The purpose of this study is to identify challenges regarding the transition from large scale combat operations to consolidation of gains as described in the 2017 US Army Field Manual 3-0 in order to inform the US Army in general and the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate in particular in the process of developing new doctrine. For the first time, Field Manual 3-0 officially implements consolidation of gains and the related physical consolidation area as part of the operational framework into US Army doctrine. Thus, the thesis topic is significant to the military profession, because it intends to familiarize political and military leaders at all levels of war, particularly at the tactical level, with the doctrinal idea behind consolidation of gains as well as its related challenges, ramifications, and implications. In addition, combined arms doctrine directorate has not yet broken down the broad tactics and procedures from Field Manual 3-0 into more detailed techniques. This study will add to the endeavor of filling this gap.
Hence, this manuscript focuses mainly on tactical to operational level considerations in order to help drive doctrine development. Issues The US Army has not fought conventional large-scale combat operations since the end of the Second Gulf War in 2003. Since then, the main emphasis of organizing, training, and equipping the force has been on stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, the military has undergone several structural reforms, which has led to reduction in 2 both size and numbers. In the meantime, the current operating environment has changed significantly over the last 25 years. Near-peer threats have emerged such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. Those threats, as well as malicious non-state adversaries, have developed capacities and capabilities that challenge and partly overmatch US forces in land combat and also in other domains of warfare: air, maritime, space, and information environment.
At the same time, those challenges differ significantly from the still on-going campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. This evolution of the operating environment, characterized by the emergence of the information age and peer and near peer adversaries, caused the US Army to address those paradigm shifts by adjusting operations doctrine. One fundamental assumption about large-scale combat operations found in Field Manual 3-0—Army units must be able to operate in sensor rich and heavily contested multi-domain battlefields requiring ground forces to enable operations in other domains, especially air. In other words, while the US Army has been in a receiving mode profiting from joint capabilities, it has now conceptually shifted into an enabling mode, setting conditions for the joint force. Quick and decisive offensive operations such as strikes against enemy long-range fire capabilities or radar sites, are necessary to maintain tempo and momentum while bypassing enemy remnants. This logic inherently contains the necessity to consolidate operational gains in order to achieve the ultimate policy or strategic goal of an operation
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