Indian Strategic Studies: 01/27/20

27 January 2020

The Strategic Implications of Chinese-Iranian-Russian Naval Drills in the Indian Ocean

By: Syed Fazl-e Haider

Introduction

In early December, Major General Shao Yuanming (邵元明), the Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), traveled to the Islamic Republic of Iran for rare high-level military meetings. These meetings were held for the purpose of organizing a series of unprecedented joint naval drills between China, Iran, and Russia, which were held in the Indian Ocean and the Sea of Oman from December 27–29. The drills took place just as escalating tensions between the United States and Iran reached a crisis point at the end of 2019. The exercise also signified a deepening relationship between Iran and the PRC in economics, diplomacy, and security affairs.

China and Russia have both increased military and economic cooperation with Iran in the year and a half since the U.S. government pulled out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). However, while Iran’s government has repeatedly touted its deepening relations with China and Russia as a show of diplomatic strength, its allies have been less public about the growing relationship. In December, Iranian officials lauded the trilateral exercises—titled “Marine Security Belt”—as proof that Iran can outlast crippling sanctions with aid from its non-Western allies, and declared that the drills signaled a new triple alliance in the Middle East (Tasnim News, December 29, 2019). [1] By contrast, officials from Russia and the PRC were more restrained, framing the joint exercises as part of routine anti-piracy operations, highlighting their peacekeeping priorities and seeking to depoliticize the drills (South China Morning Post, September 23, 2019; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Russia), October 2, 2019).

Participating Vessels and Exercise Activities

What Does Xi’s Myanmar Visit Mean for India’s China Anxieties?

By Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan

Last week, Chinese President Xi Jinping concluded a two-day visit to Myanmar, the first for Xi in his current capacity and his first overseas visit of 2020. Viewed from the perspective of growing Chinese inroads in the Indian Ocean, Xi’s trip spotlighted Beijing’s continued efforts to make geopolitical gains in line with its broader regional interests, which will be of concern to India.

While there may have been some surprise about Xi’s choice of Myanmar for his trip, it is in fact in line with China’s continued interest in making inroads with respect to the Indian Ocean. With the Myanmar visit, Xi has effectively completed his key neighborhood trips, having traveled through the Maldives and Sri Lanka in 2014, Pakistan in 2015, Bangladesh in 2016, and Nepal in 2019.

From India’s perspective, New Delhi can be none too pleased with China’s constant forays into the wider Indian Ocean region. But at least for now, India appears to be letting Myanmar’s natural caution limit China’s influence.

Who Gets to Tell the Story of the Afghanistan War?

BY KEVIN BARON

The Washington Post’s ‘Afghanistan Papers’ is the latest contribution to a growing argument over whether the conflict — or any of the ‘forever wars’ — was worth the cost.

Who gets to tell the story of the Afghanistan war?

Is it angry veterans and war-weary journalists? Is it Pentagon public relations pros, putting the spin on the best story they can for Washington politics and the public? Is it the ground troops and their families who led their men and women through combat, took terrain, won hearts and minds, killed the enemy, and then came home to heroically save each other once again, yet this time from their demons? Is it the Hollywood movies that don’t get the story quite right? Is it the 4-star generals who still methodically and earnestly warn politicians and the public that this war, like all of the United States’ contemporary missions against worldwide violent extremism, will be messy, complicated, and take much longer than 18 years to win? Is it American voters?

The latest retelling of the war, and most assuredly not the last, is the Washington Post’s “Afghanistan Papers” investigation. It landed with a splash in December, revealing raw documents obtained from John Sopko, the special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction, or SIGAR. He is a man whose office for years has been a respected and unflinching presenter of overwhelming evidence of the war’s unfulfilled promises to American taxpayers. “Here comes another Sopko report” is frequently uttered in newsrooms when the next email hits their inboxes. There have been so many, frankly, that they’ve lost impact. But with an eye-catching digital format, the Post presents the SIGAR’s latest findings, and their own reporting, as a major scoop. Indeed, the paper touted the package as a modern-day version of “Pentagon Papers.” In that legendary news moment of the 1970s, a contract analyst for the Defense Department, Daniel Ellsberg, amassed, copied, and leaked to reporters 7,000 pages of classified analysis revealing that U.S. leaders for years during the Vietnam War secretly had believed it to be an unwinnable morass but constantly and deliberately lied to the American people to keep it going.

