Indian Strategic Studies: 10/13/20

13 October 2020

India, Japan finalize cyber security pact

Elizabeth Roche

NEW DELHI: Weeks after India and Japan concluded a logistics support pact, aimed at closer cooperation between their militaries, the two countries on Wednesday said they had finalized a cyber security deal as both agreed on the need for robust and resilient digital and cyber systems.

A joint statement after the 13 round of the India-Japan strategic dialogue in Tokyo on Wednesday also said the foreign ministers of the two countries – S Jaishankar of India and Motegi Toshimitsu of Japan – were of the view that a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific region “must be premised on diversified and resilient supply chains."

In this context, the two ministers “welcomed the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative between India, Japan, Australia and other like-minded countries." The initiative comes in the context of countries looking to diversify supply chains out of China after Beijing abruptly closed factories and units in the aftermath of the covid-19 pandemic erupting there, sending economic activity into a tailspin across the world. The move threw up the question of reliability of supply chains based in China with countries looking to broaden the sources for critical procurements. In September, the trade ministers of India, Australia, and Japan had agreed to launch an initiative on supply chain resilience.

Why the Quad Is the One Alliance Trump Cares About

BY RAVI AGRAWAL

Today: What to make of the Australia-India-Japan-U.S. Quad meetings in Tokyo, Pakistani police file sedition charges against Nawaz Sharif, Amnesty International closes shop in India, and the World Bank predicts South Asia’s “worst-ever” recession.

Why Pompeo Kept His Meeting With the Quad

Despite the turmoil at the White House after the U.S. president and several top aides tested positive for the coronavirus, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made time this week to travel to Tokyo to meet his three counterparts from the so-called Quad, the rebranded security dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States.

At the start of the meeting on Tuesday, Pompeo called on the group to collaborate against what he called Beijing’s “exploitation, coercion, and corruption.” Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar was more diplomatic in underscoring the group’s differences with China, saying the Quad is composed of “vibrant and pluralistic democracies with shared values.”

Indians and Central Asians Are the New Face of the Islamic State

BY RAFFAELLO PANTUCCI

As white nationalists across the world have gained prominence through racist, Islamophobic and anti-Semitic acts, the world’s focus on terrorism seems to have shifted. Many experts on extremism now focus heavily on the far-right in its many incarnations as an important driver of terrorist threat. But this myopic approach ignores the dynamism that the Islamic State injected into the international jihadist movement, and the long-term repercussions of the networks it built. In particular, the Indian and Central Asian linkages that the group fostered are already having repercussions beyond the region.

This threat emerged most recently with the attack by the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) on Jalalabad prison in early August. The attack showed a level of ambition that distinguished the group from many of the Islamic State’s other regional affiliates. Part of a bigger global push to do something about colleagues rotting in prisons, it was also a way of signaling how the group’s approach to freeing its prisoners differed from the Taliban’s. In ISKP’s eyes, the Taliban are in essence surrendering in their peace negotiations with the U.S. government. But the most interesting aspect of the attack was the roster of fighters involved—a multinational group that included Afghans, Indians, Tajiks, and Pakistanis.

While at first glance this seems unsurprising, the presence of Central Asians and Indians in transnational attacks is a relatively new phenomenon that reflects a shifting pattern in jihadism linked to the Islamic State. Some of the group’s most dramatic attacks—like the Easter 2019 Sri Lanka bombings, the attack on a Turkish nightclub on New Year’s Eve 2017, or the 2017 truck attacks in New York City and Stockholm—revealed jihadism’s persistent appeal to a global audience. Indeed, the rise of Central and South Asian cohorts to the front rank of attack planning is a development with potentially worrying consequences.

India Needs a Digital Lawfare Strategy to Counter China

By Arindrajit Basu and Gurshabad Grover

In September, following renewed tensions at the Sino-Indian border, the Indian government banned 118 Chinese apps, including gaming sensation PUBG. This followed the ban of 59 Chinese apps in late June after the Galwan Valley clash between the two armies. A slew of other restrictions on Chinese technological inroads into India have been ordered, such as a changing stance on Huawei’s participation in 5G trials, and a press note that placed cumbersome restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI) from China. On October 4, 2020, Beijing hit back against the FDI restrictions and app ban at the World Trade Organization, accusing India of discriminatory behavior against China.

