Mauro Mantovani, Ralf Müllhaupt
Introduction
Adapting one's armed forces to a real or perceived threat is a constant political aim and keeps military staffs and defence planners around the globe busy, both on a national level and within alliances like NATO. Armed forces defence – as opposed to operations – planning is oriented towards the future and follows its own methods, which try to square various requirements like doctrine, organisation, training, materiel, personnel, finances, infrastructure, IT, etc. The current buzz phrase is “capability-based approach,” a concept with no agreed definition, let alone a common methodology. A key feature of planning is that it is based on specific assumptions about a future enemy with certain capabilities, which need to be countered, and aims at offering a range of decision-making options to policy makers.1
Completely different, however, is retrospective analysis of armed forces transformation in that it pursues the question in terms of the ways in which armed forces have developed in the past: its primary focus is on explaining the changes that have in fact taken place. There is a wide academic literature on armed forces transformation in NATO and in neutral European states.2
Additional differences between (prospective) planning and (retrospective) analysis lie in the methodology chosen and in the period of time under consideration: in general, nations act autonomously with regard to how they conduct their armed forces planning. NATO members, however, strive for a certain harmonisation via the Allied Command Transformation, ACT (which, in reality, can merely initialise processes that all too often run aground in the political mills of the member states). Conversely, analysts of past transformation usually forego disclosing the methodology they have applied, let alone strive for a unified methodology, as this could make their findings assailable. A second major distinction is that armed forces planning is a continuous activity by the bureaucracy, setting out from a present state and being conducted without envisioning a final end state, though burdened with the problem of a basically unknowable future.3 In contrast, historical research on armed forces transformation is an academic endeavour and usually quite clearly delimits its period under review.4
This is the starting point of the methodology presented here. As mentioned above, it aims to understand what has happened with hindsight, extending its focus into the future only insofar as it seeks to capture decisions previously taken yet still to be implemented. It claims to identify the most important features of a certain armed force as a whole, or branches of it, in order to explain their emergence and disappearance as well as to display the whole process of transformation in a lucid way, which, additionally, yields a didactic benefit. This methodology clearly differs from traditional approaches to transformation analysis, both in its approach and in its schematic representation by means of a matrix. This article applies the methodology, by way of example, to the (airborne part of the) Swiss Air Force since the end of the Cold War: its changes are visualised and their “driving forces” identified.
At least in an open society, public political debates and specific scholarly literature allow these driving forces (or “drivers”) to be identified to an often satisfactory degree. Insight into the planning process as well as interviews with decision makers at the time can help sharpen the analyst's judgement on the respective weight of these drivers.
Theoretical premises
Armed forces transformation has been understood, since Carl von Clausewitz, as one dimension of strategy. The Prussian war theoretician stated that the art of war – which corresponds to the modern understanding of strategy – is a two-sided coin:
Essentially, … the art of war is the art of using the given means in combat; there is no better term for it than the conduct of war. To be sure, in its wider sense the art of war includes all activities that exist for the sake of war, such as the creation of the fighting forces, their raising, armament, equipment, and training.5This corresponds to Colonel Arthur F. Lykke Jr.'s take on strategy. In an article of 1984 Lykke, at that time a lecturer of military strategy at the US Army War College, distinguished “operational strategy” from “force developmental strategy” as the two levels of (military) strategy that incorporates the interaction of ends, ways and means. In Lykke's understanding, however, both levels have a prospective meaning, i.e. they are tools for the conduct of operations (in times of armed conflict) and force development (in times of armed conflict or peace), respectively.6
Thus, the methodology for the analysis of armed forces transformation presented here focusses on the extended understanding of (military) strategy by Clausewitz and Lykke. It, however, relates to developments in the past. Furthermore, instead of the “creation of fighting forces” and “force developmental strategy,” the currently more common terms “armed forces development” and “transformation of the armed forces” are used essentially as synonyms. This methodology, hereafter explained both in abstracto and in concreto, complements the Department of Strategic Studies’ methodology for the analysis of the conduct of war.7 Hindsight, which is applied in both, serves several purposes (see Conclusion).
