Judah Grunstein
.Now that world leaders and the D.C. foreign policy establishment have breathed a collective sigh of relief over Joe Biden’s election as U.S. president, things can get back to normal when it comes to preparing for a new administration in Washington. For world leaders, that means scrambling for access and favor, while readying offer sheets of how their governments can be of help to Biden’s team. For the D.C. establishment, that means angling to be part of that team, or else writing lengthy policy proposals that, unlike in 2016, might actually be read by the people who do end up on it.
Before long, of course, foreign governments will go from complaining about an absent America under Donald Trump to once again complaining about an overbearing America under the more conventional Biden. And that Washington establishment will go from proposing policy agendas to criticizing the ones Biden’s team has decided to pursue, while swapping rumors about clashing egos and internal tensions.
Some of those internal tensions could come into view in the coming weeks and months, as Biden’s team takes shape. A tug of war for influence is expected between holdovers from Barack Obama’s presidency who are pushing for restoration, meaning a return to the broad outlines of his White House’s approach; those who advocate for reform, to take into account the significant changes in the global landscape, particularly with regard to China, that have emerged over the past four years; and the progressive wing of the Democratic party that advocates for restraint, as part of a more radical overhaul that embraces a values-driven foreign policy.
In many ways, those debates will be more aspirational than practical. Foreign policy agendas, no matter how coherently formulated and laid out, are almost always overtaken by the events and crises they are meant to forestall and shape. So the most valuable framework will be one that is defined sharply enough to help guide action, while remaining general enough to be flexible in its application.
Three fundamental questions are worth considering in trying to formulate such an approach. What must the U.S. accomplish? What can it accomplish? And what should it accomplish?
When it comes to what U.S. foreign policy must accomplish, American presidents are fortunate. Despite decades of post-Cold War fearmongering, U.S. national security faces no existential threats, and the dominance of the U.S. dollar as the global exchange currency locks in numerous advantages. For the most part, then, U.S. foreign policy consists of legacy arrangements—like alliances and international organizations that help structure the global order—through which it pursues nonessential but exceedingly beneficial national interests. It is these legacy arrangements that suffered most under Trump.
But Trump is not the only factor behind the erosion of the global order that the U.S. did so much to help construct, as well as of the norms and values the U.S. has historically defended. Ideological competition from China, as well as the rise of populist authoritarianism, has also contributed. So, too, have the real and perceived failures of that order, which has not always been as liberal or as open as its advocates suggest, and hasn’t distributed the benefits it generates fairly enough within and among nations. Biden will recommit America to its alliances and multilateralism more broadly, and he has stated that his administration will make a priority of democracy promotion, including through a coalition of democratic states he hopes to assemble to that end.
It will certainly make a difference having a president in the White House willing to defend the global order, and one who believes in the importance of democracy and human rights. At the same time, a certain amount of humility is overdue when it comes to how effective a champion the U.S. can be, given the headwinds facing globalization and democracy abroad—but also at home. And in assembling a core coalition of likeminded states to defend the tenets of an open, liberal order, the Biden administration must not avoid the difficult discussions of that order’s failures and shortcomings, and how to address them. He should also resist the temptation to try to enlist this democratic coalition into a zero-sum competition with China, which would almost certainly guarantee its irrelevance.
The Biden administration should be guided by the notion that the U.S. leads most effectively not when it mounts a crusade, but when it takes up a mission.
The question of what the U.S. can accomplish has become more salient as its relative decline has become more visible. The invasion of Iraq discredited the idea that America’s dominant military power is sufficient for accomplishing its strategic objectives. Trump’s approach to Iran and Venezuela demonstrated the limits of what can be achieved with economic sanctions, which can easily inflict pain, but not necessarily secure preferred outcomes.
Obama’s foreign policy successes point the way to a more effective approach to wielding America’s enduring power. He combined sanctions with diplomacy to achieve the landmark deal to curb Iran’s nuclear program. The Paris Agreement on climate change and normalization with Cuba are further examples of the value of stubborn diplomacy. But they were also all arguably illustrations of the danger of wanting to “get to yes” too badly. And in refusing to compartmentalize nuclear talks with Iran and climate change diplomacy with China, Obama let both those governments off the hook for their problematic behavior in other realms.
In other arenas, Obama’s risk-averse inclination self-deterred the U.S. from responding more forcefully to important challenges, for instance with Russia. In some ways, then, Obama overlearned the lessons of Iraq, and his belief in America’s deep-rooted, long-term advantages—and its adversaries’ fundamental weaknesses—made him lose sight of the fact that advantage is never fixed. It can be altered through action and initiative, and eroded through inaction. America can still deploy its considerable power to accomplish its objectives, but the Biden administration will have to embrace a greater tolerance for risk and friction to do so.
Between what America must accomplish and what it can accomplish is the broad expanse of what it should accomplish. In this, the realm of choice, the Biden administration should be guided by the notion that the U.S. leads most effectively not when it mounts a crusade, but when it takes up a mission. Relative decline also presents opportunities in this regard, because constraints can enforce discipline.
The implication for the U.S. is that it should no longer seek to remake the world in its own image, nor should it strive to impose its priorities. Instead, it should offer to partner with the countries it hopes to attract, and above all avoid forcing choices on them that they don’t want to make, particularly when it comes to the strategic competition with China. Focusing on what the U.S. can offer, what Howard French has called its value proposition, means identifying America’s strengths in that strategic competition, but also being receptive to what its interlocutors need, and then finding ways to align the two.
The most useful framework for U.S. foreign policy, the one that takes into account the changes that have occurred over the past four years within America and in the world beyond, is an ambitious and engaged version of restraint, whose three watchwords would be: compete, contest and conserve. America still enjoys unparalleled attractiveness when it comes to consolidating partnerships and leading coalitions that can effectively compete with its adversaries. It must once again use them more strategically.
Biden would also do well to pay attention to at least one thing Trump was skilled at: the ability to put adversaries on the back foot. Trump wasn’t savvy enough to pursue those advantages effectively to contest America’s adversaries. Biden’s team must be.
Finally, America’s national power has now suffered through several decades of erosion since the pinnacle of its unipolar moment, from the disastrous invasion of Iraq, to the financial crisis and then four years of Trump. Above all else, Biden must avoid similar missteps to conserve what is left of it. Used wisely, there is still much it can accomplish.
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