Pakistan and CPEC Are Drawn Into the U.S.-China Rivalry

By: Adnan Aamir

Introduction

Leaders in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan were stunned in late November when a senior U.S. government official issued a strong verbal attack on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). On November 21 in Washington, D.C., U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of South and Central Asia Affairs Alice Wells spoke at length about the CPEC at a public event, criticizing multiple elements of the $62 billion flagship component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Ambassador Wells cast doubt upon claims that CPEC will generate sustainable economic development in Pakistan and criticized the project’s cost escalations and non-transparent processes of awarding CPEC contracts to Chinese firms. She appealed to Pakistan’s citizens to ask tough questions of the PRC regarding the CPEC and China’s related projects in Pakistan (U.S. State Department, November 21, 2019).

In the past, the U.S. government had raised concerns over CPEC and China’s “debt-trap diplomacy,” but it had never presented such a direct and detailed set of criticisms. Ambassador Wells crossed that line—bringing the notoriously stalled out CPEC back under international scrutiny just after Chinese and Pakistani leaders had brokered a cautiously optimistic set of funding deals to jumpstart progress a month before (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (PRC), October 9, 2019). Chinese representatives were quick to respond to Ambassador Wells’s criticisms. The next day, PRC Ambassador to Islamabad Yao Jing(姚敬) said that he had been “shocked and surprised to see the remarks of Alice,” and that Ambassador Wells lacked accurate knowledge and had relied on “Western media ‘propaganda’” for her accusations. He called on the U.S. to “show your evidence, give me evidence” of specific cases of corruption related to the CPEC, and questioned whether Wells was taking potshots at the CPEC to score political points. Ambassador Yao challenged the U.S. to suit its actions to its words: “If there is any sincerity… [the U.S. should] come forward to invest in Pakistan. We [China] welcome U.S. investment in Pakistan.” (INP (Pakistan), November 22, 2019; VOA, November 22, 2019).

The Killer Algorithms Nobody’s Talking About

BY ARTHUR HOLLAND MICHEL
Source Link

This past fall, diplomats from around the globe gathered in Geneva to do something about killer robots. In a result that surprised nobody, they failed.

The formal debate over lethal autonomous weapons systems—machines that can select and fire at targets on their own—began in earnest about half a decade ago under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the international community’s principal mechanism for banning systems and devices deemed too hellish for use in war. But despite yearly meetings, the CCW has yet to agree what “lethal autonomous weapons” even are, let alone set a blueprint for how to rein them in.

Meanwhile, the technology is advancing ferociously; militaries aren’t going to wait for delegates to pin down the exact meaning of slippery terms such as “meaningful human control” before sending advanced warbots to battle.

To be sure, that’s a nightmarish prospect. U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres, echoing a growing chorus of governments, think tanks, academics, and technologists, has called such weapons “politically unacceptable” and “morally repugnant.” But this all overlooks an equally urgent menace: autonomous systems that are not in themselves lethal but rather act as a key accessory to human violence.

Iran Expands Support for Taliban, Targets U.S. Troops in Afghanistan

by Guy Taylor

Escalating U.S.-Iran tensions mean Afghanistan, which shares a border with Iran, could be the next proxy battleground between Washington and Tehran, a clash that threatens to undermine the Trump administration’s pursuit of a peace deal with the Taliban and eventual drawdown of American troops.

Administration officials have recently warned of the potential for expanding Iranian activity in Afghanistan, and sources say Tehran’s support for the Taliban is well known in intelligence circles, where analysts are examining the extent to which the insurgent group already outsources some of its attack planning operations to Iran.

Communications intercepted between Taliban operatives based in Mashhad, Iran, and their counterparts working in Quetta, Pakistan, have exposed at least some level of such operational connectivity, one source told The Washington Times…

Taliban admits ‘peace’ negotiations with U.S. are merely means to withdraw ‘foreign forces’

BY BILL ROGGIO
Source Link

The Taliban admitted this week that current negotiations with the “arrogant” U.S. – often billed as “peace talks” that will purportedly end the fighting in Afghanistan – are merely being conducted to facilitate “the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan.”

The Taliban made the statements in its latest commentary, titled “Powerless shall always remain shareless…!,” which was published in English on Jan. 20 on its official website, Voice of Jihad.

In addition, the terrorist group called the Afghan government “impotent,” “powerless,” “incapable,” “a tool of the invaders,” and a host of other insults in the statement. The Taliban was clear, as it has consistently been clear, that it would not deal with the Afghan government, which has been “sidelined [by the U.S.] in every major decision regarding Afghanistan.”

