Lars Henåker
This study examines simulated battle settings, to analyze how tactics are performed and victory is achieved by observing tacticians dueling in wargames. In contemporary warfare, victory in battle relates to a wide variety of elements. According to military theory, these elements commonly involve deployment, reconnaissance, manoeuvre, breakthrough, tempo, surprise, exploitation, and shock, resulting in enemy organizational breakdown. Ideally, if one side in combat exploits all elements successfully, the likelihood of victory increases. Although the use of the tactical elements is not always obvious to the participants, the study indicates a correlation between using the elements and victory in a wargame setting. Although wargames inherent bias by not being the real world, they are used in training, education and analysis worldwide. The study also illustrates that the participants view tactical victory differently in battle.
Introduction
This study explores the relationships between how tacticians act and the mechanisms used, resulting in either success or defeat in relation to theories about combat in land warfare. Current research emphasizes in particular the following elements: deployment, reconnaissance, manoeuvre, breakthrough, tempo, surprise, exploitation, and enemy organizational breakdown, as important aspects of how tactical victory can be achieved (see Biddle 2004; Collins 2010; Leonhard 1994; Lind 1985; Storr 2009). This study’s findings indicate that when these elements are employed as part of wargaming, the chance of tactical victory increases, especially if the opponent uses them to a lesser degree. One important reason for this study is that while the majority of current research focuses on war and its impact on society, few studies focus on battle itself (e.g., Lind 1985, 50; Storr 2009, 8–21; Hulterström and Widén 2013, 51). Many studies also have a strategic and not a tactical focus, further reducing the literature (Friedman 2017, 5). This study aims to contribute to the current debates on tactical victory by analysing the role of contemporary military theory and the relationship between how tacticians act and the outcome of wargaming battles. If we look to the classical study of tactics, we note Carl von Clausewitz’s definition of tactics as “the theory of the use of military forces in combat” (Clausewitz 1997, 75), which provides a broad basis for the field of tactics. Tactics include, by definition, both theoretical and practical knowledge (Liddell Hart, 212–213) of how to use military forces in combat in an effective way (e.g. Fuller, 107–110, Lind, 12). More specifically, Basil Liddell Hart (1929, 215) points to the importance of exploiting one’s own effects before an opponent has the chance to react. J.F.C. Fuller (Fuller 2012, 108, 272) suggests that one may reduce the enemy’s chance to win by destroying his plans. In addition, William Lind’s (Lind 1985, 12) view on successful tactics emerge from manoeuvre warfare. This approach emphasizes the need to combine techniques and education, and to seek unique solutions. That said, military tactics include a wide range of battlefield performances. This study focuses on exploring how tacticians use tactics in order to defeat an enemy during wargames. In this study, I have adopted a deductive approach and observed in recorded wargames the conduct of 48 academics and military officers skilled in military tactics, to understand how victory emerges in battle. In particular, this study focuses on the execution of tactics and how it is applied rather than planning processes, although they may be intimately connected. One common way to assess tactics is by focusing on planning processes (e.g. Friedman 2017, 145–146; Storr, 38, 142–143; Leonhard, 8). Military problems are dynamic, complex and opaque, and military decision-making is central to solving such problems. A dynamic problem requires a series of decisions, making timing and tempo important factors. In addition, the environment changes because of the tacticians’ own actions (Brehmer 2000, 233–234). According to Gary Klein, the level of experience matter in situations involving decision-making under time pressure as experience improves the ability to withstand pressure (Klein 1998, 161–168). Observations concerning the tacticians’ skills within the narrative were visualized by recording all of their decisions in the form of clicks. During a period of almost two hours, the individual tacticians made 150 to 250 different clicks. In the study, I use this material to identify decisive clicks with regards to the tactical performance under scrutiny. The article begins by presenting an overview of the decisive tactical elements, method, and wargame epistemology. The subsequent part focuses on the analysis and conclusions regarding the tacticians’ performance and the extent to which the successful tactician’s action complies with or challenges contemporary theories. In conclusion, I argue that, if one side in combat exploits a successful use of elements as advocated by current research, the likelihood of victory in battle increases.