The methodology explained, step-by-step
This methodology is based on the general assumption that humans or human groups, in steering the development of armed forces, make use of an array of arguments. It builds on the agency-structure duality, proposed by Colin Wight and popular in social sciences. In essence, the duality distinguishes between human actors or groups of actors, on the one hand, and an abstract framework or setting, on the other.8
Accordingly, the methodology presented here consists of a core matrix, highlighted in green, whose timeline is subdivided into the four major reforms of the Swiss Armed Forces, which serve here as an example: “Armed Forces 61,” “Armed Forces 95,” “Armed Forces XXI” and “Development of the Swiss Armed Forces.” Moreover, the core matrix distinguishes between four dimensions: Organisation, Doctrine, Equipment and Training, and respective sub-dimensions:
The dimension organisation describes how a certain branch fits into the overall structure of the armed forces.
The dimension doctrine is narrowed down, for reasons of simplicity, to the duties and tasks assigned to that branch and specifies the legal hierarchy, which in the Swiss example encompasses the constitution, military law, ordinances, decrees and regulations from the Government, Parliament, the Ministry of Defence or the Chief of Defence. Constitutional or legal provisions, of course, are less specific and less subject to revisions than decrees and regulations.
The dimension equipment captures the most important weaponry and weapon support systems that are characteristic for the chosen branch of the armed forces and critical to its success as an overall system.
The dimension training, finally, captures collective and leadership (but not so much individual) training, specifically for the respective branch and especially with regard to its specific weapon systems. The performance of equipment combined with the level of its operators’ specific training, it is worth noting, is essentially equivalent to today's term “capabilities.”
Even if these four dimensions are separated in the matrix for didactic purposes, there is a multitude of interactions between them. For instance, significant changes in the assigned tasks (on various levels, which essentially correspond to doctrine) can lead to changes in the organisation and accelerate the introduction or decommissioning of weapon systems. Switzerland, for example, decommissioned anti-personnel mines and cluster munition following accession to the respective international conventions, which was due to a shift in “strategic culture” (understood here as a nation's consensus on when it is appropriate to apply lethal force): this new “culture” demanded the Swiss armed forces to defend the country without these means in the future.
The core matrix further contains the political authorities of a country, the “agencies” in Wight's wording. In most Western countries these are the Parliament, the (executive branch of) Government – in Switzerland called the Federal Council – the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the Defence, i.e. those authorities who decide on the design of the armed forces. These human actors or bodies – which are seen as the direct drivers – are driven themselves by a number of more or less dynamic factors. These are the constituents of the “setting” or “structure” (according to Wight). In reality, the decision-making bodies make use of arguments provided by (parts of) the setting in order to advance their agenda. This methodology discerns eight clusters of dynamic factors that are called the indirect drivers, and are coloured blue:
Defence expenditure (overall and specifically for the branch under review)
Threat perception (of a majority of the electorate as well as decision makers)
Requirements arising from foreign military co-operation
Socio-economic demands as well as political initiatives and/or pressure by the private (economic) sector
“Lessons learned” (one's own or foreign) from training, exercises, and operations
Requirements of military support to civil authorities (primarily domestic) / “CIMIC”
Life span of technological systems, i.e. their – economically sound – duration of operationality
Technological development, i.e. supply of technical systems by defence industry
These indirect drivers can also interact with each other. For example, a changed threat perception obviously triggers socio-economic demands or determines the volume of funds to be spent on defence (see e.g. the “peace dividend” after 1990). Likewise, “lessons learned” in deployments have a bearing on the desire for further foreign co-operation and ensuing armed forces adaptations.
