John Allen and Michael O’Hanlon
When President-elect Joe Biden takes the oath of office on Jan. 20, he will face many issues demanding immediate attention. According to some, ending the two-decade-old U.S. and NATO military engagement in Afghanistan should be one of those. Many also argue that the Feb. 29 deal between the United States and the Taliban requires American forces to be out by this May. We disagree with both of these points. Biden should go slow on Afghanistan.
The frustration of many with the “forever wars” of the Middle East is understandable. Nineteen years since 9/11, we have not found the formula to build a stable and self-sufficient Afghanistan. More than 2,000 Americans have died there. About $1.5 trillion in American taxpayer money has been spent. American allies have lost hundreds and spent hundreds of billions, too. Afghans themselves have been at war more than four decades, ever since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan — when they defeated Soviet forces and helped end the Cold War.
Yet it is worth bearing in mind several key points as the Biden team considers future policy options:
US role is valuable and sustainable
►As counterintuitive as it may sound, there has been some success in Afghanistan. There have been no subsequent large-scale attack against U.S. or Western interests originating from that country since 2001. That this accomplishment seems obvious does not make it unimportant.
►Without even President Donald Trump’s latest abrupt cuts, which Biden might need to consider partly reversing, the United States has reduced American forces in Afghanistan by 95% relative to the peak of 2011 (when one of us had the privilege of commanding U.S. and NATO forces there). 
►American casualty rates have declined even more sharply in percentage terms — and that was true even before the Taliban stopped taking aim at our forces as part of the Feb. 29 accord. Any loss of American life is too much. But compared with what could happen to this country if al-Qaida or the Islamic State gained a solid foothold in a future Afghanistan, taking advantage of either turmoil or Taliban rule, a small enduring presence could be our least bad option.
►The recent cost of the U.S. operation in Afghanistan has been $10 billion to $20 billion a year — hardly cheap, but a far cry from the triple-digit figures of earlier periods, and it's less than 3% of the U.S. defense budget.
►The U.S. role in Afghanistan is part of a larger NATO effort that the Biden team, rightly eager to rebuild America’s alliances, should approach multilaterally. Yes, we should do so while putting America’s own interests first — but that does not mean we should treat allies as afterthoughts. And Pakistan could be showing a greater willingness to be helpful in peace talks than before, though it is too soon to be sure.
►Over-the-horizon counterterrorism, say from ships in the Arabian Sea, is oxymoronic. Counterterrorism requires partnership with indigenous forces and quick reaction times for tactical operations. U.S. forces in country need not be big, but for the foreseeable future they do need to be present.
Preserve gains for girls and women
The intra-Afghan peace process is going very slowly. For some, that is reason to pull the plug. But it would be strange to risk handing over the country to the principal perpetrators of violence in Afghanistan as a reward for their intransigence at the talks in Doha, Qatar, and their unwillingness to reduce violence during the peace process.
Moreover, the Taliban’s ongoing ties to al-Qaida elements mean that it is not in compliance with the terms of the Feb. 29 accord. That point the Biden team should make early, even as it undertakes a broader and patient policy review.
The Taliban have also been unwilling to propose any serious ideas for power sharing with the government of President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah. They have not, for example, talked about an accord that might freeze the security forces of the two sides in place, invite in a small United Nations observation presence to monitor the cease-fire and gradually create a loose coordinating command mechanism to integrate the forces over time. Such ideas would prove seriousness. They have not yet been voiced.
Ultimately, working with a U.N. mediator perhaps, the United States and international community will need to help the peace process along with these kinds of suggestions. As another example, under any eventual peace deal, Afghans who face legal issues may be given the choice of the existing court system or a Taliban-controlled sharia system. Also, mechanisms need to be found to preserve gains in education for girls, and more broadly the role of women across civil society and the government. Minority protections must preserve the gains since 2001.
It is true that there will be no perfect solution to Afghanistan. Even finding imperfect solutions will likely take years. But we can be patient. The issue has already been relegated to the kind of second-tier national security matter consistent with its importance for U.S. national security. The level of the American presence and effort in Afghanistan are now sustainable. President-elect Biden does not need to prioritize this issue in his first 100 days in any rush to get out the door.
John Allen, former commander of the International Security Assistance Force, is president of the Brookings Institution, where Michael O’Hanlon (@MichaelEOHanlon)is a senior fellow.
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