China’s Belt and Road: Is Asia Getting More Cautious?

By Prashanth Parameswaran

Myanmar’s leader Aung San Suu Kyi, right, and Chinese President Xi Jinping, left, shake hands after the ceremony of signing a memorandum of understanding at the president house in Naypyitaw Myanmar, Saturday, Jan. 18, 2020.

One of the storylines that ran throughout Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first visit to Myanmar in his current capacity was the inroads Beijing was hoping to make with respect to its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While the focus itself was not surprising, it nonetheless raised a broader question at play in the wider region: are key states getting more cautious in how they engage the BRI?

Since China’s BRI first took off, there has been a near endless focus on the mix of opportunities and challenges it presents for various countries as well as how other major powers are responding to it But as I’ve argued before, a key part of that conversation, beyond what China wants or what the United States thinks and does, is how key regional states themselves are responding to the BRI.

Facing Up to China’s Military Interests in the Arctic

By: Anne-Marie Brady

Introduction

China’s military ambitions in the Arctic, and its growing strategic partnership with Russia, have rung alarm bells in many governments. In May 2019, for the first time, the U.S. Department of Defense annual report on China’s military capabilities had a section on China’s military interests in the Arctic and the possibility of Chinese submarines operating in the Arctic basin (Department of Defense, May 2019). In August 2019, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg raised concerns about what he diplomatically referred to as “China’s increased presence in the Arctic” (Reuters, August 7).

From a nuclear security point of view, the Arctic is China’s vulnerable northern flank. The flight path of U.S. and Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) targeted at China transit the Arctic. [1] Key components of the U.S. missile defense system are also located in the Arctic.

Chinese submarine-based ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) operating in the Arctic could restore China’s nuclear deterrence capability (Huanqiu Ribao, October 28, 2013). China currently operates six nuclear-powered attack submarines, four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and fifty diesel attack submarines, with more under construction. If Chinese nuclear-armed submarines were able to access the Arctic basin undetected, this would be a game-changer for the United States, the NATO states and their partners, and the wider Asia-Pacific (Huanqiu Ribao, April 11, 2012). China would be able to target missiles at the United States and Europe with ease; such ability would strengthen China’s military dominance in Asia and bolster China’s emerging position as a global military power.

Why Aren’t More Countries Confronting China over Xinjiang?

Matt Schiavenza
Source Link

Over the past three years, the Chinese government has implemented a highly repressive series of policies against Uighurs, a Muslim ethnic minority native to the country’s Xinjiang region. Uighurs live under unprecedented surveillance, their every move tracked through cameras and spyware-riddled mobile phones. The government strictly monitors them for signs of religious devotion, such as wearing a beard or veil, avoiding cigarettes and alcohol, or refusing to eat pork. Ancient mosques have been razed and schools are prohibited from teaching the Uighur language. More than one million Uighurs and other Muslim minorities are estimated to be detained in euphemistically-named “re-education facilities,” in which some have reportedly been tortured. Hundreds of thousands of Uighur families in the region have been forced to open their homes to Han Chinese volunteers who surveil their “host” families as they oversee their “patriotic re-education.” The Chinese government has subjected even Uighurs living outside of China to harassment and pressure, often preventing them from keeping in contact with relatives still in Xinjiang.

China has justified its actions as a response to a series of terror attacks attributed to Uighurs, including a 2014 knife attack at the railway station in Kunming that led to 35 deaths. But the measures Chinese authorities have employed in Xinjiang have attracted international condemnation. In July, the United Nations representatives of 22 mostly European countries released a letter to the UN Human Rights Council calling on China to “refrain from the arbitrary detention and restriction on freedom of movement on Uighurs and other Muslim and minority communities in Xinjiang.”

The Chinese Population Crisis

By Ross Douthat

In recent days both this newspaper and The Wall Street Journal have carried reports on one of the most important geopolitical facts of the 21st century: The world’s great rising power, the People’s Republic of China, is headed for a demographic crisis.

Like the United States and most developed countries, China has a birthrate that is well below replacement level. Unlike most developed countries, China is growing old without first having grown rich.

Of course China has grown richer: My colleague David Leonhardt, who spent time in China at the beginning and the end of the 2010s, just wrote a column emphasizing the “maturing” of the Chinese economy over that period, the growth of start-ups and consumer spending and the middle class.