Like the four dimensions of analysis, the eight indirect drivers mentioned above claim to incorporate all conceivable incentives, even though their weight varies according to a nation's constitutional structure and international commitments. Thus, foreign military co-operation has clearly less weight for neutral Switzerland with its modest ambitions in supporting military-backed stability operations overseas, than for a state like Germany, which is deeply integrated in NATO structures and committed to military missions abroad.
As this methodology assumes a fundamental difference between direct and indirect driving forces, it allocates them in different spots in the matrix: Whereas the political and military decision makers (the direct drivers) are placed at the core of the matrix, in particular in the dimension doctrine, the eight dynamic factors, which “push” them (the indirect drivers), are placed at the periphery of the matrix. This is a unique feature of our methodology and distinguishes it from other methods, which tend to lump all factors together.9
Together with the four dimensions of analysis, these eight indirect drivers form the extended matrix (figure 1):
Figure 1. The analysis matrix in abstract form with a time line, four dimensions (centre), including the direct drivers (human actors), and eight indirect drivers of change (dynamic factors) (top and bottom).
The duration of validity of the features has to be displayed by arrows whose colour reflect their current status: Coloured blue are features that are valid up until the present day (vertical black line); features whose end is in sight are dotted until that point in time. Coloured red are features that ceased to exist in the past or will be terminated in the forseeable future (then dotted).
The black arrows are drawn from the “launch point” of a feature to those (out of eight) indirect drivers that presumably triggered the launch or the disappearance of that same feature. To some extent, this is always an analyst's subjective assessment, which often cannot ultimately be clarified, not even by means of intensive scrutiny of primary sources. Since, in reality, several different arguments are used by the political actors in the course of a highly complex – and inherently opaque – decision making process.
The methodology applied to the transformation of the Swiss Air Force, 1990–2022
Hereinafter, the methodology presented above will be explained using the example of (the airborne part of) the Swiss Air Force's development since the end of the Cold War. Besides the Army, the Swiss Air Force was an independent armed service within the Swiss Armed Forces for most of the period. Whereas the different service branches of the Army interact with each other on various levels, the Air Force does so to a much lesser degree. For purposes of a simplified and clear illustration, then, focussing on the development of the Air Force is arguably an optimal means of exhibiting key features of the methodology. It therefore seems reasonable to assess its developments in isolation.
The four dimensions explained
Within the dimension organisation, the structural transformation of the Air Force becomes clearly visible. Towards the end of “Armed Forces 61” the aeronautical component of the Air Force consisted of an air brigade, composed of four task-related air regiments, one for air reconnaissance, air defence, ground combat and air transport, respectively. While the transition to “Armed Forces 95” – apart from the change of name and the dissolution of one air regiment – had no major impact on the organisational structure of the Air Force, more far-reaching adjustments were made within the framework of reform known as “Armed Forces XXI.” The commander of the Air Force was directly subordinated to the Chief of Defence. The airbase commands and the air wings assigned to them replaced the airbase regiments, and the different training branches were subsumed into training units (Lehrverbände). In principle, these structures were also retained in the latest reform, “Development of the Swiss Armed Forces.” Prior to this reform, the Army and the Air Force had been directly subordinated to the Chief of Defence. Through the creation of three separate commands (Operations, Support and Training) in 2018, the former two branches were shifted one level lower in the hierarchy and were both subordinated to Joint Operations Command. The Air Force's Instruction and Training brigade (I&T brigade), which replaced Training Unit 31, was not subordinated to Training Command, but remained an integral part of the Air Force due to the shared systems and resources.10
The various airbases are also listed within the dimension organisation (and not within the dimension equipment) as the airbase regiments or commands responsible for their operation are an essential part of the Air Force's structure. Changing command and control structures and a significant reduction11 in the quantity of airbases in recent decades are the most striking features of transformation.
With the creation of the air traffic control agency, Skyguide, in 2003, the previously separate military and civil parts of air traffic control were brought together in a major reform.
