Benjamin Mainardi
As the United States has come to recognize the twenty-first century as a period of renewed great power competition, geopolitics and geostrategy have seen a major revival in American foreign policy debates as dominant concepts in the discourse. However, the renewed usage of these terms is notable for the absence of any consensus as to what the geo- refers to. All too often, national security policy professionals presume modern technology has obviated the importance of geographic location and physical features. Yet physical geography remains central to national security realities that will only become more severe as competition between great powers of relative parity intensifies. The capability of states positioned within certain geographic regions to rapidly deploy and sustain significant forces within those regions is intrinsically greater than that of a more technologically advanced power projecting itself across a continent or ocean. While a global superpower like the United States is capable of rapidly deploying small forces abroad, the logistical demands of sustaining such a force incurs greater costs and requires greater international acquiescence than that of a state within the same region. Thus, it remains an imperative that the United States cultivate and support regional allies as meaningful security partners, a fact made even more crucial as it enters a new era of great power rivalry.
THE ROOTS OF GEOPOLITICS
Few terms are as poorly understood as geopolitics. Today, the phrase appears in op-eds and policy reports with definitions that swing from simply referring to regional foreign policies to interstate relations at large. A more apt definition emphasizes the physical geography of a region, its effects on actors domestically, and how geography influences interstate interactions.
While writers have long touched on the influences of physical geography, our modern understanding of geopolitics is largely rooted in nineteenth and early-twentieth century debates on interstate relations and grand strategy.[1] In the West, such debates were often influenced by the period’s pseudo-scientific and racist ideologies. Geopolitics’ intellectual poisoning by racist conclusions is prevalent in many contemporary works, perhaps none more notoriously than the idea of the Yellow Peril found throughout many of the period’s most popular works.[2] If one is able to separate the period’s racist conclusions from the fundamental aspects of how physical geography shapes interstate relations, there are some notable implications for modern policy.
MUCH OF WHAT MAHAN AND MACKINDER WROTE WAS FOUNDED ON OBSERVATIONS OF PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY AND ITS EFFECTS ON STATE FORMATION, INTERSTATE RELATIONS, AND ECONOMIC AS WELL AS MILITARY DEVELOPMENT.
There are two figures who loomed large in that discourse, Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Halford J. Mackinder who, in their most notable works on the subject, advocated similar ideas and yet opposing conclusions.[3] Much of what Mahan and Mackinder wrote was founded on observations of physical geography and its effects on state formation, interstate relations, and economic as well as military development.
KEY IDEAS OF MAHAN AND MACKINDER
Mahan’s conception of geopolitics was deeply rooted in his navalism. Global choke points such as the Dardanelles, among others, feature prominently in his works.[4] Mahan regarded Central Asia as the pivotal region of the world from which influence may be exercised on Europe and the coastal areas of Asia.[5] For Mahan and his American contemporaries, this was viewed with great concern given the Russian Empire’s domination of the region. However, Mahan believed Russia’s primacy in Asia could be mitigated by the exercise of American sea power.[6] This conclusion was apt in that the United States, owing to its geographical separation from Afro-Eurasia, could only be directly coerced by continental powers like Russia if they developed sufficient sea power. Moreover, so long as the United States maintained significant naval forces it would likewise be capable of leveraging its sea power to influence events in Afro-Eurasia.
Whereas Mahan emphasized sea power’s dual role in mitigating the power projection capacity of continental states while retaining such capabilities for one’s own, Mackinder advocated a thesis that modern technology would eventually negate the superiority of sea power. According to his understanding, Asia represented the global heartland from which a continental power could exert unparalleled influence on international politics, owing to its central position on the primary Afro-Eurasian landmass.[7] Ideally, this continental power would utilize railroads to extend its access to strategic resources, leading to increased industrial production, and power projection across the pivot area of Central Eurasia. Rejecting the notion that sea power would invariably allow states to mitigate the reach of continental states, Mackinder asserted that should a continental state achieve control of the global heartland of Asia, it would be capable of coercing the sea powers of the United Kingdom and United States into its global order.[8] Mackinder’s hypotheses about the railroad’s ability to sufficiently reduce transportation times within the massive pivot area of Central Eurasia to confer global supremacy were premature, and sea power has retained its primacy.