But even after years of growth, Chinese per capita G.D.P. is still about one-third or one-fourth the size of neighboring countries like South Korea and Japan. And yet its birthrate has converged with the rich world much more quickly and completely — which has two interrelated implications, both of them grim.

Chinese Dreams, Russian Realities

By Michael McFaul, Kathryn Stoner

Some autocrats grow their economies; other autocrats destroy their economies. For every China, there is a North Korea. For every Singapore, there is a Zimbabwe.

After twenty years in power, Russian President Vladimir Putin has performed better than Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, but has accomplished nowhere near what Deng Xiao Peng has in China or Lee Kwan Yew in Singapore. As Putin now proposes institutional changes to lock himself into power even longer, only the most hopeful should assume that the next ten (or twenty?) years of Russian dictatorship will perform any better than the last 20 years.

Russians could not only be freer with more democracy, but richer.

When Boris Yeltsin first chose Putin to serve as the new president in 2000, a decision later ratified by the Russian voters, Putin was both an accidental and lucky ruler.

Making Foreign Companies Serve China: Outsourcing Propaganda to Local Entities in the Czech Republic

By: Martin Hála

Introduction

The fast build-up and equally sudden decline of Chinese influence in the Czech Republic offers an interesting case study of vulnerability and resilience in the newly democratic small states targeted by the united front operations of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). [1] Recent revelations about a powerful Czech financial corporation manipulating public opinion in favor of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) demonstrate the complex dynamics between political and economic actors—both Chinese and local—and how private companies are being leveraged to spread pro-PRC propaganda (Aktuálně, December 10, 2019 / English translation).

The main vector of influence in the Czech Republic has been the PRC’s “economic diplomacy,” which downplays political differences and emphasizes the economic opportunities offered by closer relationships with China (Sinopsis, March 11, 2019; China Brief, May 9, 2019). In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), it builds on promises of investments into local economies still lagging behind those in Western Europe. The promised investments may or may not materialize, but the economic enticement alone creates a conducive environment for the cooptation of local political and business elites in a manner similar to more traditional united front tactics (China Brief, May 9, 2019). Apart from the promised investments by Chinese companies, the reverse allure may consist of market access in China for local companies, which may then be manipulated into becoming propaganda echo chambers for the CCP. The Czech Republic offers examples of both of these phenomena.

Beijing’s “Economic Diplomacy” Derailed in the Czech Republic

Has the US Lost Myanmar to China?

By Hunter Marston

Myanmar’s leader Aung San Suu Kyi, right, and Chinese President Xi Jinping, left, shake hands after a ceremony signing a memorandum of understanding at the presidential house in Naypyidaw Myanmar, Jan. 18, 2020.Credit: Nyein Chan Naing/Pool Photo via AP

Chinese leader Xi Jinping just wrapped up a two-day visit to Myanmar from January 17-18, the first trip by a Chinese head of state since Jiang Zemin traveled to Burma in 2001. Xi’s visit notably occurred in the 70th anniversary year of China-Myanmar diplomatic relations and further cemented bilateral relations, which have been in general extremely positive since the West turned away from the embattled country in light of the Rohingya migrant crisis that erupted in 2017. In Naypyidaw, Xi and Myanmar State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi signed 33 agreements related to infrastructure development, trade, manufacturing, and special economic zones (SEZs).

Xi and the Chinese Communist Party now hope to put bilateral ties on a more permanently secure footing. Beijing had long shielded Myanmar’s junta from international scrutiny at the United Nations and backed the abusive military regime during the 1990s and 2000s when it was estranged from the West. But when the previous government of President Thein Sein began to reform the country’s political institutions and open the doors to global investors, the Obama administration in the U.S. responded with deft diplomacy and high-level visits, suspending economic sanctions in 2016.

Iran’s Reserve of Last Resort: Uncovering the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ground Forces Order of Battle

By Fred Kagan

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ground Forces are organized around headquarters that are meant to coordinate the operations of Iranian paramilitary forces and support the Quds Force’s use of proxy groups such as Iraqi Shi’a militias abroad.

Their basing in Iran indicates a primary focus on suppressing internal unrest and waging irregular warfare in the rear of an invader rather than on defending against an invasion conventionally.

Their organizational structure and the pattern of their operations in Syria suggest that they might be challenged to coordinate large-scale (multi-division) operations abroad and possibly at home.