At the highest level of the doctrine dimension, the duties assigned to the armed forces by the Federal Constitution are presented. These were valid for the entire armed forces, including the Swiss Air Force: prevention of war, defence of the country and its population, support of civilian authorities and peace support. The Air Force plays an important role in all areas with its resources. Air defence, as part of national defence, is in fact provided exclusively by the Air Force – which also includes ground-based air defence. The Air Force also plays a central role in peace support operations and in supporting civilian authorities at home and abroad, mainly with air transport assets: among others, there have always been deployments for the police and the border police corps within Switzerland, “semi-permanent” deployments in support of KFOR in Kosovo and EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the 2000s, and short-term (and “one-off”) deployments like the one in Indonesia following the Tsunami of 2004.
Particularly noteworthy for the Air Force is the task of maintaining air sovereignty, which has been enshrined in law since 2018.12 Air sovereignty is the protection of a country's airspace during peacetime. Directly delegated to the Air Force, this task does not fall under the concept of defence, nor is it a subsidiary task in connection with the mandate to support civil authorities. The Air Force uses active (fighter aircraft) and passive (radar surveillance) air policing measures to maintain air sovereignty.
At the level of ordinance, decrees and regulations, the entire range of missions of the Air Force is listed: air defence/counter-air, air sovereignty, air attack/counter-land, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and air mobility. Until the reform “Armed Forces 95,” the main task of the Air Force was to engage in air-to-ground attacks in support of the ground forces and in combatting ground targets.13 In connection with the decommissioning of the Hunter fleet and owing to an extensive doctrinal overhaul in the course of the reform “Armed Forces XXI,” these capabilities were much reduced or became part of a so-called build-up ability (Aufwuchsfähigkeit).14 The aim of this concept was to maintain a minimum level of competence in certain areas. In the event of a serious deterioration of the security situation, the Federal Council and Parliament may take steps to provide the armed forces with capabilities it (still) lacks so that prompt action may be taken to counter an emerging and concrete threat.15
Airborne ISR has undergone a similar change: at which level of war and conflict it can be conducted depends on the sensors and platforms used. This is indicated in the matrix by the parallel red and blue arrows. The Air Force still has airborne ISR capabilities based on the UAV system ADS 95, whose range and ability to react in an area of interest, however, places limits on observation. The capability for tactical-operational air reconnaissance was abandoned with the decommissioning of the Mirage IIIRS at the end of 2003.16
In addition to the existing ordinance on air sovereignty, which regulates the protection of airspace in peacetime, two further sovereign tasks were directly delegated to the Air Force: search and rescue (SAR)17 and the Swiss Federal Government's air transport service (LTDB), which operates the civil aircraft and helicopters of the Swiss government.18 Members of the government and high-ranking officials are authorised to make use of this service.
At the lowest level, the military (executive) regulations specify in detail the duties described in legislation and ordinances. Air-to-air refuelling as part of air mobility and air policing as part of air sovereignty both serve as examples. Air-to-air refuelling of fighter aircraft is one of the capabilities that the Swiss Air Force does not possess. To this end, a memorandum of understanding (MoU) has been concluded with the French Armée de l'air, which has enabled Swiss F/A-18 pilots to train and certify in air-to-air refuelling since 2000.19
Air policing involves the use of air assets to maintain air sovereignty, enforce air traffic regulations and to provide assistance to aircraft in distress. The capability for round-the-clock intervention by armed fighter aircraft (AP24) has been developed over the past few years and is operational since the beginning of 2021. Moreover, helicopters with gunners have been used since 2014 for purposes of air policing against slow flying objects (APOH, air policing by helicopter).
