BRAD ROBERTS
From 2004 to 2019, experts from the United States and China came together once or twice a year to discuss nuclear policy. Of the 22 total meetings, half were convened in Beijing and half in Hawaii, with each venue offering particular benefts to the dialogue (in Beijing, direct access to interested stakeholders, in Hawaii a less formal setting and a shared jet-lag burden). Participants included experts from think tanks and academia as well as former and current offcials participating in their private capacities. The U.S. and Chinese militaries were also represented at junior and senior levels.
Both sides also used the process to encourage the development of successor generation interest and expertise. Over this same period there were only a very small number of nuclear-focused meetings at the offcial level. This was essentially the only game in town. Such mixed gatherings are referred to as Track 1.5, as opposed to Track 1 (when offcials gather for offcial purposes) or Track 2 (when academic experts meet).
On the U.S. side, the dialogue was supported fnancially by the Department of Defense [via the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)]. Each session was coorganized by one or more U.S.-based think tanks and a Chinese counterpart.1 Over 15 years, DTRA invested approximately $5 million in the process. In 2019, DTRA terminated its support following declining Chinese participation and growing U.S. frustration with China’s failure to agree to an offcial dialogue. As of late 2020, whether, when, and how to resume offcial bilateral dialogue remain open questions. To inform thinking about these questions, CGSR proposed to bring together the core group of participants from both sides to take stock of the dialogue process. On September 21 and 22, we convened a virtual workshop involving a dozen experts from each country. Toward that end, CGSR partnered with the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA) to organize the event.
Our primary purposes were to: Ÿ review and take stock of two decades of nuclear-focused dialogue Ÿ better understand the existing bilateral strategic military relationship Ÿ identify emerging problems and opportunities to improve that relationship This report is the result. It includes the four discussion papers prepared for the event (as subsequently revised in light of the discussion) as well as a summary that highlights main themes. The list of participants is included in Appendix 1.
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