The fact that the Iranian leadership has not yet had to use them on a large scale to suppress growing domestic unrest suggests that the regime still has a potent reserve force to ensure its survival even if the unrest grows considerably, as long as it does not also face a requirement for large-scale military operations abroad.

Executive Summary

How Iran's military outsources its cyberthreat forces

In the wake of the U.S. killing of a top Iranian general and Iran’s retaliatory missile strike, should the U.S. be concerned about the cyberthreat from Iran? Already, pro-Iranian hackers have defaced several U.S. websites to protest the killing of General Qassem Soleimani. One group wrote “This is only a small part of Iran’s cyber capability” on one of the hacked sites.

Two years ago, I wrote that Iran’s cyberwarfare capabilities lagged behind those of both Russia and China, but that it had become a major threat which will only get worse. It had already conducted several highly damaging cyberattacks.

Since then, Iran has continued to develop and deploy its cyberattacking capabilities. It carries out attacks through a network of intermediaries, allowing the regime to strike its foes while denying direct involvement.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-supported hackers

Iran’s cyberwarfare capability lies primarily within Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a branch of the country’s military. However, rather than employing its own cyberforce against foreign targets, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps appears to mainly outsource these cyberattacks.

Don't assume Iran will be behind the next big cyber attack

BY BRIAN FINCH

Americans have become fixated on the possibility of Iran launching deadly attacks in retaliation for President Donald Trump’s decision to kill Quds force leader Qassem Soleimani. Such fears are grounded in reality, as Iran has a long track record of lashing out after being struck by the American military.

What gives this latest round of tit for tat a decidedly 21st century spin is the specter that Iran will unleash its cyber arsenal as part of any retribution. Iran has both verifiably formidable cyberwarfare assets and a history of using them, so Americans are right to be concerned.

Recent events though raise another, perhaps even more insidious scenario: that America’s other enemies will use this latest flare up as an opportunity to launch false flag cyberattacks. America’s global rivals have in fact been practicing that kind of cyber campaign, and so Washington needs to be careful before assuming that the next big cyberattack is the work of a vengeful Tehran.

South Korea to deploy anti-piracy unit to the Strait of Hormuz

Sangmi Cha, Josh Smith

Attacks on oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz off the coast of Iran last year prompted U.S. officials to call for allies to join a planned maritime security mission.

While South Korea, a key U.S. ally, will deploy its forces to the area, including the Gulf, it will not officially be joining a coalition of forces known as the International Maritime Security Construct, the defense ministry said.

“The South Korean government decided to temporarily expand the deployment of the Cheonghae military unit,” a ministry official told reporters, adding that the step would ensure the safety of citizens and free navigation of South Korean vessels.

The decision to divert the navy unit already operating southwest of Arabia is a political compromise that will not require fresh authorization by parliament ahead of an election in April.

The Cheonghae unit will continue with its mission while it cooperates with the coalition, the ministry said, adding that the United States had been briefed on the decision, which was also explained to the Iranians separately.

Why Fighting Corruption Is Key in a ‘New Era of Great-Power Competition’

Patrick Quirk, Eguiar Lizundia

The Trump administration is due to soon formally release its findings from a review of U.S. foreign assistance programs, aimed at “realigning” them for “a new era of great-power competition,” which critics have described as an effort to curb foreign aid overall. Given this context, aid and development organizations must be prepared to show how their work serves America’s strategic interests. Anti-corruption efforts do just that by striking at the heart of what keeps leaders of adversaries like China and Russia in power.

Both countries are increasingly weaponizing corruption by using flows of illicit money and opaque deals to gain influence in foreign nations, from the Solomon Islands to Montenegro. Efforts to export these kleptocratic practices are key elements of Chinese and Russian foreign policy. They imperil American interests by compromising the independence of affected states and corroding their democratic governance. As the United States seeks to recalibrate its foreign assistance spending to compete with Beijing and Moscow, it should augment efforts to tackle corruption. ...

Jeff Bezos hack: Amazon boss's phone 'hacked by Saudi crown prince'

Stephanie Kirchgaessner

The Amazon billionaire Jeff Bezos had his mobile phone “hacked” in 2018 after receiving a WhatsApp message that had apparently been sent from the personal account of the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, sources have told the Guardian.

The encrypted message from the number used by Mohammed bin Salman is believed to have included a malicious file that infiltrated the phone of the world’s richest man, according to the results of a digital forensic analysis.

This analysis found it “highly probable” that the intrusion into the phone was triggered by an infected video file sent from the account of the Saudi heir to Bezos, the owner of the Washington Post.