Finally, it should be noted that a seemingly constant task can be subject to a change of form and emphasis during the period under consideration. In the area of air mobility, for example, capabilities have been steadily expanded over the past few decades.20
The dimension equipment comprises, on the one hand, a part of the flying assets and, on the other hand, command support systems. These so-called A-Systems form the core of an operational capability. What is particularly striking is the quantitative decline in weapon systems. However, this is not a statement on their quality. On the contrary, newer systems are considered to be more versatile, require less maintenance and are thus more frequently available for deployment.
As a replacement for the Mirage III S, 34 F/A-18 C/D, equipped with air-to-air missiles (AIM-9x Sidewinder and AIM-120 AMRAAM), were introduced from 1997. The size of the Air force's fighter fleet was reduced considerably with the decommissioning of the Hunter fleet at the end of 1994 and the later liquidation of the Mirage III RS (2003). At the same time, the number of pilots was also lowered and professionalisation ensued.
Capability building took place mainly in the area of air mobility. The acquisition of 15 Super Puma helicopters (1987–1989) and 12 Cougar helicopters (2001) created new capabilities in tactical air transport. Since 2008, 20 EC 635 have been in use as training and transport helicopters, replacing the Alouette III.
The project to replace the ADS 95 drones, the Hermes 900, is still in the implementation phase. In late 2021, the first of the six new drones procured should be operational within Switzerland.
In the area of command support, the airspace surveillance and fighter guidance system was switched from FLORIDA to FLORAKO in 2003, while the mobile radar system TAFLIR has been in use over the entire timeframe. The FLINTE system, which had been used for central operational planning as well as command and control since the beginning of the 1980s, was replaced by a newer command and information system (FIS LW) in 2003.21
In the dimension training, the focus was put on pilot training. In the transition to “Armed Forces XXI,” the military service of prospective pilots was adapted. Under the old system, the candidates completed their basic military training, followed by attendance at a non-commissioned officer and subsequently an officer school, in which they were trained on helicopters and aircraft. That is to say, their officer training was accompanied by military pilot training right up to completion. In the new system, candidates are free to choose the type of branch in which they want to do their initial military service. Pilot training only begins after the successful completion of officer training.
Switzerland has a military militia system that includes all men of conscript age, and subjects them to relatively short basic training before assigning them to a formation, which allows them to refresh and expand their knowledge and skills in periodic courses. This also applies to military pilots. However, since 2004 no militia military pilots have been trained from scratch (for the reasons see below). Only after a certain time as a career officer can a pilot change to militia status. This means that Switzerland still has militia pilots who fly on different air assets and are being deployed in a specified range of operations (e.g. within Switzerland and not in the F/A-18). The prospective military pilots also previously studied aviation at the Zurich University of Applied Science. Since 2017, however, this element has been dropped. Further academic education can now be started as part of demand-oriented career management following pilot training.
The procurement of simulators for the newly introduced main helicopters and aircraft was a turning point in Swiss military training. Emergencies and technical failures could thus be trained in depth and without risks. An additional benefit of simulator training is seen in the saving of expenses (for flight hours) and materiel. Consequently, real air assets can be used over a longer time span.
The creation of favourable conditions for interoperability with foreign armed forces was intensified in the course of the reform project “Armed Forces XXI.”22 Establishing conditions for efficient co-operation with other armed forces is particularly important for the Air Force. On the one hand, multilateral exercises can be used to train skills and check procedures that could not be carried out autonomously. On the other hand, technical equipment, which meets international standards, allows for the exchange of data and communication between different systems.23
The collection of the key features results in figure 2:
Figure 2. The completed analysis matrix, i.e. the transformation of the Swiss Air Force since 1990 with the most important features of its organisation, doctrine, equipment and training.
Causes of the developments
The greatest strength of the methodology is its ability to identify the main drivers that lie behind the key features of transformation. Based on selected examples, the effects of the drivers will be explained and, in individual cases, alternative interpretations will be pointed out (figure 3).
