Watching the pictures of Afghans holding on to U.S. aircraft taking off from Kabul makes my heart break. My daughter used the adjective “cruel” which I think is very apt. I personally feel a sense of betrayal and shame. It makes you ask, what was it all for? Did anything good come out of the 20 years we spent there?
If you were a Green Beret in Group between 2001 and 2021, it is highly likely you went to Afghanistan multiple times (the official title is U.S. Army Special Forces and the nickname is the “Green Berets” based on our distinctive head gear). Every active duty and National Guard Group deployed teams there. Afghanistan defined Army Special Forces for two generations. I would argue even more so than Iraq. It was an Special Forces mission to conduct unconventional warfare and counter insurgency.
I personally spent two tours there in 2004-2006. During that time, the Afghanistan mission was secondary to the chaos that was Iraq. It is easy to understand why most Americans do not understand how quickly the country collapsed after 20 years, $2.261 trillion spent, (according to the Brown University’s Watson Institute & Boston University’s Pardee Center, and more importantly 2448 U.S. service members and 3846 contractors killed (“How Many Americans died,” AP, 16 August 21).
Why we failed
As a young Green Beret captain at Naval Postgraduate School when we entered Afghanistan, I was concerned over the U.S. going into the graveyard of empires. I had read “The Bear Went Over the Mountain” and “The Other Side of the Mountain”, two definitive case studies on the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. They were both very sobering reads and one of the key takeaways is how a technologically advanced, well-trained military was defeated by a primitive force in comparison. Those lessons learned were on my mind when we entered Afghanistan and I was ridiculed for my trepidation. After having spent a significant amount of time there as well observing and studying our operations there, I conclude that we failed due to the following reasons: endemic corruption throughout Afghanistan, attempting to implement a Western style centralized government and military on a tribal society, a failure to understand the tribal culture that is Afghanistan, and frankly U.S. arrogance and a culture of spending your way to success.
Anyone who has spent anytime in Afghanistan knows that bribes, graft, and corruption are part of every facet and level of society, the government, and the military. The example that sticks in my head is the graft involved with the transportation of goods to the outlying firebases. The contract provided funds to the contractor to supply fuel, but when the trucks arrived, they were always on empty. The drivers would throw up their hands dramatically and say that they have no idea what happened. We always had wooden yard sticks on hand to measure the true amount of fuel in the vehicle. At the end of the day, the supplies needed to be delivered so we refueled the trucks.
The Afghan National Army (ANA) basic unit was the kandak which are battalion-sized units of up to 600 Soldiers. The official rosters versus the number of Soldiers never came close to matching. I saw a 300 plus Soldier kandak rarely muster more than 150 Soldiers. The rest of the Soldiers not present were paper Soldiers who many times, with the collusion of the unit commander, would sign up for the recruiting bonus, share it with the commander and never show up again. Often these paper Soldiers
would go from kandak to kandak signing up to receive numerous bonuses. Can you imagine fighting a war with units only partially manned, but officially at full capacity? The corruption with pay, food budgets, ammo allocations, etc. started at the top. At every level, leaders would skim all the way down to the kandak. There was always a shortage of pay, food, and ammunition. Knowing that your leaders are stealing from you does not instill loyalty or confidence. The rampant corruption made the entire system rotten to the core and hence the ANA units melting away without a fight. They were an Army in name only. I must add in a caveat, Afghan special forces, CIA forces, and some of the militias that supported U.S. Army Special Forces were the notable exceptions. Many of them fought honorably and were true Afghan patriots.
The structure of Afghanistan is based on tribal allegiance, not allegiance to the province or the national government. The predominant tribe, the Pashtuns, whose area straddled the border with Pakistan are a key example of how difficult it was to foster allegiance to a national idea. It was not uncommon to have a family with members in the army, police, and the Taliban. Add in the fact that the Pashtuns were located in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, one can easily see that outside of their tribe, their allegiances were fluid. This tribalism made it folly to try and build a Western style military based on a strong central control. That is why that, besides Afghan special forces, some of the most effective fighting forces were village militias. Everything was local.
Our attempts to structure the government of Afghanistan based on Western norms also conflicted with the culture. Little things matter and holding meetings in the heat of the afternoon in Afghanistan with Afghan officials is the equivalent of someone holding a regular business meeting in the U.S. during the middle of the night. Due to the extreme afternoon heat, Afghans do not work during the heat of the day, but will go home and sleep. This small cultural ignorance was common place even after 20 years of an American presence. The U.S. military “battle rhythm” was not based on Afghan norms, but a 9 to 5 U.S. business day. Again, the basics matter which is a hallmark of Special Forces.