Excessive economic or technological dependence on a hostile neighbor limits the spectrum of strategic choices available to New Delhi. While these measures, proclaimed as ”digital strikes” by India’s IT Minister Ravi Shankar Prasad, form part of a consequent decoupling strategy, they need to be firmly grounded in both the legal and constitutional tenets which form the bedrock of Indian society and the universally accepted standards of international law.

Banning apps

China Brazenly Issues Taiwan Guidelines for Indian Media

By Abhijnan Rej

China’s increasing heavy-handedness toward international media, both on its soil as well as in other countries, is now, unfortunately, firmly part of its global image. The Indian media got a small taste of it yesterday when a so-called letter from the press section in the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi was circulated via social media and email, presenting “guidelines” for Indian outlets on how to cover Taiwan’s upcoming October 10 National Day. The eyebrow-raising move apparently came after a few Indian media outlets carried “advertorials” about it.

Demanding that it “stick to Indian government’s position on Taiwan question and do not violate the One-China principle,” the letter went on to add – astonishingly enough – “Taiwan shall not be referred to as a ‘country(nation)’ or ‘Republic of China’ or the leader of China’s Taiwan region as ‘President.'” As if that was not enough, the embassy made clear that non-compliance would come at a cost. By closing with “We are willing to maintain communication with media friends,” the implication was clear: ignoring the diktat could potentially mean losing access to the Chinese Embassy.

Soon after the letter was shared by an Indian journalist on Twitter, a tweet signed off by Republic of China’s Foreign Minister Joseph Wu shot back, noting that “…it looks like communist #China is hoping to march into the subcontinent by imposing censorship. #Taiwan’s Indian friends will have one reply: GET LOST!” Earlier this year, in May, two ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) members of parliament had sent congratulatory messages to President Tsai Ing-wen on her re-election, noting in a joint statement that “India and Taiwan are democratic countries, bonded by shared values of freedom, democracy and respect for human rights.”

Building the Next Generation of Chinese Military Leaders

By Roderick Lee

How does the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) People’s Liberation Army (PLA) treat senior military leadership development? This article answers this question by looking at what the PLA views as a good leader, how it develops such leaders, and when the new generation of PLA leaders will emerge.

But why does it matter? US Department of Defense operational concepts such as joint all-domain operations, multi-domain operations, and distributed maritime operations require our joint force to execute harder, better, and faster than our opponents. However, our opponents, namely China, are not static forces. China is also trying to build a military “system of systems” that will execute harder, better, and faster than ours. It is relatively easy to observe and measure how different hardware components of the PLA function. Measuring how the “software”1 functions is a more difficult but equally important part of determining how well the system as a whole will operate. The leaders of the PLA are in some ways the operating systems of the PLA as a whole.

While we do not have access to canonical literature discussing the specific question of “How the PLA views senior leadership development,” we can extrapolate themes based on publicly available, native-language literature written by the PLA on the subjects of command and leadership. In an effort to break down the aforementioned question into more tractable terms, we look at the following three subquestions:

1. What does the PLA view as a good leader?

2. How does the organization develop such leaders?

3. When will these leaders show up?

Takshashila Discussion Document – BRI in the Post-COVID World: Risks and Responses

BY MANOJ KEWALRAMANI AND GUEST POST TAKSHASHILA

This document provides an assessment of China’s changing approach towards the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) amid the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic’s impact on China’s and the world economy along with the intensification of geopolitical tensions between China and the US have amplified certain pre-existing risks while also creating some opportunities. In response, the Chinese government has gradually begun to shift its approach to BRI, readjusting its priorities.