Figure 3. The comprehensive analysis matrix, i.e. the transformation of the Swiss Air Force since 1990 with the most important features (in the four dimensions) plus their respective explanations (drivers)
During the period under review, the total budget of the armed forces decreased from just under CHF 6 billion (1990) to less than CHF 4.9 billion (2019).24 This explains the reduction in the number of systems in use and in personnel across the armed forces. The air force's share of the defence expenditure declined proportionally. The budget is likely to have been the main driver only when a capability was cancelled without replacement, or when one was abandoned despite its military strategic necessity. Thus, the reduction in the number of airbases from initially 25 to 6 operational ones means a concentration and centralisation of resources and a corresponding easing of the burden on the budget. This makes sense in terms of reducing costs and exploiting synergy potentials, but a decentralised allocation of air defence assets would have been favourable in light of military strategic considerations.25 In view of this fact, different options of re-decentralisation are currently being considered.
The liquidation of the Mirage III RS was also mainly based on financial considerations. This is reflected in the fact that the resulting gap in airborne ISR capabilities in a contested airspace was not closed. This capability, however, is to be reestablished within the framework of the project concerning a new fighter aircraft intended to replace the F/A-18 and the F-5 fleets over the next decade.26
In principle, an analysis of threats and security-related challenges precedes any reform of the armed forces. The elaboration of strategies to meet these challenges is the result of a corresponding threat perception by various actors (decision-makers and electorate). Thus, the end of the East–West antagonism resulted in a massive reduction in troops and weapon systems amongst Western European armed forces. Besides structural changes, this also led to doctrinal adjustments. In Switzerland, with the transformation to “Armed Forces 95,” air interdiction (AI) as part of air attack/counter-land, the main task of the Air Force before the reform, was abandoned.27 With the acquisition of the F/A-18, this capability could theoretically have been maintained and further developed. However, due to the greater emphasis on peace-support and military support to civilian authorities among the armed forces’ tasks, the Air Force's primary missions also shifted to air sovereignty and air defence, understood as integrating offensive and defensive counter-air operations to attain and maintain a desired degree of control of national airspace and sufficient protection by neutralising or destroying enemy aircraft and missiles.
A changed perception of potential threats has also led to new forms of missions. Since 9/11 at the latest, air attacks are no longer seen to originate exclusively or necessarily from regular military forces. Now, any of a wide variety of flying platforms poses this potential threat. The role of air policing is to intercept, identify, escort and, if need be, destroy any airborne object. However, fighter aircraft have limited capabilities to intercept, identify and destroy slow flying objects. Thus, helicopters with on-board snipers are being utilised to fulfil this duty. These assets are mainly used for conference protection and within restricted airspace.
Intensified co-operation with foreign armed forces has led to different developments within the Air Force. “Security through co-operation” was the guiding principle of Switzerland's security policy at the beginning of the twenty-first century.28 As a result, the armed forces increasingly relied on co-operation with foreign countries, and, at the same time, created conditions to facilitate this co-operation.29 This affected not only the organisation and the structure of the armed forces, but also its key standards and procedures. A concrete example of an operational procedure that could only be established through co-operation with other armed forces is air-to-air refuelling. The knowledge (trainer and certification) and resources (tanker aircraft) required for this capability have never been fielded in Switzerland. The motivation for training their pilots in air-to-air refuelling is twofold: Firstly, Switzerland can relatively easily build up its own air-to-air refuelling competence if the purchase of their own tankers is decided upon. Secondly, the option is left open to deepen co-operation with friendly states if necessary.
Only the alignment of the organisation and processes with current international standards makes direct bilateral or multilateral co-operation possible.30 Military co-operation with foreign countries is thus the driver for structural adjustments and for enabling interoperability, but also results in a lasting capability to co-operate.
As regards equipment, technological developments in particular are the central driver for change. Furthermore, the procurement of new materiel allows for a diversification of the mission spectrum, which is illustrated by the example of the EC 635.31 Although the predecessor model, the Alouette III, could in principle still have been operated, as is still the case in Austria's Bundesheer, the procurement of a new light transport helicopter made it possible to improve the quality of training, and weather-related restrictions were largely eliminated due to instrument flying capabilities. Moreover, completely new missions have been opened up thanks to appropriate technology, such as the introduction of a drone system for reconnaissance purposes.
