From the Israeli perspective, Iran’s expanding missile capacity and network of non-state militia partners pose a grave threat. Iran’s past support for terrorist attacks within Israel itself and against Israelis abroad, combined with inflammatory rhetoric expressing the intention to ‘wipe Israel off the map’, further elevates the Iranian menace in the Israeli psyche, write Dalia Dassa Kaye and Shira Efron.
Concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions have consumed Israeli decision-makers for decades. Another grave concern is what Israelis perceive as Iran’s growing political and military influence in the region, particularly in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. Capitalising on regional conflicts and political vacuums, Iran is building what Israel views as a ‘land bridge’ of friendly, largely Shia forces from Tehran to the Mediterranean. Never mind that Iran faces serious limitations to its regional power-projection capabilities and is domestically vulnerable after years of sanctions, repressive rule and poor governance. Or that Israel remains the most powerful and well-equipped military force in the region, supported by its strategic ally, the United States. From the Israeli perspective, Iran’s expanding missile capacity and network of non-state militia partners pose a grave threat. Iran’s past support for terrorist attacks within Israel itself and against Israelis abroad, combined with inflammatory rhetoric expressing the intention to ‘wipe Israel off the map’, further elevates the Iranian menace in the Israeli psyche. In short, there is little debate in Israel about Iran’s desire or ability to do it harm.
Until recently, however, views on how to deal with the Iranian nuclear challenge diverged. From fissures within the security establishment about the utility of military options and the wisdom of the Iranian nuclear agreement to concerns among political leaders about publicly opposing an American president, Israel’s positions on Iran policy were more divided over the past decade than is often understood. While a consensus emerged about the need to counter Iran in Syria even before the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – that is, the nuclear deal – Israeli views on Iran’s nuclear programme remained contested.
The most significant divisions arose between Israel’s political and security establishments, with the latter taking a less alarmist view of Iran and the nuclear agreement than Israel’s political leaders, most notably Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. As a former senior intelligence official noted, ‘Israel’s security establishment has seen Iran as a serious threat that needs to be managed. For Netanyahu, fearing Iran is like a religion.’ These cracks persisted into the first year of the Trump administration, when it was still unclear whether a US president openly hostile to the nuclear agreement would nonetheless remain in the deal. A number of prominent Israeli security officials and analysts, even those originally opposed to the JCPOA, were in favour of the US staying in the agreement and believed it was working to keep the Iranian nuclear challenge contained. Having delayed the nuclear threat, the JCPOA provided Israel with space to shift its attention to the more immediate and prevalent challenge the country faced from Iran, namely its growing influence in Syria.
Once President Donald Trump decided to pull the US out of the JCPOA in 2018, though, domestic debates within Israel over Iran policies dissipated. A new consensus emerged in support of the Trump administration’s ‘maximum pressure’ approach, which many Israelis hope may lead to the collapse of the Islamic Republic. The increased Israeli focus on Iranian entrenchment in Syria and the belief that the JCPOA had empowered Iran regionally brought the political and security communities into closer alignment and overshadowed previous differences over how to handle the nuclear threat and relations with Washington.
Notwithstanding a minority of Israeli analysts who question the effectiveness of the American maximum-pressure approach in achieving its stated goals, there is widespread optimism that the strategy is weakening Iran and its regional networks, particularly following the United States’ killing of Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander Qasem Soleimani in early January. Even the analysts who question the merits of maximum pressure do not propose an alternative strategy.
The perception of Iranian vulnerability has only grown in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis, which has hit Iran particularly hard as its leaders blundered their response to the outbreak. Israelis are expressing confidence that the twin pressures of the pandemic and economic hardship are leading Iran to pull back its forces from Syria. After an attempted Iranian cyber attack on Israeli water infrastructure in spring 2020, some Israeli analysts viewed Israel’s successful retaliatory cyber attack, which shut down an Iranian port, as further evidence of Iranian vulnerability. Such assessments reinforce Israeli support for continuing pressure on Iran despite calls for easing economic sanctions during the pandemic.
Public debates in Israel over its Iran policies have largely disappeared. Once the Trump administration decided to withdraw from the JCPOA and apply maximum pressure, Israelis across the political and security establishments embraced American policies.Dalia Dassa Kaye and Shira Efron
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