After a decade of modernisation and reform, Russia’s conventional military capabilities are at their highest since the country’s armed forces were formed in 1992. Can Moscow sustain the equipment-modernisation gains made as part of the 2020 State Armament Programme?
Russia’s armed forces entered the last decade trying to come to terms with a lacklustre performance in its short war with Georgia. Russia struggled with an ageing equipment inventory and remained over-reliant on conscription. It begins the 2020s with a recapitalised inventory, a successful military intervention in Syria and far greater numbers of professional personnel. The key aims of the modernisation and reform programme implemented over the past ten years have been broadly met.
The impact and implications of the Russian military’s modernisation and reform efforts are explored in the latest IISS Strategic Dossier Russia’s Military Modernisation: An Assessment. It recognises that while Russia’s armed forces today are far smaller than those of the Soviet era, conventional military capabilities are now at their highest since the Russian armed forces were formed in 1992. From 2010, sustained investment has supported an equipment-modernisation programme across all services, even if some military arms have benefited more than others. Structural reforms were also pursued as part of the New Look programme, launched towards the end of 2008, to improve performance. Taken together, these now provide Moscow with conventional armed forces at a far higher level of readiness than previously, which can be rapidly deployed. And as the Syrian and Ukrainian campaigns underscore, it is a capacity that the Russian government is willing to use when it considers its interests to be threatened.
Above and below the threshold
While Moscow has willingly adopted ‘below the threshold’ hostile activities, including information warfare and the use of cyber domain, it has by no means abandoned the traditional markers of military capability. Indeed, the Dossier suggests that from a Russian perspective this is not a binary choice. Rather, both sets of capabilities are seen as complementary and necessary to meet Russia’s defence and security requirements.
The Dossier notes the broad success of the modernisation and reform programme in the decade to 2020 but suggests that the coming decade will be no less significant. A defining feature of the equipment-modernisation effort supported by the 2020 State Armament Programme (SAP) is the continued reliance for the most part on existing designs. While the Ground Forces (SV) received improved main battle tanks as part of SAP 2020, these were upgrades of existing models. The Aerospace Forces (VKS) similarly was the beneficiary of new combat aircraft, but again these were upgrades of existing designs.
For both services the initial aim of SAP 2020 was to support the introduction of new designs: for the SV it was to be the T-14 Armata main battle tank, and for the VKS the Su-57 Felon multi-role fighter aircraft. For neither service was this goal met, with development problems continuing to delay both projects. Instead the SV turned to upgrades of existing types, taking delivery of the T-72B3, T-80BVM and T-90M, while the VKS continued to acquire the Su-35S Flanker M and Su-30SM Flanker H.
It is perhaps the Navy (VMF) that has seen the largest gap between acquisition ambition and actual delivery. Even so, the widespread introduction on naval platforms of the 3M14 Kalibr (SS-N-30A Sagaris) 2,500 km-range land-attack cruise missile has greatly improved the service’s land-attack capability. The 3M14 is almost certainly capable of being fitted with both conventional and nuclear warheads.
Into the 2030s
While these designs provide the Russian armed forces with credible combat platforms for the coming decade and into the 2030s, they are all based on Soviet-era programmes. If Russia is to sustain the equipment-modernisation gains made as part of SAP 2020, it will therefore need to make better progress in completing the development – and entry into service − of the new combat-equipment types that will be the cornerstone of Russian capabilities from the mid-2030s and beyond.
This need is also readily apparent in the strategic forces, which fared better during the lean years of the 1990s and early 2000s than the conventional military services. Even here, however, the Russian defence ministry has had to extend the service life of missile systems and introduce new capabilities on ageing platforms. The Avangard hypersonic boost glide system was likely intended to be fielded as part of the RS-28 Sarmat (SS-X-29) liquid-fuelled heavy intercontinental ballistic missile. Delays to the latter have meant that Avangard has instead been deployed first using the aged RS-18 (SS-19 Stiletto mod 4).
Russia’s economic performance will be important in determining the level of continuing investment in defence, and the defence industry, over the coming decade, as part of SAP 2027 and beyond. While the government will almost certainly be willing to curtail expenditure elsewhere to support defence spending, how the economy fares will still hold fundamental sway over the prospects for defence investment.
As a result of a decade of modernisation and reform, Russia’s armed forces today provide the government with a far more credible tool to use – or threaten to use − if deemed necessary. This surety is based on a better-equipped, better-trained and more professional military, while the ultimate guarantor of Russia’s security continues to be its strategic nuclear arsenal. Its conventional forces, however, have neither the strength in depth, nor the equipment or weapons arsenal, to sustain a war of attrition against a peer rival or an alliance. Should Moscow deploy its conventional military on a large scale, the Dossier argues that it would look to secure a quick decisive outcome with a view to avoiding either a prolonged conflict it fears it would lose, or the risk of having to escalate into the nuclear realm.
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