The two men had been having a seemingly friendly WhatsApp exchange when, on 1 May of that year, the unsolicited file was sent, according to sources who spoke to the Guardian on the condition of anonymity.

Large amounts of data were exfiltrated from Bezos’s phone within hours, according to a person familiar with the matter. The Guardian has no knowledge of what was taken from the phone or how it was used.

Putin’s Surprise and Russia’s Foreign Policy

By: Pavel K. Baev

The Russian political class suffered a massive shock from President Vladimir Putin’s address to the Federal Assembly last Wednesday (January 15) in which he delivered three unexpected bombshells (see EDM, January 16, 2020). The first was a set of vaguely formulated revisions to the Russian Constitution—even though Putin had pledged in 2005 never to open this fundamental document to changes “under any circumstances” due to unpredictable risks to political stability (Meduza.io, January 16, 2020). The second was the resignation of the government led by Dmitry Medvedev, a loyal lieutenant, who held the position of president in 2008–2011 and then smoothly returned to the role of prime minister (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 15, 2020). The third surprise was the appointment of Mikhail Mishustin, heretofore the head of the Tax Service, as the prime minister, which propelled the obscure bureaucrat to the highest level of officialdom (Carnegie.ru, January 16, 2020). Pundits of all persuasions in Moscow have been busy trying to make sense of this uncharacteristic rush by the usually procrastination-prone Putin to reconfigure the country’s political arena, but hardly any attention is being paid to the consequences for Russian foreign policy.

The foreign ministry and a few semi-official mouthpieces have asserted that the course of external affairs will remain unchanged, but a shakeup of this magnitude will inevitably resonate in Russia’s international positions (RIA Novosti, January 18, 2020). Putin is facing growing public discontent caused by the sustained decline of personal incomes, which cannot be compensated with proposed social handouts, and it is significant that he has opted for a domestic reshuffling at the top—and not for another foreign policy gambit, such as in 2018 (Rosbalt, January 16, 2020). At that time, he captured much attention with the presentation of an array of innovative weapons systems; in contrast, last week he mentioned only briefly that new missiles have been secured, allegedly giving Russia an advantage in the global arms race—a claim worth treating with skepticism (Moscow Times, January 16, 2020). Public enthusiasm about super-missiles evaporated after several bad accidents involving nuclear assets in 2019, and Putin is currently trying to justify cuts in defense expenditures. Medvedev, in his newly created (and not as yet legally approved) position of deputy chairperson of the Russian Security Council, will have to distribute these cuts and handle the bitter complaints that will come from the military-industrial complex (Moscow Echo, January 17, 2020).

Striking Oil Ain’t What It Used to Be

By Amy Myers Jaffe

On January 7, the oil and gas companies Apache Corporation and Total SA announced a major oil find off the coast of Suriname, not far from enormous offshore deposits in neighboring Guyana discovered by ExxonMobil last year. The size of the Suriname discovery is yet to be determined, but it could be large enough to transform the small South American country, where per capita income is less than $6,000. Just three months prior on the other side of the Atlantic, the British oil major BP announced the largest natural gas discovery of 2019: the energy equivalent of 1.3 billion barrels of oil lies waiting to be extracted off the coast of Mauritania, more than enough to support a liquefied natural gas (LNG) hub. And the same year in Mozambique, Total acquired a $3.9 billion stake in an LNG project whose total cost will likely dwarf that country’s national economy.

At a time when many countries are finally trying to reduce their reliance on fossil fuels, the world is suddenly awash in oil and gas discoveries. But for the countries with the newest finds, many of them in Africa and South America, mineral wealth may not be the bonanza it was in decades past. Large oil and gas companies see long-term prices trending downward. As a result, they are investing in fields that can be brought into production quickly instead of developing expensive, far-flung reserves. Global natural gas markets, in particular, face a huge glut of resources and projects that must compete against the falling price of renewable energy technologies. As a result, Suriname, Guyana, Mauritania, Mozambique, and a handful of other developing countries with recent fossil fuel finds are in a desperate race against time.