Going ahead, the progress of BRI will encounter significant hurdles. Economic recovery within China and among BRI partner states is likely to be a gradual process. The pace of project resumption can be expected to stabilise by late 2021, contingent on fresh outbreaks of infections and the pace of vaccination. Consequently, Beijing is likely to remain much more discerning with its investments. At the same time, one can expect Beijing to prioritise BRI partner states for vaccine distribution and extend loans for the procurement of doses as part of the Health Silk Road. Finally, Sino-US competition is unlikely to abate even if there is a change in leadership in Washington in November. This implies that geopolitical and technology risks for BRI will remain high in the near future.

A Coming Decade of Arab Decisions

Marwan Muasher, Maha Yahya

The coronavirus pandemic is the fourth major crisis to hit the Arab region in a decade. The first three—the 2011 Arab uprisings, the 2014–2016 decline in oil prices, and the 2019 protests in Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Sudan—shook the foundations of the old Arab order. This latest crisis may yet put the final nail in the old order’s coffin.

The pandemic has brought into sharp focus the structural inequalities afflicting the rentier economies of the Middle East and North Africa. It is also compounding problems in conflict-affected countries, where political and military actors are weaponizing the public health emergency. Amid the global economic downturn, inequalities in health, education, and economic opportunity will pose even greater difficulties for Arab states and may trigger significant upheavals. A transition to stability and prosperity requires the region’s leaders to respond to the pandemic’s fallout, as well as future economic shocks, through inclusive policies that ensure equity and equality among citizens.

The central question is not whether the old Arab order, based largely on authoritarian governments and rentier economies, can survive the pandemic. It’s whether Arab leaders will finally make the policy decisions necessary to get ahead of an inevitable wave of change or, once again, allow it to swallow up their governments and their people.

THE OLD ARAB ORDER IS DEAD

A Weak Economy Won’t Stop Turkey’s Activist Foreign Policy

BY SINAN ULGEN

Since the resumption of hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh last week between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Ankara’s rhetoric has differed dramatically from that of the rest of the international community. The United Nations, the European Union, and even Russia and Iran have called for a cease-fire. Turkey, on the other hand, expressed unequivocal support for Azerbaijan, and said that without a sustainable solution, a cease-fire is meaningless.

The government’s statement underlined that Turkey would fully support Azerbaijan with unwavering solidarity and “stand by Azerbaijan whichever way it prefers.” Turkey’s stance illustrates a broader change in Turkish foreign policy that is driven by lost trust in international diplomacy, a greater willingness to get directly involved in regional conflicts with a view to acquiring relevance and influence, and an urge to capitalize on the domestic popularity of these moves.

Turkey’s position on Nagorno-Karabakh can firstly be explained by the close emotional and identity ties linking Turkey and Azerbaijan. Turks and Azerbaijanis speak closely related languages and consider themselves part of a greater Turkic family extending all the way to Central Asia. In addition, Turkey has been firm in its criticism of the international community’s stance.

Jamestown Foundation

China Brief, September 16, 2020, v. 20, no

The China-U.S. Exchange Foundation and United Front “Lobbying Laundering” in American Politics

Examining China’s Organ Transplantation System: The Nexus of Security, Medicine, and Predation / Part 3:China’s United Front Tactics in Managing the Narrative on Organ Trafficking

The Role of Coopted Diaspora Groups in Czech and European United Front Work

The CCP’s United Front Network in Sweden: “Harmonious Diaspora Associations” and Strange Political Bedfellows

Putting Money in the Party’s Mouth: How China Mobilizes Funding for United Front Work

These are the world’s best universities right now

Douglas Broom

Oxford has been named the world’s best university for the fifth consecutive year. But the latest rankings show that it’s China's universities that are the rising stars of global higher education.

Tsinghua University enters the coveted top 20 of the Times Higher Education World University Rankings this year, a distinction previously only bestowed on European and US institutions.

Six of the world’s top 100 global universities are from China – double the number in the previous year – while all but one of the country’s top 20 institutions have either bettered or maintained their 2020 rankings.

