Meir Elran, Amichai Cohen, Carmit Padan, Idit Shafran Gittleman
A team of researchers from the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) and the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) have conducted a study on how the IDF – particularly through the Home Front Command – could best use its various capacities to assist in the struggle against the coronavirus. The IDF should serve as a support system to reinforce and supplement civilian agencies, but it should not be drawn into the overall management of the crisis or specific economic and social tasks that exceed its authority, in order to avoid contravening democratic principles. Transfer of responsibility to the IDF for the management of mass disasters should be considered only in extreme cases of a national catastrophe where state systems have ceased to function. Even then, military action must be clearly subordinate to the political echelon, with close parliamentary and legal supervision.
The coronavirus crisis threatens to undermine fundamental concepts and worldviews in a range of fields. Uncertainty and confusion dominate the public discourse in most countries combating the spread of the virus. So far Israel has been relatively successful in handling COVID-19, which constitutes a threat not only to public health but also to the national economy and society. At the same time, Israel has contended with a lengthy and complex political and constitutional crisis, and the stability of the newly formed government is in doubt. The nexus between the political and the coronavirus crises, which has exposed considerable weaknesses in the civilian system, could also challenge Israeli democracy. One of the most troubling aspects of this challenge relates to the question of IDF engagement in the management of the crisis. The purpose of this article is to propose guidelines and limitations on engagement of the IDF in the efforts to cope with mass disasters in Israel (in legal terminology, civilian emergency events), based on the lessons of the coronavirus pandemic so far.
Basic Assumptions
The purpose of the IDF is to defend the State of Israel, and to ensure its survival and its victory in war. According to the IDF mission statement, “The purpose of the IDF is to defend the existence and independence of the State of Israel, and the security of its citizens and inhabitants.”
The absolute subordination of the IDF to the elected political echelon must be strictly maintained. Basic Law: The Army (1976) stipulates that “the Israel Defense Force is the army of the State” and that “the army is subject to the authority of the Government.”
The IDF’s deployment in the civilian sphere must be based on explicit legal authority. Such authority is granted by the Civil Defense Law (1951) only to the Civil Defense Forces (today – the Home Front Command, HFC), which are authorized to take action to save lives even when no explicit security threat is present. The legal authority for all IDF forces to assist in a crisis is also found in the Police Order (2006), which states that in the event of a civilian emergency the IDF may assist the police in handling a mass disaster. In extreme cases, the Prime Minister may transfer the authority to handle the event to the IDF. The designation of a civilian emergency event that lasts longer than seven days requires a government decision and approval by the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee. So far, the corona pandemic has not been designated as such.
The pandemic has already created a severe crisis in the healthcare, economic, and social fields that is likely to continue and even worsen. Nevertheless, thus far it has not reached the level of a mass disaster or a war. Framing it as a war is not helpful in understanding or managing the pandemic.
Overall, the Israeli public has demonstrated a fairly high level of compliance with the government’s ongoing instructions on matters such as social distancing and self-protection against infection.
IDF Engagement in the Civilian Sphere
In the COVID-19 crisis, the IDF was quick to extend various forms of assistance to meet specific civilian needs that civilian authorities have found difficult to meet, either because of deficient prior preparedness or due to high demand, particularly from less privileged segments of the population. Military engagement in the crisis has mainly focused on large-scale direct assistance (18,000 soldiers at the height of the effort) to individuals in need and to the elderly in outbreak hotspots. Most of the assistance was provided by the HFC, which has vast experience in aiding civilians in emergencies (primarily security-oriented), as well as an extensive permanent presence within local authorities (through its network of Local Authority Liaison Units). Considerable media attention was given to the deployment of additional military units – up to 14 battalions were stationed in critical arenas – and of senior commanders from outside the HFC. Moreover, former senior military officers have become involved in the management of towns with high levels of sickness – e.g., ultra-Orthodox areas with a high rate of infection, providing individual counseling to local authorities and using their contacts with the IDF and the government ministries.
IDF soldiers were also recruited to assist the police in enforcing the lockdown, and in patrols, isolating restricted zones, and manning roadblocks. The IDF was careful to be less conspicuous in enforcement tasks and to avoid unnecessary friction with civilians. At the same time, the IDF was eager to demonstrate its technological, communication, and data processing skills that bolstered the national effort, particularly through the Intelligence Directorate. Similar help was provided by the Israeli Security Agency (Shin Bet) and the Mossad.