Putin’s Surprise and Russia’s Foreign Policy

Pavel K. Baev

The Russian political class suffered a massive shock from President Vladimir Putin’s address to the Federal Assembly last Wednesday (January 15) in which he delivered three unexpected bombshells (see EDM, January 16, 2020). The first was a set of vaguely formulated revisions to the Russian Constitution—even though Putin had pledged in 2005 never to open this fundamental document to changes “under any circumstances” due to unpredictable risks to political stability (Meduza.io, January 16, 2020). The second was the resignation of the government led by Dmitry Medvedev, a loyal lieutenant, who held the position of president in 2008–2011 and then smoothly returned to the role of prime minister (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 15, 2020). The third surprise was the appointment of Mikhail Mishustin, heretofore the head of the Tax Service, as the prime minister, which propelled the obscure bureaucrat to the highest level of officialdom (Carnegie.ru, January 16, 2020). Pundits of all persuasions in Moscow have been busy trying to make sense of this uncharacteristic rush by the usually procrastination-prone Putin to reconfigure the country’s political arena, but hardly any attention is being paid to the consequences for Russian foreign policy.

The foreign ministry and a few semi-official mouthpieces have asserted that the course of external affairs will remain unchanged, but a shakeup of this magnitude will inevitably resonate in Russia’s international positions (RIA Novosti, January 18, 2020). Putin is facing growing public discontent caused by the sustained decline of personal incomes, which cannot be compensated with proposed social handouts, and it is significant that he has opted for a domestic reshuffling at the top—and not for another foreign policy gambit, such as in 2018 (Rosbalt, January 16, 2020). At that time, he captured much attention with the presentation of an array of innovative weapons systems; in contrast, last week he mentioned only briefly that new missiles have been secured, allegedly giving Russia an advantage in the global arms race—a claim worth treating with skepticism (Moscow Times, January 16, 2020). Public enthusiasm about super-missiles evaporated after several bad accidents involving nuclear assets in 2019, and Putin is currently trying to justify cuts in defense expenditures. Medvedev, in his newly created (and not as yet legally approved) position of deputy chairperson of the Russian Security Council, will have to distribute these cuts and handle the bitter complaints that will come from the military-industrial complex (Moscow Echo, January 17, 2020).

The Ukrainian Economy in 2020: A Difficult Road Ahead

By: Vladislav Inozemtsev

The start of 2020 in Kyiv was initially thought to be a triumphant one. The last weeks of 2019 brought some de-escalation in the war in Donbas (EADaily, December 30, 2019), new hopes for peace and, importantly, formidable economic successes. Notably, the United States adopted new sanctions that delayed construction of the Nord Stream Two natural gas pipeline, thus forcing Russia to sign a renewed gas transit contract with Ukraine (Ukrinform.net, December 31, 2019) as well as to pay Gazprom’s penalties to Ukraine’s Naftohaz, in line with earlier rulings by a Stockholm arbitration court (Naftogaz.com, December 31, 2019). At the same time, in recent months, fears of a sovereign financial default—widely discussed since President Volodymir Zelenskyy started his tenure last May (EADaily, May 29, 2019)—have now entirely evaporated.

But in mid-January, the situation in Kyiv was roiled again, this time by a political scandal involving the release of tapes on which Prime Minister Oleksiy Honcharuk can be heard rudely dismissing the president’s abilities to understand and analyze the economic situation (Strana.ua, January 15, 2020). Honcharuk quickly submitted his resignation, which, for now, President Zelenskyy has rejected (President.gov.ua, January 17, 2020). Undoubtedly, if the Honcharuk Cabinet is dissolved in the near future, various Ukrainian clans and political groupings will immediately arise, leading to unpredictable outcomes. Nevertheless, an overview of recent economic developments helps to clarify some of the foreseeable challenges and perspectives for the Ukrainian economy going forward.

Gold in an era of drones, deep mines, and dedollarization

Greg Callaway is a consultant in McKinsey’s Johannesburg office; Oliver Ramsbottom is a partner in the Hong Kong office. Simon London, a member of McKinsey Publishing, is based in the Silicon Valley office.

Tentative Stabilization, Sluggish Recovery?

by Gita Gopinath

In the October World Economic Outlook, we described the global economy as in a synchronized slowdown, with escalating downside risks that could further derail growth. Since then, some risks have partially receded with the announcement of a US-China Phase I trade deal and a lower likelihood of a no-deal Brexit. Monetary policy has continued to support growth and buoyant financial conditions. With these developments, there are now tentative signs that global growth may be stabilizing, though at subdued levels.

