The beginning of the end or doomed from the start? As part of a series of blogs to mark the publication of the Armed Conflict Survey 2020, Isa Gailani and Viraj Solanki reflect on the immensely fragile peace process that seeks to bring an end to nearly two decades of conflict in Afghanistan.
The United States and the Taliban signed an unprecedented peace agreement on 29 February 2020, which was intended to pave the way for the Afghan government and the Taliban to engage in an intra-Afghan dialogue. In the months leading up to the signing, violence had intensified across the country, primarily due to an increase in attacks by the Taliban; in the months following, the Taliban continued its campaign of violence and political disputes within the Afghan government endured.
The deal was signed after nine rounds of formal negotiations and only months after US President Donald Trump had stated that the peace talks ‘were dead’. Following a pair of deadly attacks in Kabul in September 2019, including one near the US embassy that killed an American soldier, Trump cancelled a signing ceremony between the Taliban and the US government at Camp David.
The US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, Zalmay Khalilzad, subsequently continued with efforts to revive the negotiations. The Trump administration’s aim to withdraw the majority of US troops from Afghanistan saw major breakthroughs in early 2020, leading to the signing of the agreement in Qatar.
Framework for peace
Prior to the signing of the ‘Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan’, a seven-day reduction in violence was implemented by the Taliban and the US. The agreement was comprised of four parts: a commitment that the Taliban or other groups, including al-Qaeda, would not use Afghan soil to conduct attacks against the US and its allies; a timeline for the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan; and a date for the commencement of an intra-Afghan dialogue, which would, as the fourth item on the list, include a permanent ceasefire as part of its agenda.
The agreement stipulated that US and NATO forces would withdraw gradually from Afghanistan over a period of 14 months, with the US military presence to be reduced from 12,000 to 8,600 by 15 July – the withdrawal continued as planned, as of late May. This was based on the condition that all sides reduce violence by as much as 80% across the country and the Taliban maintain a ceasefire with international forces only.
Once agreed, an intra-Afghan dialogue was expected to start on 10 March, preceded by the release of 5,000 Taliban prisoners held by the Afghan government, in exchange for 1,000 Afghan government prisoners held by the Taliban. This would lead to the final phase, which would establish a joint mechanism to implement a permanent ceasefire.
The US–Taliban agreement is heavily reliant on the cooperation of all parties both domestically and regionally. This is an ambitious demand in a country that has seen several decades of war, involving a wide variety of different actors. Notably, the US–Taliban agreement was constructed without the presence of the Afghan government. On the same day as the US–Taliban agreement was signed, the US and Afghan governments signed a joint declaration. However, differences in the language between the two documents resulted in difficulties in implementing points raised in both documents.
Intra-Afghan dialogue delays
Importantly, the planned prisoner release was the subject of one of these differences. The early March deadline was optimistic, with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani only allowing the phased release of Taliban prisoners. As of late May, nearly 2,000 of the 5,000 Taliban prisoners had been released by the Afghan government, while over 250 Afghan government prisoners had been released by the Taliban.
Political disputes within the Afghan government delayed the establishment of a coherent stance on the peace process and its redlines for negotiating with the Taliban. A dispute over the results of the September 2019 presidential election led to both Ghani and his political rival Dr Abdullah Abdullah claiming that they were Afghanistan’s rightful president.
A resolution was finally achieved on 17 May, with Abdullah agreeing to a compromise following increased international pressure and the threat of a US$1 billion cut in aid from the US. Ghani would remain as president, but Dr Abdullah’s party would appoint half of the cabinet ministers and he would lead the peace process with the Taliban. Abdullah accepted a role as Chairman of the High Council of National Reconciliation, which includes overseeing the 21-member Afghan government negotiating team, representing all political, civil-society and tribal elements of Afghan society.
Prospects for intra-Afghan talks
The intra-Afghan dialogue has yet to take place following the stalled formation of an inclusive government, a surge in violence in Afghanistan – with over 3,800 Taliban attacks since February – and the delayed prisoner release. Animosity and mistrust have increased on both sides, exacerbated by the fact that some Taliban prisoners released by the Afghan government have returned to the battlefield.
Differences also remain over women’s rights and the future of the Afghan constitution, including the Taliban’s desire for Afghanistan to be an Islamic Emirate, in place of the current Islamic Republic. These systemic issues point to a protracted stalemate in Afghanistan.
Although the Taliban’s spokesman has called for an inclusive government in Afghanistan, questions remain as to whether the Taliban is in fact buying time to further its insurgency, following the continued withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan. On 12 May, the violence in Afghanistan reached its highest level since the signing of the peace agreement and included an attack on a maternity ward in a Kabul hospital. The Taliban denied any involvement, while Washington indicated that it was conducted by the Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (ISIS-KP).
However, President Ghani subsequently ordered Afghan security forces to resume offensive operations against the Taliban, a step up from the ‘active defence’ posture that it adopted in mid-March. Afghanistan’s National Security Adviser Hamdullah Mohib stated that there was ‘little point in continuing to engage [the] Taliban in peace talks’. Until a permanent ceasefire is implemented in Afghanistan, militant groups such as ISIS-KP, will continue to exploit tensions in the country.
The peace process in Afghanistan has many hurdles ahead and has been on the brink of failure since the agreement was signed in February. Afghanistan’s fragile roadmap to peace has now been impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has resulted in at least 220 deaths. COVID-19 emphasises the urgent need for the Taliban to reduce its violence significantly by building upon the three-day Eid ceasefire from 24 May with the Afghan government, regional actors to increase their cooperation, an intra-Afghan dialogue to begin, and a permanent ceasefire to be implemented.
No comments:
Post a Comment