The IDF is first and foremost responsible for its regular and demanding tasks of ongoing security, training, and force buildup. It must therefore protect its soldiers and commanders from COVID-19. Thus, while the military involvement was considerable and extensive (until beginning to diminish with the easing of the lockdown), it was also highly focused and cautious, precisely so as to avoid superfluous friction with civilians or display a provocative presence in sensitive areas. HFC commander Tamir Yadai (in an April 8 interview with Yediot Ahronot) stressed that this was “a civilian, not a military event. It is a professional case that fundamentally concerns medical personnel…The Prime Minister, the National Security Council (NSC) and the Ministry of Health are managing it, and everyone else is guided by them.” His remarks reflect the law and the Israeli norm that give considerable freedom to the HFC (but not other units) to deploy on civilian missions. The HFC can and should be used whenever it has an advantage over civilian systems, including evacuation of civilians, food supply, and management of temporary living facilities and hospitals.
Thanks to its contribution to the civilian effort the IDF earned much praise among the public, burnishing its image as an army of the people for the people. The IDF focus on the vulnerable ultra-Orthodox sector has created an opportunity for a future dialogue with a population that generally has little connection with the military. This also occurred with Israel’s Arab sector, much of which welcomed the aid provided by the HFC in their localities.
Indeed, the IDF has so far succeeded in maintaining appropriate limitations regarding engagement in the civilian effort to curb the virus. Yadai stated, “Our responsibility is greater than our authority; we respond to every request for help.” This is the essence of the concept of “extended responsibility” that the IDF strives to evoke in the public. The Chief of Staff emphasized this same approach in an interview with Army Radio on April 8, saying that “COVID-19 is a high-risk threat…this is a national mission… It allows the IDF to take responsibility…to use its capabilities…The IDF must be at the forefront…under the guidance of the government and the Ministry of Health.”
Soldiers helping Magen David Adom. photo: IDF Spokesperson's Unit
Along with these positive aspects, warning signs arise in case of a renewed outbreak of the pandemic or other future disruptions. First, the use of military units apart from the HFC in missions that interface with the civilian population – particularly those that involve enforcement measures alongside the police – is potentially problematic and should be avoided. Second, both the IDF and the political system should be mindful of the IDF’s potential to transition from involvement in support tasks to management missions. Third, the IDF must be extremely careful in its involvement with sensitive population groups, such as the ultra-Orthodox and the Arabs.
The line between providing assistance and managing an emergency event is not always clear. In practice, it is often linked to conflicts between various government ministries in sensitive situations, which have sometimes impeded proper handling of the coronavirus crisis. Against the background of political and sometimes personal rivalry within the government, particularly between the Prime Minister and the Minister of Health and Minister of Defense, it appears that senior IDF commanders, as well as other agencies in the security establishment, have found it necessary to compromise the nature and level of their involvement in the civilian domain in the present fight against the virus.
Several senior IDF commanders demonstrated signs of ambivalence regarding military involvement in the crisis. The Chief of Staff is reported to have suggested to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense (Israel Hayom, April 6) that the IDF assume immediate “full responsibility” for eight domains of the crisis (in reference to the Minister of Defense’s demand to transfer responsibilities from the Ministry of Health to the Ministry of Defense). The IDF spokesperson commented, “The IDF has been in constant dialogue with the political echelon throughout the crisis, with the idea of expanded responsibility as far as possible.” The Deputy Chief of Staff clarified (Israel Hayom, April 8) that in principle,
The scenario in which the event is handled by the civilian authorities and we render help is correct; but we also assume more responsibility…If the outbreak mushrooms to being out of control, I assume that we will receive more authority…We are ready for any eventuality and any decision…by the political echelon…It is in the IDF's DNA to initiate and tackle any threat…We cannot sit by when the whole country is dealing with an unprecedented danger…Our message to the decision makers is that we are ready for any mission…[yet] whatever responsibility we assume, we will not release the civilian agencies from their responsibility…It is unacceptable for civilian authorities to be accustomed to a military engagement that exempts them from responsibility…Our mission is to support them in areas where they face difficulties.
These remarks reflect the IDF's commitment to involvement in the civilian sphere in times of crisis, while clarifying its cognizance of its place and the risks inherent in any deviation from the required norms.