In this update to the World Economic Outlook, we project global growth to increase modestly from 2.9 percent in 2019 to 3.3 percent in 2020 and 3.4 percent in 2021. The slight downward revision of 0.1 percent for 2019 and 2020, and 0.2 percent for 2021, is owed largely to downward revisions for India. The projected recovery for global growth remains uncertain. It continues to rely on recoveries in stressed and underperforming emerging market economies, as growth in advanced economies stabilizes at close to current levels.

Uniting the Cyber Domain Stakeholders

Jessica Ojala

Introduction

The Cyber Domain has become increasingly important in the 21st century. As technology and the capabilities that follow continue to grow, the need for extensive cyber capabilities has also grown. The United States adversaries continue to grow in the cyber realm, as Russia and China continue to develop into near-peer adversaries. As Russia and China continue to develop their cyber capabilities, the United States also needs to build on their current capabilities. The United States faces an organizational dilemma when it comes to the cyber domain, as the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, Intelligence Community, and the private sector all are stakeholders in the domain and the security. Uniting the stakeholders under one security domain, specifically quantum encryption, would strengthen the United States cyber defense against their adversaries.

Definitions Regarding Cyber

Cyber covers an association with the elements of cyberspace.[i] The cyber domain is electronic information or data processing domain comprising of one or several information technology infrastructures.[ii] Cyberspace are artifacts based on or dependent on computing and communications technology; the information that these artifacts use, store, handle, or process; and the interconnections among these elements.[iii] Cybersecurity is the defense of computers and servers, mobile devices, electronic systems, networks and data from malicious attacks.[iv]

What new documents reveal about Cyber Command’s biggest operation

Mark Pomerleau
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New documents provide insight into the growing pains U.S. Cyber Command faced in building a force while simultaneously conducting operations.

The documents, which were released as part of a Freedom of Information Act request from the National Security Archive at George Washington University and later shared with journalists, are a series of internal briefings and lessons from the Defense Department’s most complex cyber operation at the time, Operation Glowing Symphony.

That operation was part of the larger counter-ISIS operations — Joint Task Force-Ares — but specifically targeted ISIS’s media and online operations, taking out infrastructure and preventing ISIS members from communicating and posting propaganda.

While Cyber Command described the operation, which took place in November of 2016, as a victory in the sense that it “successfully contested [ISIS] in the information domain,” the documents demonstrate the extent to which the command was still learning how to conduct operations and the exact steps to follow.

We Must Win Today’s War for Talent

By Vice Admiral John Nowell
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Our nation faces the greatest military challenges since the fall of the Soviet Union. A quick flip through recent issues of Proceedings will turn up a sea of references to “Great Power Competition,” and, more specifically, Russia and China. To confront these disrupters of our nation’s peace and prosperity, crucial attention has been paid to developing the missiles, platforms, and emerging technologies the U.S. Navy will need in the future battlespace. However, these investments are only as lethal as the warfighters who wield them.

Our team here at MyNavy HR’s mission is to recruit, retain, and manage the talent of the sailors who can win those wars and empower them throughout their careers, however long or short.

Within our nation’s thriving civilian labor market, however, the pool of possible recruits, and their desire to serve in the military, are the lowest in our nation’s history. Despite that, we must be more selective than ever before as tomorrow’s sailors will fight at the edge of human-machine integration, cyberspace, gray-zone conflict, and hyperwar. These future leaders need to be critical thinkers, life-long learners, and savvy technologists in ways unthinkable to the architects of the personnel system we inherited.

Lockheed Job Listing Offers New Details About Long-Range Ground-Launched Hypersonic Weapon

BY JOSEPH TREVITHICK

ALockheed Martin job posting has offered new details about the design and development schedule of a tactical, ground-launched hypersonic weapon that the U.S. Army and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency are working on together. The company won the contract to proceed to the third phase of this program, known as Operational Fires, or OpFires, two weeks ago.

Steve Trimble, Aviation Week's defense editor and good friend of The War Zone spotted the job opening for a "Staff SRM [solid rocket motor] Propulsion Engineer" at Lockheed Martin's facility in Grand Prairie, Texas, on Jan. 20, 2020, and shared it on Twitter. The posting itself is dated Dec. 17, 2019. This was in advance of the Maryland-headquartered defense giant officially getting the Phase 3 OpFires contract, worth just under $32 million, on Jan. 10. Phase 1 had wrapped up in 2019 and Phase 2, which involves further development and testing of various components of the system, is ongoing now. Phase 3 will involve Lockheed Martin integrating the various pieces into a complete weapon system and conducting an end-to-end test, presently scheduled to take place in 2022.

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