The procurement of the F/A-18 must also be viewed from this perspective. The technological developments in the 1980s and 1990s represented a quantum leap. A further upgrading of the Mirage III S to the level of new generation combat aircraft was impossible. Hence, the purchase of the F/A-18 resulted from the operational necessity to have the ability to stand up to equivalent opponents in the future.32 Technological development was thus the driver of innovation in two ways: on the one hand, it was necessary to keep up with a technologically stronger potential opponent; on the other hand, the defence market offered technologically enhanced systems such as the F/A-18.
Technical developments in data processing were also behind the creation of the Air Control and Information System of the Air Force (FIS LW). Thanks to a modular and a network-oriented management structure, numerous processes could be digitised and simplified accordingly.33
In the opinion of the authors, civil–military co-operation is also the driver of characteristics that arise from the synergies between military and non-military authorities. For example, search and rescue in the event of civil aircraft accidents is regulated as a sovereign task in Annex 12 of the Convention of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). In Switzerland, the Federal Office of Civil Aviation is responsible for supervising SAR and the Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC).34 Search operations for civil aviation accidents are delegated to the Air Force, whereas rescue of people is generally carried out by civil helicopter companies.35 This means that private companies and state institutions are deployed together due to their different competencies, which ideally leads to a more efficient execution of a mission.
“Lessons learned” from training and operations have a particular influence on pilot training in the Air Force. With the introduction of the F/A-18 and the Super Puma it was no longer possible to include instruction on these types of advanced aircraft in the basic flight training of prospective military pilots. The complexity of the systems and the demands on the crews led to increased professionalisation.36 The decision not to train militia-only pilots is thus due to the experience gained in the first few years after the introduction of these new main systems.
“Lessons learned” have also led to the adaptation of the “Armed Forces XXI” training syllabus of the Air Force's pilot school. Specifically, as of 2017, a B.A. course in aviation, which previously preceded flight school, was again dropped with the aim of reducing the overall instruction time. Until 2017, future military pilots had to finish their officer training, graduate at university and complete the commercial pilot training at a civil flight school before entering military pilot training programmes. Postponing the academic course to a later stage brings the pilots earlier into a cockpit of an F/A-18 or Super Puma, thereby making them operational over a longer period. This reform also reintroduced the training of prospective military helicopter pilots on the PC-7 to further enhance their flying skills because of the aircraft's usability in aerobatics.
An example of a socio-economic demand that acted as a decisive driver is the creation of a permanent state of readiness for air policing missions. Until a few years ago, intervention with fighter aircraft to detect and document violations of air traffic regulations outside normal office hours was not possible. Policy makers saw no need for around-the-clock Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) capabilities and Swiss airspace was only passively controlled. A motion by a member of the Council of States called on the Federal Council in 2009 to establish a permanent readiness to intervene.37 After the motion was accepted, the Ministry of Defence launched the Air Policing (AP) 24 project, started to hire and train personnel, established processes and created legal foundations. The project was completed only by the end of 2020 and ever since around-the-clock QRA capabilities are in place to deal with renegades or to assist air assets in distress. This example is a good illustration of a competitive situation with threat perception as a possible driver. Following the 9/11 attacks, a majority of Western European states had established or expanded QRA capabilities. A permanent state of readiness was considered to be an adequate means against unforeseeable incidents in the air. In these states, threat perception was therefore a powerful driver. Although considerations to this effect had been made earlier in Switzerland, the eventual, “decisive” trigger for this innovation was the aforementioned motion.