Everything You Think About the Geopolitics of Climate Change Is Wrong

BY JASON BORDOFF

Signs that the energy transition is picking up speed abound. One of the world’s largest oil companies, BP, recently projected oil demand may be close to peaking. The governor of California just signed an executive order to ban the sale of new gasoline-fueled cars by 2035. China, responsible for more than one-quarter of the world’s carbon emissions, pledged to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. And public polling shows a rising sense of urgency about the climate threat, galvanized by raging California wildfires and severe U.S. Gulf Coast hurricanes.

Transforming an industry that has defined the modern era will have profound consequences on the global order. China will rise and petrostates will fall—or so says conventional wisdom. In reality, the geopolitical fallout of a clean energy transition will be far more subtle, complex, and counterintuitive. Many of today’s predictions are likely to turn out wrong, or will take decades to unfold in unpredictable ways. If policymakers don’t get a clear-eyed understanding of how global power relations will change—not only in a future era of zero-carbon energy, but during the long and messy transition to get there—they won’t be able to manage the coming era of foreign-policy risks, and their efforts to combat climate change will be stymied.

Could Biden Rebuild the Economy by Funding Green Energy?

LET’S SUPPOSE AMERICANS choose Joe Biden to replace Donald Trump as president. (And also that the world doesn’t end sometime in the next month.) What might that mean for the fight against climate change?

In August, Biden announced a $2 trillion, four-year climate plan designed to steer energy policy away from coddling Big Oil and toward bolstering green energy. He’s outlined several energy policies he’d pursue if elected, including reducing carbon emissions and creating 10 million jobs by building out a green energy infrastructure. The financing would come from a combination of corporate income taxes and government stimulus funds. "Joe is about saying, we're going to invest that in renewable energy," said running mate Senator Kamala Harris during Wednesday night's vice presidential debate. "It's going to be about the creation of millions of jobs. We will achieve net zero emissions by 2050, carbon neutral by 2035. Joe has a plan."

Biden and Harris' plan is not the same as the New Green Deal, which floundered in the Senate in 2019 amid fierce Republican opposition. And it’s miles away from lining up a new round of pandemic stimulus funds, which Democrats and Republicans have been fighting over for the past few months. (Trump said on Tuesday that he was killing talks with Democrats on even just a regular old stimulus to keep the economy from further Covid-19 destruction, much less any kind of green stimulus. Then he apparently doubled back via late-night tweet, saying he would support some stand-alone items, like issuing $1,200 checks to Americans.) Biden’s climate plan, on the other hand, would tackle environmental problems with government funds.

Four Game-Changing Challenges Facing Transatlantic Security

ANNEGRET KRAMP-KARRENBAUER

As for most Germans from my generation, the transatlantic relationship is a personal affair. It provided the security Germans needed during the Cold War. It ensured Westbindung— Germany’s firm embeddedness in the community of free and democratic countries. And it was the foundation on which our national unity was built in 1990. This is why I deeply care about the mighty challenges we face as transatlantic partners today. As the world struggles to find a new form of order amid a pandemic, power shifts, and political uncertainty, transatlantic relations are in a phase of reorientation. This does not come as a surprise. For decades, transatlanticism—a robust worldview based on human rights, democracy, and open markets—has been a core pillar of the rules-based international order that is under so much duress at the moment. If one is in trouble, the other one will feel the pain, and vice versa.

IDENTIFYING THE KEY CHALLENGES

What can be done? Looking beyond the headlines, four challenges are of particular importance for the future of transatlantic relations.

The first challenge is to what extent U.S.-China relations are turning confrontational. Predictions range from inevitable war to joint stewardship of globalization. Europeans are already gravely affected by China’s rise and the U.S. response. Their role in that confrontation will be defined, either by themselves or by Washington and Beijing. There is no doubt in my mind that Europe will come to the defense of freedom and openness and that we have to strengthen democracy and human rights. This is very much in our interest. To do this, Europe needs to be strong, resilient, and capable of acting in service of both principles and interests. But something else is crucial here as well: will the United States still be interested in the fate of its European allies? Will Europe be seen by Washington as a key asset in that great power competition with Beijing? At the very least, European dependence on U.S. security guarantees make these questions crucial for the future of transatlantic relations.

Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer

Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer is the Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Harris, Pence Battle Over Foreign Policy

BY MICHAEL HIRSH

In an election that until now has been mostly defined by COVID-19 and domestic policy issues, U.S. Sen. Kamala Harris and Vice President Mike Pence spent a surprising amount of time Wednesday night battling over President Donald Trump’s foreign policy and America’s role in the world, as well as how Democratic challenger Joe Biden might perform as a global leader.

The two vice presidential candidates engaged in a notably sober discussion, moderated by USA Today’s Susan Page, about whether Trump or Biden would be the tougher president, who would do a better job taking on China and Iran, and who has the better approach to climate change.

Harris, a 55-year-old California Democrat who became Biden’s running mate in August, made history as the first Black woman to appear in a vice presidential debate. And though she appeared at times smug, pushing back against Pence’s interruptions to say, “I’m speaking,” Harris delivered an extended and coherent attack on Trump’s foreign policy, including his cozy relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, whom she said the U.S. president trusts more than his own FBI director. She said Trump had betrayed American allies and made the country less safe.

“You’ve got to be loyal to your friends,” she said. “What we’ve seen with Donald Trump is he’s betrayed our friends and [embraced] dictators around the world.” She also defended the Iran nuclear deal that Trump rejected, saying America is “less safe … because of Donald Trump’s unilateral approach to foreign policy.”

Global Security Review

By Joshua E. Duke

“O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you, we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible; and hence we can hold the enemy’s fate in our hands.”

– Sun Tzu, c.500 BC

The flood gates of the information age have been blasted open forever. Short of global electrical failure, robots taking over the world, or mankind’s evacuation of the planet, global connectivity, instant communications, and massive information accessibility are here to stay, along with all the dangers and benefits related. The internet and network connectivity have become too integrated within the basic daily functions of societies and nations for information services to be overly regulated or censored, and as the world becomes perpetually more dependent on networks to function, more technologically adept generations grow up with the entire history of human knowledge at their fingertips. The entire cyber warfare enterprise of Computer Network Attack (CNA) and Computer Network Defense (CND) is blossoming, along with telecommunications and other vital industries, which means more and more people will be trained in these areas, in addition to information technology and computer sciences. As people are trained to operate in a network-centric world, more of the world will be under a perpetual threat from cyberattacks, and more people will be employed to defend it.

The global cyber arms race is in full swing, and American leadership is necessary to ensure the future of freedom of thought and individuality in cyberspace. The alternative is a sharp contrast, centered around the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) communist censorship and propaganda machine, combined with their allies around the world, intent on securing ultimate power and crushing the United States in the process. This article examines the physical and cyberspace dangers posed by the PRC and its allies, detailing a long-term strategic trend of anti-American actions taken in recent history that have not been adequately addressed or publicized. This article begins with an examination of a variety of actions the PRC has taken against America over multiple decades and the extent of their success. An interconnected multinational web of espionage, cyber warfare, and targeted actions designed to collapse the United States is then exposed, highlighting the need for renewed American leadership in cyberspace and on the world stage. Any action taken against any entity with the purpose of degrading their capabilities, manipulating them, or spying on them, using the realm of cyberspace as the primary conduit, is cyber warfare. A short explanation of cyber warfare basics is provided at the end of this article, with examples of what the cyber battlespace consists of.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Titan Rain Hackers

Tanzania’s Opposition Fears Election Violence Because, Lissu Says, ‘We Are Winning’

Sophie Neiman

At a jubilant rally one recent evening in the town of Geita, in northwestern Tanzania, Tundu Lissu sang along to Bob Marley’s “One Love” as he looked out on the sun setting over a sea of cheering supporters. The opposition firebrand is running to replace incumbent President John Magufuli in a general election later this month; he has been on the campaign trail since late August, drawing massive crowds at each stop.

“Everywhere I’ve gone, I’ve looked people in the eye,” Lissu told World Politics Review in an interview. “Everywhere I’ve gone, people are so happy. It’s unbelievable, and it’s uplifting.” He returned home this summer after three years in exile, part of which was spent recovering after unidentified gunmen shot him 16 times in 2017, in what he suspects was an assassination attempt. .