Decisive tactical elements
This part describes in brief which of eight elements identified above in military theories as important in achieving victory. I highlight what significance each element has and what items I focus on. Deployment is the starting point that determines the order of battle and disposition in the upcoming battle. Deployment includes combined arms and the approach to battle. It is only relevant prior to the battle and as such, it influences the first contact with enemy units (Leonhard 1991, 253). In my analysis, I focus on how well combined arms integrate, if manoeuvre units are within range of their own artillery support, how small-unit independently approach the battle and the battle groups dispersion (Biddle 2004, 35) of own “soft targets” such as logistic and artillery units. The element of reconnaissance amounts to the practice of exploring the battlefield and exploiting weak spots and opportunities as they are discovered (Storr 2009, 49). According to Storr, the exploitation of reconnaissance may result in the seizure of opportunities, neutralization of enemy reconnaissance, the location of surfaces and gaps, disruption to defence including HQs and logistic units, the demoralization and creation of uncertainty and the disguise of the nature and direction of the attacker´s thrusts (Storr 2009, 50). In my analysis, I focus on whether reconnaissance companies find and exploit gaps while avoiding being annihilated (>85percentage losses) if contact with the enemy is made. Third, we find the element of manoeuvre. Manoeuvre amounts to movement on the field of battle including adopting fire positions and establishing protection and it tends ultimately to culminate in fighting. Hence, manoeuvre requires time, where its greatest success is seen in terms of achieving a breakthrough into the enemy´s rear or interior lines, and disrupting enemy units’ movements. Through manoeuvre, a smaller force can defeat a much larger one, and major victories can be won with relatively few casualties on the winning side (Collins 2010, 4). In my analysis, I focus on manoeuvre leading to infiltration and outflanking of enemy units. Fourth, breakthrough is the beginning of overturning the opponent’s defence (Biddle 2004, 40–41). A breakthrough opens up a defence line and forces the opponent to react. A reaction is, for example, when using reserves in a counter-attack, a withdrawal to new defence positions or redeploying supporting units such as artillery and logistics. As a prelude, breakthrough enables exploitation to occur. In my analysis, I focus on manoeuvre units reaching and pursuing enemy soft targets. In this study, soft targets are equal to artillery and logistic unit. Fifth, we find tempo. Lind suggests that the purpose of manoeuvre warfare should be to outpace the enemy and implement action faster than the enemy (Lind 1985, pp. 4–8; for a more detailed discussion, see Boyd 1996, 2007). The side with greater speed tends to deny the enemy from being able to use its forces effectively. In my analysis, I focus on control of Uppsala city1 as a hub and if any side is linear, passive, or fighting in a static mode, using attrition. Sixth, surprise can be achieved in a number of ways such as unexpected timing, direction, means, and methods of an attack. In addition, deception, intelligence, security, speed, and originality are major factors in achieving surprise (Storr 2009, 84). Lind underlines the importance of avoiding fixed schemes and instead inventing new tactical patterns and creating new tactical options that lead to confusion and disorder (Lind 1985, 6–7). In my analysis, I focus on disruption of artillery by direct fire occurring as a result of unexpected timing and direction. Seventh, exploitation is a crucial ingredient in achieving victory. In essence, exploitation consists of conducting a successful attack followed by the subsequent exploitation of the enemy’s weaknesses or a collapsed enemy defence and turning a small tactical victory into a large-scale operational success (Leonhard 1994, 155). Exploitation is important for victory in that it reduces the attacking side’s casualties and deprives the defending side of any organized coherent defence. The combination of shock and surprise further reduces their defensive capability. Shock occurs in battle mainly due to rapid bombardment, sudden approach, the use of armour and certain types of weapons (Storr 2009, 87). In my analysis of exploitation, I focus on units in depth assaulting rear enemy units. The final element is to accomplish enemy organizational breakdown, achieved through breaking the defender´s will and cohesion by reducing their participation in further combat (Clausewitz 1997, 204; Storr 2009, 90–92; Leonhard 1991, 112). Hypothetically, if all the elements are achieved, the likelihood of winning the battle increases, and if the opponent does not follow the elements, the chances of winning increase even further. In my analysis, I focus on the losses of manoeuvre units. When one side has less than 45 percentage losses at the same time the opponent received more than 85 percentage in losses, an organizational breakdown is taken to occur.
