combat experiences that influenced the character and behavior of General George S. Patton compared to books on his World War II exploits.