The Biggest Risk to This Election Is Not Russia. It’s Us.

By Fiona Hill

Robert O’Brien, President Trump’s national security adviser, revealed this week that he had recently met his Russian counterpart, Nikolai Patrushev, in Geneva and warned him that “there would be absolutely no tolerance for any interference” in the November election.

This was a pointless exchange. It misrepresents how Russia actually interferes in our affairs. The Russian state does not meddle directly. It delegates to proxies, who amplify our divisions and exploit our political polarization.

And the truth is, Americans must recognize that the United States is ripe for manipulation. With a month to go before Election Day, we are ripping ourselves apart.

When I was at the National Security Council, I had similar meetings with Mr. Patrushev and other Russian officials; we met in Geneva, in Moscow and in side rooms at international summits. With the national security advisers H.R. McMaster and John Bolton, we called them out for intervening in our 2016 elections. We warned them not to repeat their operations in 2018 and 2020.

Who Won the Vice Presidential Debate Between Pence and Harris? Analysis and Highlights

BY JENNI FINK

In his Wednesday night debate with Senator Kamala Harris, Vice President Mike Pence defended Donald Trump as ably as anyone could, given that the resurgent COVID-19 crisis, which Pence is in charge of handling, meant that the debate had to be conducted with plexiglass dividers.

But it's likely that nothing Pence said threatened former Vice President Joe Biden's lead. And nothing he did dislodged a determined fly from his head where it landed—and stayed—for nearly two minutes as he championed the Trump administration's support for law enforcement.

The fly was the elephant in the room, as it were: a reminder that no matter how strongly Pence portrayed the administration through its accomplishments, it's impossible to ignore the missteps.

Harris and Pence's 90-minute debate at the University of Utah in Salt Lake City was the calm after the storm that was the debate between President Donald Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden. Both wanted more time to address voters during their one and only debate, but they kept the interruptions to a minimum, although they argued over what constituted a "fact."

Harris scored in finding an opportunity to share her personal story as the daughter of a Jamaican father and Indian mother. She also avoided moments that would make it easy to dismiss her as an "angry Black woman" or "unlikeable"—unfair standards that a woman, and especially a woman of color, probably had to meet.

The False Promise of Regime Change

By Philip H. Gordon

Since the 1950s, the United States has tried to oust governments in the broader Middle East once every decade, on average. It has done so in Iran, Afghanistan (twice), Iraq, Egypt, Libya, and Syria—a list that includes only the instances in which the removal of a country’s leaders and the transformation of its political system were the goals of U.S. policy and Washington made sustained efforts to achieve them. The motives behind those interventions varied widely, as have Washington’s methods: in some cases sponsoring a coup, in others invading and occupying a country, and in others relying on diplomacy, rhetoric, and sanctions.

All these attempts, however, have one thing in common: they failed. In every case, American policymakers overstated the threat faced by the United States, underestimated the challenges of ousting a regime, and embraced the optimistic assurances of exiles or local actors with little power.

McMaster and commander in chief

Clifford D. May

There was a simplicity to the Cold War. Free peoples, and those who aspired to that status, were threatened by communism, a totalitarian ideology aggressively propagated by the Soviet Union, an expansionist empire. The Cold War also was a “forever war”: No one knew when it would end.

And then, of course, it did end, the way a character in Ernest Hemingway’s “The Sun Also Rises” describes having gone bankrupt: “Gradually, then suddenly.”

After that, Americans took a holiday from history, one abruptly brought to a halt on Sept. 11, 2001. Over the years since, other threats to the U.S. have emerged or, more precisely, been widely (though not universally) recognized. The response of American leaders has left much to be desired.

During the 13 months he served as National Security Advisor to the commander in chief, H.R. McMaster made a strenuous effort to bring what he calls “strategic competence” to the Rubik’s Cube that is national security in the 21st century.

He has now distilled his thinking into a book. It’s titled “Battlegrounds” (note his use of the plural), and subtitled: “The Fight to Defend the Free World” (note his conviction that there is, still, a Free World, and that it is worth defending).

