By DAVE MAKICHUK
The US Defense Department says the entire military must get better at “Irregular Warfare” to fend off the rise of not just nonstate terror groups and cyber attackers, but to stymie Russia and China as well.
The National Defense Strategy pivots the Pentagon to focus on potential conflict with those countries and other advanced militaries instead of lower-tech militants in the Middle East and Africa, according to a report by Rachel S. Cohen at Air Force Magazine.
To put it succinctly, “irregular warfare” isn’t just for special operations forces.
A newly published summary of an annex to the 2018 National Defense Strategy argues despite decades of asymmetric conflict — wars where enemies have exploited weaknesses in U.S. technology and tactics — the Pentagon is still underprepared for that kind of combat, the report said.
The summary, released Oct. 2, points to China, Russia, and Iran as “willing practitioners of campaigns of disinformation, deception, sabotage, and economic coercion, as well as proxy, guerrilla and covert operations.”
Those types of fights don’t fit neatly into the physical “great power competition” the US expects to wage with fighter jets, hypersonic weapons and other advanced assets, the report said.
“Our department’s shift towards great power competition does not signal an abandonment of the critical competencies we have developed to prosecute irregular warfare,” the summary said.
“Instead, this shift gives us a vital opportunity to update our approach to irregular warfare and meet the full range of challenges posed by our adversaries and competitors today.”
Irregular warfare refers to conflict with enemies like the Islamic State group that have less-advanced technology than the US, are generally not part of formal state-run militaries, and that sow disinformation and propaganda to achieve their goals, the report said.
Rather than relying on traditional military action such as airstrikes and ground invasions, irregular warfare leans more heavily on digital deception and weapons that exploit holes in an adversary’s abilities.
Paratroopers get up to the defensive position and unleash their weapon systems at targets downrange at a combined arms live fire lane in the Grafenwoehr Training Area. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Jacob Sawyer)
Irregular warfare has long fallen in the court of special operations troops, whose approach can be more flexible and unconventional than their counterparts, the report said.
The military must rethink how the joint force will use forces for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency missions as well as digital ventures like cyber and information warfare, the DOD said.
To address the issue, the Pentagon advised more consistent investment in irregular warfare capabilities that are easily upgradable and cost-effective, to prepare for “gray area” conflict — actions that could escalate from cyberspace into the physical realm.
According to Real Clear Defense online, the Russian model appears to be a Cold War regression with emphasis on proxies to conduct irregular warfare in a geo-political scramble for client states and overseas bases.
However, the Russian model leverages technological advances to gain effectiveness and efficiency via subversion. Russia’s fomenting of rebellion in eastern Ukraine gave Russia the opportunity to seize Crimea while simultaneously derailing Ukraine’s inclusion into the European Union and NATO.
During the Cold War, old-school radio, television, and print propaganda was often dismissed by adversaries when attribution was obvious. Today’s opaque attribution of computer network attacks gives Russia plausible deniability while sowing confusion.
Meanwhile, China re-crafted the Russian model based on Chinese strategic thinking to create a “penetrating and persistent campaign.”
The Chinese model — which falls into “gray area” activities — preys upon ambiguities in international law and eschews the level of violence associated with irregular warfare tactics, the report said.
U.S. Marines observe an MV-22B Osprey prepare to land during a simulated embassy reinforcement at Kin, Okinawa, Japan. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Colton Garrett).
Unlike Russia, China’s unconventional warfare does not use special operations forces, but involves the physical, de facto, acquisition of territory. China relies on less overtly hostile forces such as para-police and coast guard forces.
Like Russia, the China model is intertwined with information warfare and strategic communications to convince its own population of the righteousness of its cause and to stiff-arm international complaints of China’s failure to follow conventions, norms, and rulings on disputed territory, the report said.
Unlike Russia, China’s efforts at subversion do not rely on insurgency but instead sews division between potential allied opponents. For example, China’s wooing of President Duterte was partially responsible for the cooling of US-Philippine relations.
China is also integrating diplomatic maneuvers, economic, and military activities to achieve its strategic objectives. For example, Chinese diplomatic and economic efforts in the South China Sea have softened efforts to enforce the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative has built a “string of pearls” of airports, ports, and special economic zones across South Asia and East Africa provides China “strategic strong points” for basing and resupply while simultaneously limiting competitors’ options, the report said.
The debt structure of these development projects typically result in Chinese oversight of the operations and, in some cases, repossession.
It also provides a chain of intelligence collection posts. This territorial breadth creates de facto buffer zones that create time and space to deal with any potential adversary.
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