Method
This study uses a qualitative approach to operationalize, analyse, and interpret the content of collected material into meaningful conclusions (Patton 2015, 5–15; Margolis and Zunjarwad 2018, 616–621). The collection of data contains recordings of 48 tacticians’ actions in a computerized wargame duel, one blue side and one red side, of approximately two hours and exploring military action and decision processes. All duels are recorded to be replayed and then deductively analyzed. The replay of each battle enables analysis of how the elements have been used to achieve victory. Some elements, such as manoeuvre and tempo, are present throughout the battle process, while others may arise following a chain of decisions and actions, such as breakthrough and exploitation. To conduct an analysis of the material, the text operationalizes seven predefined levels of victory (Bartholomees 2008, 26–28) and eight tactical decisive elements. The results of each battle are then translated and placed in any of the defined victory levels, e.g. decisive victory or draw. The fighting results are compared with how well the elements have been used. This means that established results reveal something about the quality of the fight and any differences between the participants’ actions. Although tactical proficiency is ultimately a result not only of how well one tactician being assessed performs, a full consideration must be taken in account of how well the tactician’s opponent acts. In the assessment, both tactician’s overall performances are compared to each other’s conduct of successful tactics. In detail, through the elements, I screen and compare each side’s performance in every duel to find mechanisms explaining how one side is more or less successful than the other side. This means also that both tacticians at the same time possibly make similar decisions, in the form of clicks, equally good or bad. Moreover, tacticians doing some of the elements while achieving others. Tacticians do deploy their battlegroup, conduct reconnaissance, manoeuvre,, and exploitation. Eventually, the tacticians achieve breakthrough, high tempo, surprise, and enemy organizational breakdown. Tacticians may intend to achieve elements but are denied it because of their opponent or lack of tactical skills. The analysis of “doing and achieving” is necessary in order to find a meaningful interpretation of elements impact.
Epistemology of the wargame
Artefacts are visible structures and processes, easy to observe but difficult to decipher, which in their style embody the emotional display in observable culture, rituals, routines, and organizational charts (Schein 2004, 25–26). Wargames and tactics are artefacts, created by humans for a variety of reasons. Wargames are delimited by simulation and modelling, and playable simulation of military action (Perla 2011, 23; Sabin 2016, 47; Elg 2018, 266–286). A wargame can never replace a real-world situation in its dynamism and complexity (e.g. Rubel 2006, 123; Caffrey, 263) in its simplification of it. Wargames have been part of military curriculums for about 200 years and are perceived as something of an art form (Elg 2017, 6). In the studied wargame´s simplicity, details of aerial tactics, operational art of war and strategic assets are diminisheded to a minimum not to distract tacticians by even more complex systems than a battle group already represents. However, simplification carries the inherent risk of misrepresenting the “real world” to the extent that valid assessment of ground force tactics is threatened. Moreover, we need to recognize that absence of strategic and operative assets such as aerial assets will systematically alter the incentives and behaviours of tacticians in ways that are not faithful to real life. Accordingly, any inferences made about the value and effect of said behaviours in battle must be viewed with circumspection. One limitation of the findings of this article study is the participant’s similar background. A Western European approach bias to solve tactical problems may differ from how other tacticians and academics solve the same situation. However, victory would be possible to measure regardless of whom playing when using the same context. In general, the expected results risk not measuring victory objectively. If playing with participants from other backgrounds, different tactical patterns would possibly result. Still, victory would be possible to measure regardless of against whom one was playing when using the same context. We need to remember that the results derive from wargame duels and lacking some features that exist in a real combat setting and influence which negatively hinder us drawing generic conclusions. According to Rubel (2006), wargames are not experiments; however, they can include experimentation, which focuses on aspects of command, and control (Rubel 2006, 114–115). The validity of a model (or knowledge) is formed from the degree of utility in the process of problem-solving (Rubel 2006, 109). Despite the fact that the wargame as a tool presents an imperfect model of reality, it is the best means to facilitate the visualization of the decision-making process (Perla 2011, 24–25). Insights that result from conducting wargames are conditional however, and their validity must reflect the comparable effects of the decision-making process in real-world situations (Rubel 2006, 116). A certain significance can be ascribed to a wargame’s outcomes when it is conducted according to given rules. These rules form the foundation for a valid simplification in the simulation of reality (Rubel 2006, 118). A wargame is built around the elements of physical parts, rules, and decisions made by individual tacticians and the effects of reality, skills, and chance influence the result throughout the whole wargame (Sabin 2016, 117). The amount of information and the time given to make a plan based on the scenario must be accepted as realistic. When comparing wargame research, findings suggest that wargames appear to be explanatory, repeatable, and double directed and that playing wargames provides new insights (Sabin 2016, 47) and patterns in tactics. Through a controlled visualization of the cause-and-effect linkages in a wargame, the specific conditions give insights generated by the wargame itself. The wargame functions as a tool in helping to understand the tactician's' mind for decision-making in a complex and dynamic environment (Rubel 2006, 111–112).