I always laughed when senior leadership would tout how successful our Afghanistan counterinsurgency efforts were by showing how many regional warlords and power brokers were on our side. To put it bluntly, especially at the beginning of the war, it is because we paid them and they were making money off of us! During the years prior to our entry, tribal leaders would repeatedly switch sides based on the who was the strongest and who paid them the most. In Afghanistan, loyalty and allegiance are available for a price and based on who is the strongest. Once we said we were pulling out, the U.S. was no longer the strongest so of course that house of cards collapsed.
The U.S. attitude towards foreign policy and outreach is that there is no problem that cannot be fixed with more money and resources. That attitude only further deepened the level of corruption throughout the country. The U.S. built countless school buildings that were never used or were subsequently abandoned such as water treatment plants, etc. The Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), designed to provide funds to unit commanders for local projects in many ways just exasperated problems even though the projects were designed with the best intentions.
The American way of war, for most forces, was also not conducive to Afghanistan and a counterinsurgency fight. American military operations are centered on kinetic (use of lethal force) operations. In a counterinsurgency, restraint is key. Unfortunately, besides Army Special Forces, most other U.S. forces, to include other special operations units, would quickly become frustrated with the mundane business of counterinsurgency which involves many hours of idle talk and tea drinking. Middle
of the night raids and large scale operations searching villages with dogs (considered a very unclean animal by Afghan culture), while necessary in many cases, were the frequent cause of much resentment from the Afghan people. On a side note, I had to personally deliver a “solatia payment” (or blood money payment) to the family survivors for a U.S. special operations raid gone horribly wrong in Iraq. These payments were also commonplace in Afghanistan. The end result of the idle talk and rapport building sometimes resulted in less violence and village leaders bringing suspected militants wanted by coalition forces directly to firebases. At a minimum, it served as a force protection measure. The better you know someone, the less likely they are to attack you.
Future
One of the saddest and most ironic likely outcomes of the end of the U.S. mission is that we will be back in some shape form or fashion. Our original mission to keep Afghanistan from being a safe haven for terrorist groups to attack the U.S. was not completed. Al Qaeda still has a robust presence there and ISIS affiliates are still present and operational. According to a August 17, 2021, report from the Congressional Research Service, “Al Qaeda and the Taliban remain closely aligned and show no indication of breaking ties,” furthermore “the Taliban have reportedly freed prisoners, including Al Qaeda members.” Anyone who has fought the Taliban and seen the results of their brutal and violent behavior knows that this current “charm offensive” is just a farce. A review of recent U.S. military withdrawals from unfinished conflicts shows the U.S. returning in Iraq and Somalia. I am not arguing for wars with no end, but completely pulling out when fighting is still ongoing is a recipe for the future loss of more Americans and the expenditure of additional resources.
If you take a step back and look at Afghanistan’s history from Alexander the Great, to the British, to the Soviet Union, and now the U.S., it eventually consumes the national (or empire’s) will to fight and eventually the vanquished return to influence things on the periphery. China is waiting in the wings to gain influence over Afghanistan, especially with the Belt & Road Initiative and a potential oil and gas pipeline from Iran through Afghanistan. The irony is that China will more than likely have to fight a Muslim extremist insurgency in their own backyard, and the U.S. will, in a geopolitical twist of fate, end up backing the Taliban. China shares a 50-mile border with Afghanistan and it buts up against the Xingjiang Province which is the home of the persecuted Muslim Uighurs.
Unintended Consequences
The U.S. withdrawal will lead to a civil war and a return to the endless conflict days of pre-September 11th. Already anti-Taliban forces are gathering in Panjshir province north of Kabul. Two prominent leaders are based there, Afghan Vice President Amrullah Saleh, who declared himself the caretaker president after Ashraf Ghani fled, and Ahmad Massoud, the son of famed rebel fighter, Ahmad Shah Massoud (“What’s Happening in Afghanistan’s Last Anti-Taliban Holdout,” The Week, 17 Aug 2021). Even if the Taliban overrun resistance forces in the Panjshir Valley, Afghanistan has many warlords and fighters who know they under a death sentence if they surrender to the Taliban. The war continues…
The U.S. departure from Afghanistan does not mean an end of U.S. involvement. From being a participant and observer of U.S. foreign policy for the past 30+ years, we will be back in some shape form or fashion. As mentioned previously, the irony is that the U.S. will probably covertly support the Taliban as a counter balance to Chinese influence in the region in the not too distant future.
It goes without saying that American credibility abroad is at low point. In the eyes of our allies who fought alongside us, there is a feeling of abandonment and betrayal. To our competitors and enemies, it is a victory. One of the unintended consequences will likely be a further U.S. step back from the world stage and a diminished moral authority.