The U.S. Military is Preparing for an "Irregular" War

by Kris Osborn

A new Pentagon Irregular Warfare Annex report explains that great power threats not only pose major force-on-force threat possibilities but also have a history of engaging in unconventional war tactics.

“China, Russia, and Iran are willing practitioners of campaigns of disinformation, deception, sabotage, and economic coercion, as well as proxy, guerrilla, and covert operations. This increasingly complex security environment suggests the need for a revised understanding of [information warfare] to account for its role as a component of great power competition,” an unclassified summary of the report states.

Future great-power war, the thinking maintains, will involve both major weapons platforms and large forces as well as countless unconventional or irregular dynamics.

“Our doctrine, acquisition and training for conflict is excessively focused on maintaining deterrence or winning the high-end conventional war fight, when the simple reality is that modern warfare is not nearly that clear-cut,” Ezra Cohen, the acting assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, said in the Pentagon report.

Cohen said in the report that conventional forces are greatly needed when it comes to irregular warfare as well.

“Even when special operations forces (SOF) have taken the lead in unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, and foreign internal defense missions, they are heavily enabled by conventional forces. As we shift towards great power competition, our conventional forces must not lose the ability to wage irregular war,” the report states.

Breaking the Silo: Examining International Security at the Nuclear Nexus

Rebecca Hersman, Reja Younis, Maxwell Simon

Understanding international security issues at the “nuclear nexus” is critical for managing a contemporary security environment characterized by rapid technological innovation, increased strategic competition, and a looming nuclear shadow. The International Security at the Nuclear Nexus article series was created to galvanize cross-pollination between the study of nuclear issues and other international security subject areas by exploring points of intersection.

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AI won’t replace radiologists, but it will change their work. Here’s how

Ohad Arazi

From “Terminator” to “Black Mirror,” we’re inundated with the idea that machines are slowly taking over, set to eventually replace humankind entirely. This sort of apocalyptic chatter within the medical field, especially in radiology, reinforces the notion that radiologists are in danger of becoming obsolete, along with every other profession. This could not be further from the truth. The number of radiologists has been growing in the double digits for decades, and radiology is predicted to be among the fastest growing fields of the next decade. Some countries are even facing a radiologist shortage.

Still, AI will reshape how radiologists work, shifting their detection of medical conditions from an active to a proactive approach. Understanding these changes can give a better picture of how work will change for radiologists in the near term.

CORONAVIRUS, HEALTH, COVID19, PANDEMIC

What is the World Economic Forum doing to manage emerging risks from COVID-19?

One of the greater misconceptions about radiologists is that they essentially just analyze images. Such simplified assessments, “dramatically oversimplify what radiologists do,” according to Curtis P. Langlotz, MD, PhD, department of radiology at Stanford University. As Langlotz points out, a comprehensive catalog of radiology diagnoses lists nearly 20,000 terms for disorders and imaging observations and over 50,000 causal relations. Algorithms that can help diagnose common conditions are a “major step forward,” he notes, but an experienced radiologist is looking for numerous conditions all at once. Only some of these assessments can be performed with AI.

The Conventional Force Perspective: Nuclear Integration in Doctrine, Concepts, and Exercises

Adam Saxton, Mark Cancian

While there should be continued debate of the normative merits or dangers of CNI, this article focuses on the issue from the perspective of the conventional force and highlights some important steps that would have to be taken if CNI is to work more fully with conventional forces. Specifically, nuclear planning would need to be more clearly present and detailed in high-level military doctrine, concepts, and large-scale exercises. This is no small undertaking, particularly for exercises, and poses many potential risks and trade-offs that merit careful consideration by decisionmakers.

What would detailed conventional nuclear integration in doctrine, concepts, and large-scale exercises look like? Joint concepts inform high-level military doctrine, which in turn provides guidance on what the military should aim to achieve through planning and training in large-scale exercises. If the Department of Defense desires to pursue CNI as a policy goal, then nuclear planning would be expected to make an appearance in doctrine, concepts, and exercises.

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