Prof. em. Marvin G. Weinbaum and Dr Shanthie Mariet D’Souza
While mindful of the looming obstacles, most Afghans along with much of the international community continue to place their faith in the eventual success of the current peace process. Understanding military victory over the Taliban to be unachievable and repelled by the idea of unending warfare, they have placed their faith in diplomacy. The hope is that the Taliban, conscious of the difficulties in achieving an outright military victory, will be ready to sign a political deal once it has extracted enough concessions. Ultimately, the Taliban is conceived of as a transactional actor. That ideology rather than pragmatism might dominate Taliban thinking is conveniently dismissed. Hardly surprisingly, then, little attention is given to what might follow should the current peace talks prove fruitless. Negotiations could very well drag on unproductively for many more months, even extend to years, and at any point in time collapse entirely. Despite the agonizingly slow progress, both sides for their separate reasons appear for now hesitant to quit the negotiations. But Taliban reluctance could quickly vanish should a Biden administration declare its intention to retain a residual counterterrorism troop presence in the country beyond April.
A Taliban spokesman has publicly stated that anything less than a full U.S. withdrawal is a deal breaker. And with the level of violence in the country continuing to rise, the Kabul government may soon find it politically too costly to remain in the talks. For whatever reason the negotiations might break down, the reactions among a disillusioned Afghan public, a disunited political elite, and sorely disappointed international community could well determine the future of the Ashraf Ghani government and of Afghanistan’s Islamic Republic. In the wake of failed peace negotiations, the government can be expected to express its confidence in the country’s ability to soldier on.
It would insist on the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) being capable of defending the state, even in face of almost certain increased Taliban attacks of greater scope and intensity. Afghan forces have for some time conducted ground operations independently and have slowly grown an air force instrumental in keeping major population centers out of the hands of the militants. But even with uninterrupted American financial assistance to the ANDSF, the departure of most or all foreign troops and private contractors, and especially the loss of U.S. tactical air support will test the Afghan military’s mettle and morale. It could serve as a strong accelerant to an already high rate of military desertions that leads to an unraveling of the Afghan security forces. The transfer by deserters of their equipment and training to various militias countrywide could ignite a messy, more destructive civil war.
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