Arzan Tarapore, David Brewster
In April 1989 a Time magazine cover story declared that India was “determinedly transforming itself into a regional superpower.” The trends were compelling: India was strenuously building its military, it was already the world’s largest weapons importer, and it was on the cusp of building nuclear weapons. Its military had recently seized control of the Siachen glacier, muscled its way into Sri Lanka, and decisively intervened in Maldives. But New Delhi’s strategic intentions were unclear. Some countries around the Indian Ocean were looking upon this newly brawny India with a degree of unease. “What,” the article asked, “does India intend to do with all that power?”1 Australia was one of those uneasy countries. Even if bilateral relations were cordial, there was significant concern that India’s rapidly growing military power and “disconcerting predisposition to use force” could destabilize the Indian Ocean region.2
The world changed quickly. The end of the Cold War, India’s economic opening, and the emergence of new regional threats—especially Chinese power—clarified not only New Delhi’s strategic preferences but also regional states’ views of the country. The United States, followed in quick order by allies like Australia, brushed aside any lingering qualms and embraced India as a favored strategic partner. India would be particularly important in securing the Indian Ocean, a thoroughfare of globally critical sea lanes. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, speaking on the shores of the Indian Ocean at Chennai in 2011, proclaimed that India was, “with us, a
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