Domestically, the U.S. withdrawal is comparable to the post-Vietnam era of a national identity crisis and what does America mean and stand for. The Afghanistan pull out coupled with our already divided nation will require a period of soul searching; especially within our military. It will take time to rebuild trust in our values, institutions, and leaders. Looking through the long lens of U.S. history, these periods of soul searching and “systems shock” to our national psyche seem cyclic and tend to roughly correlate to a decade of healing and reflection. This time feels different. Only time will tell.
One of the saddest outcomes of the chaotic U.S. withdrawal is veterans of Afghanistan will be looked at with pity much like the way Vietnam veterans are viewed. A perceived military defeat changes the way veterans are viewed; from heroes to people who you feel sorry for; participating in a noble, but lost cause. That is the exact opposite of the way veterans want to be treated, but it is a likely outcome from well-intentioned fellow Americans.
Gold Star families, Veterans, & Afghans Who Supported U.S. Efforts
The hardest hit of the different groups actively involved in the Afghanistan War are the Gold Star families who lost loved ones, the veterans who served multiple tours and carry physical and hidden mental scars for the rest of their lives, and the Afghans who bravely supported our efforts and are desperately trying to escape.
My former company operations sergeant and friend, “T”, deployed eight deployments to Afghanistan with a total of six years, 9 months, and 22 days of his life there. He gave up over six years of his life for this cause and suffered wounds that he will carry with him the rest of his time on this planet. I remember telling Afghans who would say to me that “you Americans will do what you always do, cut and run when you lose interest.” I told them that this time it was different, our nation was attacked and we are not going anywhere. Again, a feeling amongst veterans of promises made and promises broken. As a result, “local and national veterans facilities are seeing an increase in the number of veterans seeking mental health treatment,” (“VA seeing increase in mental health service utilization as U.S. leaves Afghanistan, 9/11 anniversary nears,” WCSC News, 19 August 2021). For U.S. and allied Afghan veterans, the fast withdrawal is personal.
The Afghans who supported us, especially the interpreters who lived and fought with U.S. special forces in remote firebases with names like Noway Naray, Chapman Airfield, or Lwara, sacrificed even more than us. Americans serving in Afghanistan knew that our families were safe back in America over 7000 miles away. Afghans working with us did not have that luxury. Their families were under constant threat, because of their affiliation with us. Some Afghans working with American forces wore masks to cover their identity. We owe them and as one American reporter aptly put it, there is an unprecedented “digital Dunkirk” ongoing with American veterans trying everything in their power to get their brothers in arms out of harms way. I foresee a lifetime brotherhood between Green Berets (and other veterans) and the Afghans who served with us similar to the relationship with the Montagnards in Vietnam.
Finally and most importantly, I want to address the service members who have served in Afghanistan and the Gold Star families who lost their fathers, wives, sons, daughters, brothers, and sisters. I run a nonprofit, Special Ops Survivors, that provides long-term assistance to the surviving spouses of U.S. special operators and support personnel across all the services who were killed in combat or training since September 11, 2001. I have heard the anguish and resurfacing of old wounds. I sent our Survivors the following message:
“As I try to make sense of it all, I think of you and your sacrifices. I am sure many of you are asking some of the same questions that have crossed the minds of many veterans. What was it all for? Was it worth it? I will say this much, when you are down range, you are not fighting for the national goals or considering the geopolitical implications, you are thinking about not letting your buddies down. You are thinking about stopping the bad guys overseas so they cannot harm your families back home. You are thinking about bringing honor to your family and how proud they are of you. Also, you are doing it because you love being a U.S. special operations operator, are well trained, and are good at what you do. You work with the best of the best; salt of the earth Americans who want to serve at the tip of the spear.
I do not want to try to rationalize your losses or justify our Afghanistan pullout, I just want you to know that you are not alone. Please reach out to your fellow Survivors and veterans; without being prompted. A lot of us are in pain right now and we need the fellowship and community that the special operations community provides now more than ever.”
Please reach out to Gold Star families and veterans that you know and just check in with them. Do not pity them. We all volunteered and understood what we were getting in to. We are proud of our personal efforts, but this is a very trying time and the best thing you can do is reach out and ask them how they are doing. Provide them an outlet to vent and possibly an activity that gets them out of the house and off of social media.
The U.S. Army Special Forces motto is “De oppresso liber,” to free the oppressed. That is what we went to Afghanistan to do. It was our core mission. As we struggle to process the hasty U.S. withdrawal and see the images of Afghans clinging to a U.S. C17 taxiing down the Kabul Airport runway, Green Berets know we did everything that was asked of us and more. We showed Afghans what right looked like. That is the best I can come up with right now.
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