Frida Ghitis
Venezuelan opposition leaders and the governments that back them just saw their strategy for dislodging the increasingly tyrannical regime of President Nicolas Maduro culminate in failure. Last Sunday, in farcical elections for a new legislature, Maduro’s supporters took control of the last remaining bastion of the opposition, the National Assembly. The legislature had served as the tip of the spear for a coordinated international campaign to remove Maduro, which was promoted by the Trump administration and supported by European and Latin American democracies.That plan, which launched two years ago, had tried to capitalize on the opposition’s control of the National Assembly. Opposition politicians had won an overwhelming majority during the last legislative elections, in 2015, which turned out to be Venezuela’s last credible polls. Although the regime later stripped the National Assembly of all its powers, the opposition still enjoyed the legitimacy of a duly elected government institution, even one with seemingly no practical authority, and found a way to leverage it.
After Maduro proclaimed himself the winner of a fraudulent presidential election in 2018, the National Assembly declared the presidency vacant and, following constitutional guidelines, named the head of the legislature, Juan Guaido, as the country’s rightful interim president until fair elections could be held. Guaido was soon recognized by some 50 countries as Venezuela’s legitimate head of state. The United States led a new “maximum pressure” campaign against the regime, including tightening sanctions, but an expected military uprising to oust Maduro failed to materialize.
The strategy was successful in boosting President Donald Trump’s bona fides among large segments of Latino voters in the United States—a significant contributor to Trump’s comfortable electoral win in Florida in November. It also helped galvanize support for the Venezuelan opposition among European democracies. But in its most important goal, carving a path toward a return to democracy, the strategy didn’t make any progress.
Last weekend’s dubious legislative elections went a long way in removing Guaido’s claim to the presidency. Before the vote, Maduro did everything he could to prevent the opposition from competing. The pro-Maduro Supreme Court removed the leaders of opposition parties, replacing them with politicians who had been thrown out of those parties because they were, in fact, Maduro loyalists. The court also appointed a new national electoral council in June, ignoring the fact that the constitution grants that power to the National Assembly.
As a result, opposition parties decided not to participate in the electoral charade. Popular opposition to Maduro was evident in the meager turnout. The government said just 31 percent of eligible voters participated, but the opposition said the total was in fact about half of that, despite enormous government pressure to vote. More than 70 percent of eligible Venezuelans participated in the 2015 election.
The question now is what the anti-Maduro forces can do next. The regime, and the new National Assembly, have little international legitimacy. The European Union’s top foreign policy official, Josep Borrell, said the election “failed to comply with the minimum international standards.” U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called the election “a fraud and a sham,” and said Washington will continue to recognize Guaido as Venezuela’s legitimate president. A group of Latin American countries, including Venezuela’s neighbors Colombia and Brazil, declared that the vote “lacks legality and legitimacy.”
Whatever the Venezuelan opposition does now, and however the U.S. chooses to help, no one is under any illusions. The Maduro regime is more entrenched than ever.
The opposition held a parallel referendum to compete with the official election and may still declare its members as the legitimate legislature. But it’s clear the original plan to push Maduro out didn’t work. With the help of Iran and Russia, Maduro was able to withstand the economic pressure exerted by the United States, even if those sanctions exacerbated already dire living conditions in Venezuela. A calamitous situation has since become much worse because of the coronavirus pandemic and the government’s continuing mismanagement of the economy.
Venezuelan hospitals are scenes of horror. The economy is projected to contract by an additional 25 percent this year, with inflation at 6,000 percent. The currency, the sovereign bolivar, is worthless, valued at about one-millionth of a dollar.
Unlike Trump, President-elect Joe Biden has experience with the Venezuela file. The one thing he knows is that it is a tough problem to solve. If Trump’s strategy failed, it’s also true that President Barack Obama’s did too, and Europe’s—and even the Pope’s attempts to reach a negotiated solution in Caracas.
Venezuela’s socialist leaders have been guided by their Cuban mentors, who have survived 60 years of U.S. efforts to force change on the island. Biden has no illusions about Maduro. He has called him a “dictator,” and has noted, correctly, that Maduro uses negotiations with the opposition as a ploy to kill time and weaken the intensity of demands for change.
The incoming administration is likely to shift Washington’s approach. Biden will use more targeted sanctions against individuals in the Maduro regime, while looking for ways to ease the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela and support nongovernmental organizations. Much more U.S. aid will likely be channeled initially toward health care and pandemic-related assistance. Biden may also do something that Trump refused to: grant Temporary Protected Status to Venezuelan refugees in the United States.
Biden will ultimately have to decide how visible a role the United States will play in Venezuela’s crisis. Previous U.S. presidents have tried both kinds of approaches. George W. Bush took the more visible route and served as an ideal foil for the late President Hugo Chavez, who painted the opposition as lackeys of the U.S., or “the empire,” as he called it. Obama lowered Washington’s visibility, trying to shift the focus back to Venezuelans’ own rejection of the regime. Trump threatened to invade Venezuela, which allowed Maduro to again paint the opposition as a tool of the United States.
In the end, none of those approaches made much headway. It’s likely that the Biden administration will work behind the scenes on economic and diplomatic sanctions, working multilaterally with other democracies, while speaking out publicly about the regime’s human rights violations.
Whatever the Venezuelan opposition chooses to do going forward, and however the United States and the European Union choose to help, no one is under any illusions. The Maduro regime is more entrenched than ever. Bringing democracy, and prosperity, back to Venezuela has become tougher than ever.
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