Elizabeth Bachman
Since the mid-2000s, successive leaders of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have called
explicitly for Beijing to improve its external propaganda capabilities and international
influence.1 Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) first elevated these efforts in 2004, and they gained renewed
urgency after the 2008 Beijing Olympics; international protests over China’s human rights
record largely overshadowed the lead-up to the games. The following year, the Chinese
government started investing billions into efforts to improve Chinese foreign-directed media
and combat a perceived anti-China bias in Western reporting.
These funds paid for Chinese
state media and broadcasters to produce content in a broader range of foreign languages,
establish overseas bureaus, and develop increasingly sophisticated content aimed at foreign
audiences.3
Although these efforts began in the previous decade, they have grown in scale and
sophistication since Xi Jinping (习近平) became general secretary of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) in 2012. Under his leadership, the Party has made a concerted effort to tighten its
control over China’s internal and external propaganda apparatuses. He has overseen the
formal consolidation of Party control over China’s print media, with recent administrative
reorganizations moving direct control of the media out of state structures and into the hands
of the Party.4
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