David Axe
Twenty-five years after the U.S. Navy steamed two aircraft carriers near Taiwan to deter a possible Chinese attack on the island country, there’s good news and bad for Taiwan.
The good news is that, despite hot rhetoric and frequent overt displays of military aggression, Chinese leaders seem to be happy with the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan functionally is independent, but Taiwanese officials carefully avoid saying as much.
The Chinese Communist Party meanwhile insists it’s within its rights to enforce Chinese “unity,” but the Party at the same time maintains an elaborate fiction that the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China in fact already comprise a single state.
The bad news is that there are few constraints on China when it comes to Taiwan. If Taipei were formally to declare independence, or if the CCP decided its unity fiction were losing credibility, then the Chinese People’s Liberation Army could invade—and possibly win.
Those are the main conclusions of a new assessment by RAND, a California think-tank with close ties to the U.S. military. RAND’s experts rated U.S. deterrence efforts in two conflicts—the Koreas and China-Taiwan.
On the Korean Peninsula, the United States and South Korea together have successfully deterred a North Korean attack. This deterrence is strong and holding thanks to South Korea’s growing military might and clear and consistence expressions of support from American officials.
The situation across the Taiwan Strait is quite different. “Many of the variables governing capability, commitment and national will appear to have degraded over the past two decades, leaving only China’s motivations as the major barrier to a seriously imperiled deterrence posture,” RAND explained.
In other words, it’s up to the CCP whether and when the Taiwan issue gets settled in combat.
Which is not to say war is inevitable, RAND noted. “As long as China continues to prioritize other pressing concerns, such as economic transformation, over unification—and continues to believe that peaceful methods could succeed—the uncertain risks and costs of war could prove a daunting enough reason for Beijing to avoid military aggression to compel unification.”
The deterrence equation has changed a lot in a quarter-century. In the run-up to Taiwan’s 1996 presidential election, China mobilized troops and fired missiles into the waters surrounding the PRC.
The U.S. Navy responded with one of its biggest peacetime shows of force since the Vietnam War. Two aircraft carriers and an amphibious assault ship plus their escorts sailed near Taiwan—a reminder that the United States could intervene at will to end a Chinese invasion attempt.
The ‘96 crisis motivated the CCP to embark on a far-reaching military modernization effort. Chine’s explosive economic growth sustained the top-to-bottom transformation of the PLA into a modern force. Today the Chinese navy, air force and army are among the biggest and most sophisticated in the world. And they train for one main mission—capturing Taiwan.
Meanwhile, Taiwan’s own armed forces are shrinking and aging as the cost of defending the island exceeds what Taipei realistically can afford.
China’s rise as a military power has changed the strategic math in Washington, D.C. “As the potential costs and risks of a military intervention on Taiwan’s behalf climb, experts have begun to raise fresh questions about the wisdom and feasibility of an implied U.S. security commitment to the island,” RAND explained.
It undoubtedly is becoming potentially more costly for the United States to go to war on behalf of Taiwan. But the cost of not going to war is rising, too. “Asian countries monitor how the United States handles its commitments when deciding whether to prioritize relations with Washington or Beijing,” according to RAND.
“Perceptions that the United States cannot or will not honor its commitment could spur countries in the region to doubt the wisdom of forging closer ties with the United States. As China and the United States step up their competition for leadership in Asia, the strategic importance of credibility could increase in value for both countries.”
All that is to say, the United States might fight—and fight hard—to defend Taiwan. But U.S. leaders obviously prefer the peaceful status quo.
Preserving that peace requires the Americans to strike a delicate balance. “Commentators have widely noted that the United States has adopted a deliberate policy of inconsistency and ambiguity as a way to restrain both Taiwan and China,” RAND explained.
“U.S. officials have generally hinted that U.S. military assistance to Taiwan would be conditioned on unprovoked Chinese aggression and, even then, would be employed primarily to enable Taiwan’s defense; at the same time, officials have emphasized that rash actions to promote Taiwan independence may not merit U.S. military backing.”
“Although this broad policy has generally remained consistent, U.S. officials have not clarified how Washington might respond to Chinese military coercive actions that fall below the threshold of unprovoked military attack.”
That ambiguity makes it difficult to say for sure just how safe Taiwan is right now. “The Chinese gains in military modernization, the continued atrophy of Taiwan’s military capabilities and uncertainty about the U.S. willingness to carry out military operations to fulfill its political commitments provide Beijing with growing reason to doubt the credibility of the U.S. deterrence message,” RAND’s experts wrote.
“However, strengthening U.S.-Taiwanese ties, especially under [former] president [Donald] Trump, raises the political credibility of U.S. commitments to the island. Beijing accordingly cannot be absolutely confident of the U.S. response to a potential contingency, and any miscalculation could therefore prove disastrous if the PLA is unprepared to fight U.S. forces.”
“Moreover, given the PLA’s inexperience and the high risks involved in any major war to subjugate Taiwan, a Chinese military attack to compel reunification would remain a high-risk endeavor.”
“Our overall assessment is that the deterrence posture is mixed,” RAND concluded, “but it seems to be weakening.”
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