Expanding IDF Involvement in Mass Disaster Management
There is currently a noticeable reduction in IDF involvement in civilian activities pertaining to the crisis. However, a possible renewed outbreak of the disease could reverse that process, renewing the call, initially voiced by prominent public and media personalities when the fear of the virus was at its peak, for the IDF to take responsibility for managing the crisis. This petition, which resonates of “let the IDF win” and reflects a kind of Pavlovian response among parts of the public, could become stronger in extreme conditions of a mass disaster of national proportions that is far greater than the current crisis. An example of such an eventuality might be a severe earthquake that leads to numerous casualties and massive damage to property and infrastructure. Such a call is not detached from the Israeli reality. It is not just that the IDF has over the years acquired considerable military strength; it also has the tools to take action in certain civilian domains, and it enjoys the confidence of much of the public. This contrasts with the much lower level of professional skills among most government ministries. It is the inevitable result of years of granting a clear priority and budgets to the defense establishment, at the expense of civilian allocations.
Israel's Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi. photo: REUTERS/Corinna Kern
Putting the military in charge of managing a mass disaster in Israel is an abnormal, extreme move, certainly when carried out in one fell swoop. Israeli democracy is expected to skirt such a development, for both conceptual and practical reasons. Israeli law and practice do not support such a scenario. Most Western democracies avoid granting the military governing authority, even during emergencies. Some Western countries possess paramilitary organs (such as the National Guard in the United States, the Carabinieri in Italy, and the Gendarmerie in France), inter alia for the purpose of reinforcing civilian systems in maintaining public order. It appears that the option of granting the army extensive civilian powers is also incompatible with the basic perceptions of the IDF and its commanders, who adhere to the democratic tradition of subordination to the civilian political level. Senior IDF commanders would presumably refuse to assume overall responsibility for the management of a mass disaster, partly due to their awareness that in extreme cases they would be incapable of handling failing civilian, health, economic, and social systems while simultaneously attending to their primary mission of maintaining national security. This is particularly true if an adversary decides to exploit a serious civilian crisis by posing a military threat.
Still, the transfer of responsibility to the IDF to manage a large-scale civilian crisis in case of a severe exacerbation of the corona crisis or in the event of another mass disaster such as a massive earthquake is possible. The collapse of civilian systems could lead to a call for the IDF to be more involved and perhaps even to assume control of parts or the entirety of a civilian catastrophe at the local or national level. In such circumstances, it might appear inevitable for the IDF to take charge, presumably as a higher level of commitment in line with the “expanded responsibility.” In case of a national disaster, the public might see this option as an “indisputable necessity.”
Conclusion
In spite of the emerging present trajectory of containment, it is important to consider the possibility of a renewed outbreak of the pandemic. In such a scenario, or that of a different mass disaster, Israel could be confronted with inadequate civilian performance or even the collapse of civilian systems. Like other countries, Israel is not properly prepared for extreme scenarios such as a massive earthquake.
Under such challenging circumstances, established patterns of thought and conduct in Israel (and elsewhere) might be undermined. Accepted norms could be challenged and more radical and less liberal thinking and conduct, in which individual rights are relegated to second place, could be perceived as appropriate for a major crisis. In the absence of a governmental mechanism that can deal effectively with a mass disaster, a call by the government, probably with the support of large segments of the public, for the army to take (partial? temporary?) control of the system, is eminently possible. Arguably, there are gradations in the military’s assumption of control: it might begin with the temporary management of a disaster-struck town and end up with the unlimited management of the entire country, possibly with less than total subordination to the local or central government. This latter extreme scenario would pose a severe challenge to Israeli democracy and reflect the basic weakness of the civilian system. It is doubtful that the IDF has the necessary skills to play such a role in this scenario.
In order to prevent this undesirable development, everything must be done to limit the risk of collapse of the health, economic and social systems. In the short term, it is necessary – even at this stage – to construct a government apparatus capable of handling the coronavirus crisis more effectively. At the same time, there is a need to plan an updated system, anchored in law, for managing mass disasters – using the lessons of the current crisis and based on strengthening civilian mechanisms. In any event, any future assumption of extended IDF responsibility requires unequivocal legal boundaries, including time limits, definitions of the military's powers and responsibilities, and clear requirements of complete civilian supervision.
At the same time, Israel must bolster its preparedness and fortify the civilian systems for future disasters so as to reduce the country’s dependency on the IDF, whose professional skills in the management of complex, ongoing civilian crises are in any case limited. In addition, legislation is needed to establish a decision making mechanism for determining the initiation and scope of military involvement in the handling of a mass disaster. This mechanism must have a broad base of public support. The Knesset must legislate the process of making such a crucial decision and the circumstances that would justify its implementation, so as to ensure close parliamentary and judicial supervision of all military activities in the civilian domain.
No comments:
Post a Comment