By Siegfried O. Wolf
Pakistan is in the process of realigning its foreign policy parameters. Since last year, it became clear that Islamabad is trying to achieve more independence from Saudi Arabia in order to enlarge the room for collaboration with Iran.[1] Currently, in a second major move to change the paradigm in its foreign affairs, Pakistan is envisaging a fundamental reset of its relations with the U.S. Islamabad now expresses its interests in an engaged cooperation with Washington. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi is convinced that there is (still) a ‘convergence of interests’[2] between his country and the U.S. However, Pakistan does not want to be seen anymore solely through the ‘Afghan lens’[3]. Islamabad wishes Afghanistan to cease “exclusively” determining the framework of future collaboration between Islamabad and Washington. Instead, the Pakistani leadership aims to focus on economics, trade, and other investments, particularly within the larger framework of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor/CPEC (Wolf, 2019).
Besides the Afghan issue, Islamabad also wills the U.S. to ‘de-couple’ Pakistan-China relations from Pakistan-U.S. ties. Qureshi stated that the U.S. should not see ties between Islamabad and Beijing as ‘a zero-sum game’. In an interview with Al Jazeera, Prime Minister Imran Khan pointed out: ‘why does it have to be an “either, or” formula’; ‘why does Pakistan have to be in any camp?’ Further: ‘Every country looks to its own interests. Why can’t we have good relations with everyone?’ Moreover, Pakistan offered to serve as a mediator between the US and China (creating some kind of a déjà vu moment relating to 1972[4]). Nevertheless, despite the attempts to follow a “dual-trac approach”, the PM made his country’s preference clear: ‘Our relationship with China is better than ever before. For us, the way we look at it is…our future, economic future is now linked with China.’
This envisaged reset of relations with the U.S. raises questions regarding implications for Pakistan’s approach towards Afghanistan – and regarding what the U.S. can expect from Islamabad in terms of the Afghan peace negotiations (APN). During the last months it has become obvious that Islamabad considers a redefinition of its role in the APN – which could have an impact on the nature of Pakistan’s overall support for U.S. peace efforts in Afghanistan. Islamabad perhaps sees its main function (vis-à-vis the U.S./NATO) in Afghanistan as accomplished[5]: it facilitated peace talks between the Taliban and the U.S., resulting in the signing of a peace agreement in February 2020. Additionally, Pakistan played a key role in bringing the Taliban to the negotiation table with the Afghan government, launching the Afghan Peace Negotiations (APN/Doha process). In other words, the Pakistani leadership is of the opinion that it did the ‘maximum’ it could do for the Doha process. From now on Islamabad does not want to be attached to ‘unrealistic expectations’. Instead, the U.S. needs to talk directly with the Taliban regarding issues of compliance with the February 2020 deal. Pakistan’s contributions to these processes were internationally recognized and the country received much credit for it.[6] Islamabad thus achieved some major, immediate foreign policy goals (breaking out of diplomatic isolation; achieving international reputation and improvement of regional standing, achieving leverage within Afghanistan) through its engagement in the APN. Pakistan’s subsequent engagement in the APN will likely reveal less determination than before when it comes to convincing the Taliban to comply with the 2020 agreement with the US and negotiate earnestly with the Afghan government. In other words, Pakistan does not feel further obliged (at least not with the previous dedication) to support the APN, especially not as a basis for future PAK-US relations – as was expected from former administrations in Washington.
Furthermore, Pakistan’s armed forces and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) will probably proceed with their military assistance to insurgents and various terror groups in Afghanistan.[7] This will be flanked by the continuation of Pakistan’s political and diplomatic support to the Taliban. As concerns the future of a foreign military presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan insists that all sides must remain committed to the peace process/APN – including a U.S. withdrawal scheduled as agreed in the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement, thus respecting the May 1 deadline. Nevertheless, ‘Pakistan is not averse to the idea of US-led international forces extending their stay in Afghanistan until a political deal is reached through intra-Afghan talks’. An official of the Pakistani army stated in an interview after a meeting on February 19, 2021 between the Pakistani Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Qamar Javed Bajwa and General Frank McKenzie, Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM): ‘Pakistan’s military leaders “would not be unhappy” if the United States extended its departure date’ – ‘there has to be a responsible withdrawal’, ‘rather than a chaotic pullout’. However, besides emphasizing that Pakistan ‘would welcome a postponement of the departure of foreign forces in Afghanistan’, the same Pakistani military official (who spoke under the condition of anonymity) also stressed that such a delay in a U.S./NATO troop pull-out ‘should be negotiated with the Taliban in order to avoid a relaunch of conflict’.
At the moment, it remains unclear how the new Biden administration will handle the upcoming challenges in Afghanistan in general and the “staying, delaying or leaving” puzzle in particular. However, after observing the latest statements by U.S. officials, it seems that Washington plans to follow the entrenched patterns of the past: ‘embracing Pakistan’ and setting aside the bitterness of the country’s involvement in undermining the war and peace efforts of the U.S./NATO in Afghanistan in order to convince the Pakistani leadership to support U.S. interests in said Afghanistan. It is interesting to recall that Biden indicated during his presidential campaign that he wills a stronger role by Pakistan in ending the war in Afghanistan[8], obviously including a ‘military dimension’, namely the provision of bases within Pakistan for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. Biden stated: ‘We can prevent the United States from being the victim of terror coming out of Afghanistan by providing for bases – insist the Pakistanis provide bases for us to air lift from and to move against what we know.’ The observation of comments by U.S. officials suggests that this option is still circulating among some U.S. security circles.[9] U.S. Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin described Pakistan as an ‘essential partner in any peace process in Afghanistan’[10] and suggested that military-to-military ties should be improved.[11] However, Biden’s comment regarding a potential “Pakistan option” for the U.S. military was rejected by Pakistani officials at that time. It remains highly unlikely that Pakistan changes its views and becomes willing to serve as a host country for a U.S. military presence conducting counterterrorism and counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan.
Islamabad will continue to engage with the U.S. in both Afghanistan and the APN. However, Pakistan now wants to focus on a ‘economic security paradigm’. In other words, Pakistan aims to establish itself as the new connectivity hub in the region and wants to offer the U S ‘economic bases, not military bases’. Special Advisor to the Prime Minister (SAPM) Yusuf stressed that Pakistan wants to ensure that relations between Islamabad and Washington ‘are not clouded by hyphenating the relationship with US policy towards other countries in the region’. Instead, as stated by Qureshi, ‘They [the US] should come, compete and invest’ – an obvious reference to China. As such, Pakistani officials and experts are calling for a complete ‘reset’ of ties with the US based on ‘fresh conversations’ beyond Afghanistan and on the ‘geostrategic salience of Pakistan’.
In sum, the envisaged disentanglement of Pakistan-U.S. ties from Pakistan-China relations seems improbable considering the persistently growing leverage by China both in Pakistan and in the extended Afghanistan-Pakistan area. Moreover, the rapidly growing defence collaboration between Islamabad and Beijing cannot be ignored by the U.S. due to its impacts on Pakistan’s neighbours, foremost India and Iran and their respective Afghan policies. Moreover, after considering the multitude of existential challenges Afghanistan and the extended South Asian region are facing, a complete reset of relations between Pakistan and the U.S. ( a will to rebuild these along predominantly economic lines) can be described as a “visionary endeavour” at best.
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