Jamie Shea and Michael John Williams
NATO is a political-military alliance, but the political element has been lost in recent years, frustrating those such as the NATO 2030 Reflection Group who argue that the Alliance should be the premier forum for transatlantic policy coordination and crisis management. The Biden administration has a unique opportunity to reset NATO and take up the Reflection Group’s recommendations.
Why has NATO failed to be an effective political forum and what signs need to emerge from this week’s summit that NATO is making progress toward political effectiveness? There are six core areas to watch over the next eighteen months.
1. A coherent political-military strategy toward China
China presents the most pressing threat to the international system as we know it. With 1.3 billion people and an economy of nearly $16 trillion, China is a juggernaut that does not accept settled international norms (and laws) such as freedom of the seas and has very different ideas about human rights. The scale and scope of Chinese ambition, coupled with the reality that China is a major trading partner for many allies, complicates matters. Europe, for its part, has prevaricated on the matter but is finally starting to see the nature of the Chinese challenge. Coming out of the summit, where NATO for the first time took on the “challenge” of China in its communiqué, the Alliance must balance Russia—which remains a threat—with a new focus on Asia aimed at building modernized Indo-Pacific partnerships. China should be top of mind throughout all Alliance structures and a regular discussion point in all high-level meetings. The goal is a comprehensive political strategy that accounts for China being the world’s dominant economic power within a decade.
2. A renewed focus on arms control, both nuclear and conventional
NATO needs to get back in the nonproliferation and arms-control business that it used to do so well. Russia has repeatedly violated the letter of agreements and continues the development of new, ungoverned technologies as well as a total nuclear modernization—all in all a serious threat to NATO. China is also modernizing and expanding nuclear and conventional assets. The Alliance must continue to pursue its historic approach to arms control—a dual track of robust deterrence coupled with risk-reduction efforts. Progress in this area would allow NATO to return as the premier space for arms-control discussions, allowing for pan-alliance input. In line with the Reflection Group report, the Alliance should create a distinguished historical inquiry group to review NATO’s past approach to nuclear deterrence and détente and establish best practices going forward. The Alliance should confirm its adherence to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons while renewing nuclear-sharing agreements. On the public front, NATO should work with the expert community on outreach to inform public opinion about the need for NATO nuclear deterrence in the face of political interference that will (wrongly) attempt to paint NATO as the aggressor. The Alliance should push for reengagement with Russia but, following on the discussions above, should work to include China in all new arms agreements.
3. A more operational EU-NATO relationship
On paper, relations between NATO and the European Union (EU) seem to have progressed well. Joint declarations signed in 2016 and 2018 emphasize more productive relations and lay the groundwork for cooperation. But the working relationship has been less than ideal. After the political agreements are inked, implementation is lackluster and often left to lower-level staff, when political heavyweights dedicated to a better EU-NATO relationship are required to steer the ship to harbor. EU-NATO conflict and consternation were evident throughout operations in Afghanistan, for example. European leaders seem receptive to the idea of more collaboration, and for the first time in decades there is a dedicated trans-Atlanticist in the White House. The time is ripe to elevate this agenda. Renewal would include unequivocal support for European defense capacity that strengthens NATO and leads to more equitable burden-sharing, institutionalization of staff links through exchanges and partnership, and implementation of secure data-sharing, as well as a high-level panel to implement military deconfliction and reduce duplication of efforts. Finally, the renewal of the EU-US relationship should put a strong emphasis on resilience. As recent attacks against the United States demonstrate, NATO and the EU need to have the capacity to reduce the negative impacts of attacks, restore service, and improve strategies to counter cyberattacks from both state and non-state actors.
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