MAHAN AND MACKINDER’S RELEVANT CONCLUSIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES TODAY
Both Mahan and Mackinder’s works predicted Asia—most notably East, Southeast, and South Asia—as the global center of mass. Roughly 50 percent of the world’s population lives in East, Southeast, and South Asia, primarily in coastal and adjoining areas, and it accounts for over a third of the global economy, depending on the measures one uses.[9] However, in contrast to the hypotheses of Mahan and Mackinder, it is largely the coastal region stretching from East Asia to South Asia that may be considered the pivotal region of the twenty-first century. Indeed, much of the American national security establishment appears cognizant of this geopolitical reality as evidenced by the manner in which recent Indo-Pacific policy has linked the littoral areas spanning the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions.[10]
National security practitioners must recognize that this region will be one of the most important, if not the most important, of the twenty-first century. Accepting this reality, how will the United States be able to sustain a position of strength in international politics as the center of global mass shifts further away from it? Mahan argued just over a century ago that the answer is quite simple: sea power. Indeed, the United States Navy has enabled it to project power onto the Eurasian landmass for decades.
And yet, sea power is no panacea for the limitations of a state’s geographic location. The United States, even though it pretends otherwise, is physically removed from the locus of Indo-Pacific affairs. Indeed, while the United States maintains a significant presence in Asia, the continental United States remains some 5,000 to 7,000 miles away from the First Pacific Island Chain. Nonetheless, the assumption that, owing to the capabilities of modern technology, the United States would be able to immediately and sufficiently respond to a crisis or conflict in the Indo-Pacific is deeply flawed. It is true that the United States Air Force is capable of redeploying some forces virtually anywhere in the world in under twenty-four hours. However, the value of a small rapid response diminishes as the size of a crisis increases. This principle of diminishing value is similarly true for the United States Seventh Fleet, despite its status as the largest of American forward-deployed fleets. When the United States’ chief competitor possesses ever-growing military capabilities and is physically present in the region, is modern technology enough? It is questionable.
A HISTORICAL COUNTERWEIGHT?
Observant students of American military history may recall that the United States possessed a significant forward base in the Philippines prior to the Second World War. American forces in the Philippines and minor Pacific islands proved unable to stem the tide of major Japanese offensives in late 1941 and early 1942. As a result, the significant deployments of American forces in the First Pacific Island Chain were sacrificed for little value in terms of American security. A policy of forward deployments of American forces in the Indo-Pacific today could be criticized by some as a failure to learn the lessons of that war. Should a similarly sweeping offensive, like that of Imperial Japan’s, be launched, are current in-theater forces enough to stop an advance? It is unlikely. It may logically follow that maintaining overseas deployments invariably incurs pointless sunk costs.
M4 Sherman tank in Garapan Lagoon, Saipan (Jason Burns and Michael Krivor/MUA)
There are several key flaws with this line of thought. First and foremost, it presumes that not only is there a state with sufficient capabilities to replicate Imperial Japan’s massive series of operations, but also that there is one that desires to do so. Anxieties over China’s increasing military power are well-founded. However, China has not indicated a desire for the kind of territorial expansion that Japan sought, nor does it sense a potential need for such conquest. Equally notable is the fact that, prior to the outbreak of Second World War, the United States had already ceded the initiative in the Pacific to Japan by deciding it would prioritize the European Theater.[11] In doing so, the potential utility of any forces deployed in the Pacific was undercut. Perhaps most significantly, the United States did not possess the alliance network in 1941 that it does today. America’s numerous allies and partners in the region are increasingly coordinating their security policies with the United States to address shared regional security concerns.[12] It cannot be forgotten that Americans deployed in the Indo-Pacific are not the only military forces in that country and that not every security issue will be at the scale of total war.
REMEMBERING THE LIMITS OF GEOGRAPHY
The submarine tender USS Emory S. Land (AS 39) transits San Francisco Bay. (Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Zachary Grooman/U.S. Navy)
As transportation by sea remains the primary means of shifting manpower and equipment abroad, it is primarily on the U.S. Navy that the burden of an American response to crisis or conflict abroad falls. The fact that, for example, the voyage by ship from San Francisco to the American military base at Okinawa may take anywhere from six to fourteen days is a significant factor in the ability of the United States to influence security shifts in the Indo-Pacific. It is for precisely this reason, contrary to a growing portion of the American public’s sentiments in recent years, that forward basing in allied countries such as Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea are of paramount importance to the United States’ ability to react to and influence regional affairs. This, in turn, serves to enhance the international credibility of American alliances and diplomatic guarantees. Nonetheless, the primacy of American sea power is eroding due to the emergence of China as a major contender in the naval arena as well as political neglect.
Thus—owing to its reliance on the navy as the primary means of maintaining its presence in the Indo-Pacific as well as growing competition for naval supremacy in the region—if the United States wants to retain its ability to influence and respond to events in the Indo-Pacific, it must reinvest in its navy whose force totals have reached a near-century low.[13] Doing so not only bolsters the great power competition capabilities of the United States in the region, but also furthers its ability to deepen security ties with regional partners and fulfill alliance commitments. Moreover, it is through such regional partners that the United States is able to maintain a sustained presence in the Indo-Pacific. In this way, it is essential to American security interests to maintain good relations with regional allies and continue to invest in international relationships.
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