Alexandra Stark
This report examines the combined influence of four factors by about 2014 led three Gulf monarchies to change their calculations and adopt proxy warfare strategies aimed more consistently at managing crises that threatened their spheres of interest and maintaining the political status quo for the region rather than revising the regional balance of power. After introducing you to the three Gulf monarchies the report is divided into four sections. The first section examines each of these three Gulf monarchies’ strategic interests in the early post-Arab Spring period from 2011 through 2014 and goes on to look at how these interests shaped their proxy interventions in Bahrain, Libya, and Syria. The second section examines the four factors that led the Gulf states to change their strategic assessments, and the third section examines the interventions that followed that turning point in Yemen. Finally, the conclusion discusses what the Gulf states’ shifting approach means for U.S. policy in the Middle East.
Thank you to David Sterman for his careful editorial guidance and support throughout the production of this report, to the rest of the International Security Program team, and Joe Wilkes for formatting the report. I would also like to thank my PhD dissertation advisor Dr. Lise M Howard, and committee members Dr. Andrew Bennett and Dr. Daniel Byman. Their guidance greatly shaped my dissertation framing and research, which in turn helped me conceptualize the framework for this report. Many thanks also to Nate Rosenblatt, the reviewer of this paper, and Andrew Leber for their thoughtful feedback. Any remaining errors are mine alone.
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