For the Air Force, the end of the life span of technological systems has a selective influence on the equipment. ADS 95, a drone system that was procured in the late 1990s, was operational for about 20 years. However, maintenance work became more frequent and, hence, more costly due to the aging of the system, so that the operational cost exceeded the tactical benefit. Thus, the ADS 95 was taken out of service by the end of 2019 and will be replaced by the Hermes 900 within the next years.
Also important for understanding the further development of the Air Force is the decommissioning of the two fighter aircraft F-5 E/F and F/A-18, which, however, falls outside of the period under consideration. Still used for a very limited range of missions, the F-5 E/F is judged to reach the ultimate end of its life cycle by 2025, and the F/A-18, with a possible extension of its service life, will no longer be usable by 2030 at the latest.38
The driver life span of technological systems often competes with that of technological development. The analysis focuses on whether a discontinued system could in principle have continued to be operated. If a system is replaced by a more efficient means, then a specific technological development may be identified as the key driver. If, however, a system is taken out of service because the cost of operation exceeds the benefits achieved, then it is probably better viewed as being due to the end of its life span. This, of course, remains at the discretion of political and military decision-makers, who also take into account the available financial resources. Thus, contextual considerations determine the relative weight of drivers associated with either technological obsolescence or technological innovation.
Conclusion
This methodology for the transformation of armed forces aims to display and explain the key features of the organisation, doctrine, equipment and training of an entire armed force of a nation or a part of it. The final comprehensive matrix (figure 3) is the end product of a thorough application of the methodology. Selecting the key features and establishing their interaction is demanding and time consuming and requires in-depth knowledge of the topic.
Selecting key features as well as one single “pivotal” (indirect) driver does, of course, simplify reality, but it nonetheless offers a structured point of departure for informed discussions. Ultimately, a highly complex phenomenon like armed forces development cannot be more than approximated.
This novel methodology offers numerous advantages over conventional ways of analysis and description, which are typically narrative and focussed on an often arbitrary selection of prominent features. This holds true for the literature in the field (see footnote 2). We see the advantages of our methodology as follows:
Systematic and transparent analysis
This methodology compels analysts to investigate their object step-by-step and to disclose their assumptions and findings in a transparent way. It requires a clear-cut and detailed account of which single feature of an armed force – out of a theoretically unlimited number – deserves to be considered predominant and in what way it changed over time through interaction with other features.
Overview
The final product of the analysis is presented in the form of a synthesis, i.e. a comprehensive description of the transformation of a part of the armed forces with its most important elements, its dynamics and interdependencies over a specific time period under consideration. The whole period needs to be laid bare and justified as well. Thus, the synthesis becomes a synopsis, which makes the transformation transparent and tangible in that it requires only a single depiction or slide. In this way, the audience cannot merely grasp the “big picture” but also “step back” or look ahead along the time continuum during the presentation. This is a complete departure from a conventional (power point) slide presentation.39
“Snapshots”
The matrix allows the most important features of (a specific part of) the armed forces – their organisation, doctrine, equipment and training – to be traced year by year, within the period under review.
Theoretical basis for historical research
This methodology offers a theoretical foundation for the analysis of armed forces development to historical scholars, who are hardly “over-endowed” with theory.40
A dashboard for defence planners
Finally, our methodology – although it takes a retrospective view – has also something to offer to the defence planners: It allows them to show in a transparent fashion to politicians the deficiencies in the military capabilities (equipment combined with training) that have emerged while simultaneously pointing to the political arguments that have proven useful to overcome them in the past.
To be fair, there are also limits to this methodology: Amongst them is the fact that it has no ambition to judge whether a certain transformation was successful or not. Here, clear yardsticks would also be of crucial importance, as it makes a huge difference whether a specific armed force is measured in terms of the recommendations of its planners, the political decisions that steered its development, the economic cost-effectiveness of the transformation's implementation or the efficiency and effectiveness of that force against a (peer) competitor in an armed conflict. Analysts of armed forces transformation cannot evade a clear statement.
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