Sajad Jiyad

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There is serious doubt as to whether Iraq’s upcoming parliamentary elections in October will be free and fair, or have any meaningful level of voter turnout, yet the outcome is easy to foresee. Iraqi elections inevitably produce no clear winner: Major parties compete as parts of alliances, and once results are announced, several of these blocs engage in a protracted period of negotiations that yields a fragile ruling coalition. These weak governments, hobbled by political divisions and corruption, are designed to maintain the political elite’s grip on power and protect the system from internal and external pressures. The prime minister, who heads a government of rivals concerned with protecting their own gains at the cost of the state, becomes either a toothless bystander or a willing participant in the game.

At the same time, the prime minister is also the only one who might conceivably change the status quo and force the country onto a new path. Doing so will require striking a grand bargain with all of Iraq’s key external partners, addressing each side’s concerns in return for concessions that serve Iraqi interests. Such a grand bargain will require negotiating with tough partners who are already in a more advantageous position. The next Iraqi prime minister should be prepared for such an undertaking, as it will be one of the last opportunities to turn the country around from its current state of economic decline, insecurity and social unrest.

The most critical deal that must be struck is with Iran. It is common knowledge in Baghdad that Iran is the most powerful and influential actor in Iraq, given its sponsorship of armed groups and associated political parties that have infiltrated the state at all levels. However, successive Iraqi prime ministers have failed to restore balance to a bilateral relationship that is heavily tilted in Tehran’s favor. In part, this is due to Iraqi officials’ lack of understanding of how foreign policy is shaped in Iran. Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi and his predecessors have generally tried to work with the Iranian president’s office or other government agencies, like the Intelligence Ministry, but have run up against the reality that those entities only make up part of the system. In reality, it is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC, the most powerful branch of Iran’s military, that calls the shots in Iraq through its control of armed proxy groups and political entities that carry out attacks on U.S. facilities and enforce pro-Iranian policies. Thus, to achieve anything with Iran, the Iraqi government needs to reach an understanding not only with Iran’s elected government, but also with the IRGC and the office of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, which oversees defense and foreign policy. These are the main pillars of the Islamic Republic’s political system, and a deal with Iran needs to involve an agreement with all three.

Iran’s newly elected president, Ebrahim Raisi, appears fully aligned with the IRGC and Khamenei, presenting a rare opening for Iraq to reach an agreement with all the organs of power in Iran. The deal with Iran should offer two important concessions: the removal of American forces from Iraq and access to Iraqi imports of nonmilitary goods from the U.S. and other nations. In exchange, Tehran would put a stop to its armed proxy groups’ attacks on foreign forces and facilities in Iraq, and cooperate in reining in and disbanding pro-Iranian militias that threaten peace and security in Iraq. This bargain would offer important gains for both sides: Iran would benefit economically at a time when it remains under U.S. sanctions—and is likely to stay that way, at least partially, for the foreseeable future; while Iraq would regain a measure of political autonomy. In fact, Iran should see this as a win-win, given that it faces more risks than rewards from a failing Iraq.

The next prime minister must look beyond his own political fortunes and be bold in trying to strike deals that give Iraq a lifeline and a shot at stability.

A deal with Iraq’s other key external stakeholder, the U.S., may be easier to reach given that a bilateral strategic dialogue is already underway, and President Joe Biden is easier to deal with than his predecessor. Here, again, Iraq should seek mutually agreeable tradeoffs. It will need to obtain the Biden administration’s blessing on withdrawing U.S. troops from Iraq and halting any American air strikes in the country, while securing U.S. approval to allow Iraq to forward imports to Iran. In exchange, Baghdad should offer to prevent Iran from using its territory as a launchpad or transit point for attacking American interests and allies, in addition to rolling back the IRGC’s influence over the Iraqi government and key state facilities and resources. The idea is to give Iraq enough leverage with Iran in order to rebalance that relationship without the risk of it being disrupted by Iran-U.S. tensions playing out in Iraq.

With both of these deals, the end result should be full Iranian and American support for the Iraqi government and the prime minister who leads it after the October elections, assuming they are not postponed. Of course, the government will still need to deal with political rivals within Iraq, but it will be greatly empowered by Iranian and American support. An Iraqi prime minister who has both Tehran and Washington on his side will have a much freer hand to rein in the excesses of the country’s political elites, restoring the state’s primacy and preventing nonstate groups from undermining democratic governance.

One other important external power that Iraq will need to reach a deal with is Turkey. The two neighbors face perennial issues around managing shared water resources, trade, border and customs procedures, and energy pipelines. But agreements will also need to be reached on Turkey’s ongoing military incursions against Kurdish groups active within Iraqi territory, like the Kurdistan Workers’ Party or PKK, in order to prevent an escalating conflict in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region. Turkey may prefer to strike individual deals on all of these separate issues, but for Iraq, there is strategic value in pushing Turkey to accept a package deal that resolves all of them at once.

Without some effort at statesmanship by whoever heads the next government, there is a real risk that Iraq will accelerate its downward spiral and become a repressive failed state. The political elites, who use hard power to dominate their respective territories and plunder state resources, are either unwilling to compromise and allow gradual reforms or incapable of doing so. The next prime minister, though he will come out of a deal struck by this same corrupt elite, must look beyond his own political fortunes and be bold in trying to strike deals that give Iraq a lifeline and a shot at stability. Without such an attempt, Iraq’s state will become meaningless and, in time, the ruling system will collapse violently. Therefore, reaching comprehensive agreements with the external powers that control Iraq is a matter of self-preservation.