James McDonnell
This paper responds to a topic from the Army War College’s Key Strategic Issues List, 2018-2020: Evaluate the ramifications of China’s and/or Russia’s interests in Africa for U.S. land forces and suggest options, both to compete and to cooperate, to further U.S. interests.As there is no Department of Defense (DoD) definition of “competition,” I will employ a Rand Corporation suggested definition: “Competition in the international realm involves the attempt to gain advantage, often relative to others believed to pose a challenge or threat, through the self-interested pursuit of contested goods such as power, security, wealth, influence, and status.”1For “cooperation,” I reference Helen Milner’s definition of “goal-directed behavior that entails mutual policy adjustments so that all sides end up better off than they would otherwise be.”2 Furthermore, while U.S. land forces may benefit from competition or cooperation with Chinese elements in Africa, I judge that they possess limited agency to compete or cooperate in the context of these definitions. Therefore, I will take a whole-of-government approach to furthering U.S. interests in Africa vis-à-vis China.
Executive Summary
The Chinese presence on the African continent, exemplified by large-scale transportation infrastructure projects, overt and covert arms sales, peacekeeping operations, and the establishment of the first of potentially several overseas bases, is an irritant, but not yet a threat, to America’s enduring interest in establishing a secure, stable, and prosperous Africa. This is not a return to the Cold War where Washington and Moscow saw Africa as a zero-sum game as China has as much to gain as Washington from a stable and prosperous African continent. Nonetheless, a strategy to manage these developments, in an era of global power competition, will ensure America’s standing, meet broader foreign policy objectives, and permit continuous freedom of movement on the continent and its littoral regions. This paper addresses courses of action that for the near to midterm will maintain a favorable balance of power:
Negotiations designed to increase the transparency of Chinese arms sales;
Formalized engagements with the militaries of China and African nations to develop best practices in peacekeeping operations;
Collaborating with our African partners to develop sustainable and affordable means for the financing and construction of transportation infrastructure.
To substantiate these recommendations, this paper reviews the current operating environment as Washington and Beijing develop and maintain military relationships with their African counterparts. It addresses both Chinese and American diplomatic and economic objectives—from both an historical and current perspective—and how Washington’s efforts, until recently, have been comparatively ineffective. Lastly, the paper examines potential impediments, particularly the COVID-19 pandemic, which are likely to complicate the implementation of the recommended multi- and bilateral courses of action.
1. Current Operating Environment
This chapter briefly reviews foreign military relations among African nations and the depth of the infrastructure deficit that impedes the continent’s development. It will show how China, over the past two decades, has improved its military-to-military relations with several key African nations as evidenced by increasing arms sales and peacekeeping deployments. In contrast, the influence of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) which has fostered closer ties with many African nations since its 2008 establishment may be decremented owing to more pressing global priorities. Lastly, this chapter offers a precis of Africa’s infrastructure shortfalls and how China, by bankrolling major construction projects, may have undermined the financial solvency and good governance of several African states.
1.1 China’s Military-to-Military Relations
China’s military-to-military relationship with their African counterparts reached a high-water mark in June 2018 when Beijing hosted a two-week “China-Africa Defense and Security Forum” (CADSF) with representatives from 49 African nations.3 A month later, with the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan, Chinese officials addressed how it would provision defense and security assistance to Africa.4
This meeting represented a stark evolution of China’s foreign policy which was forged in 1954 and was more commonly known as the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”:
non-interference;
mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity;
equality and mutual benefit;
mutual non-aggression;
peaceful coexistence.5
In sum, China refrained from arms transfers, prohibited deploying forces beyond its borders, and avoided establishing overseas bases. That may no longer be the case. Recent academic studies suggest that Beijing policymakers are liberally reinterpreting “non-interference” so that it can be aligned with what many Chinese leaders believe is the start of a “Great Rejuvenation of China.”6
Arms Transfers
Both Moscow and Beijing had ramped up military aid to the continent by the start of the 1960s and began competing with one another in the wake of the Sino-Soviet split of the mid-1960s.7 A 1964 study reported that the Sino-Soviet bloc (when viewed as joint monolith) had provided as much as $60 million to at least eight nations and several revolutionary groups. Typically, assistance was offered to those states that were either denied Western aid or were dissatisfied with what they had received. In some instances, China likely provided financing and training in lieu of weapons:
China established a military mission in Mogadishu, Somalia to train guerilla fighters on strategy and tactics. Beijing reportedly provided interest-free loans to Somalia to underwrite their border conflicts with Ethiopia.
Beijing later concluded a military aid agreement with Zanzibar before they merged with what is currently known as Tanzania.
By the 1990s, China became a leading arms dealer with a significant stock of old weapons that were sent to Africa, cementing Beijing’s reputation as an affordable but unreliable alternative to Washington or Moscow.8 By March 2016, more than two-thirds of African countries were equipped with Chinese military material which “reflected the broader growth in Beijing’s influence and investment in the continent” according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies.9
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