In this study, a computerized wargame referred to as SSM,2 developed at the Swedish Defence University (SEDU), was used to record and collect samples for analysis. The recording also collected tacit knowledge as this is of great significance for our ability to cope with complex and dynamic situations (Klein 2011, 34). The wargame used is categorized as a so-called “low fidelity” wargame. While low fidelity wargames have purposely been designed to include only a minimum level of detail as opposed to more advanced, so-called “high fidelity” wargames, they have proven to be as effective (Waldenström 2012, 1–2). Moreover, to measure how successful tactics and victory emerge we reduce and frame a narrative into a combat scenario by the peeling back of some real-world features, retaining only the core of abilities required to conduct tactics. There is, however, some need to be cautious of the fact that wargames can create inputs that are invalid in the form of what are termed “game artefacts”. This generates the further risk that such defects become attributed to the “fog of war”. A crucial assumption of wargaming is that the tacticians will try to make the best decisions they can. In addition, we need to believe that tacticians are expected to be loyal to trying to win or fulfilling their tasks (Rubel 2006, 115–116).
The 48 participants in the wargame were officers, academics, and students ranging from civilian academics to OF-2–OF-5 (lieutenant to Colonel). The range of age was 31 years to 62 years and the participants were from Finland, Norway, England, Germany, and Sweden. Although the participants had different backgrounds, their culture similarities are to be considered as bias and a limitation when drawing conclusions of the generating the results. The majority of all participants were Swedish citizens and with that arguable have a common tactical bias. The samples average time in academic studies was a little more than three years (150 ECTS), their military average time as platoon commanders was over two years in average an as company commanders over one-and-a-half years. In average, the sample group had a little more than six months as battalion commanders. The explorative study was conducted over a period of three weeks in February 2018 at SEDU. All participants were provided with 10 minutes to read their task and if possible, create their own plan on a map before starting the wargame, after which a 15-minute tutorial enabled them to locate all the features of the wargame. After building confidence in using all the features through the tutorial, participants began the duel. The duel lasted between 1 hour and 30 minutes and 1 hour and 45 minutes. The game-time equalizess real time including speed and distance making the realism accurate. Most of the samples had not been in contact with SSM and none had seen the scenario before the wargame started. In this study, a modern and technological army force, reflecting an already existing north European and east European army, is used in a narrative to outline the requirements of realism and acceptance. The choice of perspective affects the design, and this in turn influences the continued steps in the research process. After conducting a battle, each participant was asked to estimate their own level of victory outcome in a seven-step scale assessing their performance from own decisive victory down to enemy decisive victory.
This study observes and explores relationships between how tacticians act and what mechanisms lead to either success or defeat in relation to theories about victory in combat. In detail, the impact on how successful each battle was performed is measured through the elements of deployment, reconnaissance, manoeuvre, breakthrough, tempo, surprise, exploitation, and enemy organizational breakdown. This gives different observable results for analysing quality assessments. Qualitative research uses a naturalistic approach (Patton 2002, 39) such a “real world setting” to understand phenomena in a specific context. At the same time, qualitative research is considered weak when generalizing validity. Therefore, researcher bias, such as selective recording or one’s personal view and perspective, is one threat to validity that the researcher must be careful and mindful of. Crucial to this point is that the researcher constantly engages in self-reflection and become more self-aware on her potential bias and predispositions (Johnson 1997, 283–284). While we cannot draw a generic or universal conclusion on tactics from this study, we may observe other important things. The most prominent of these involve a better understanding of how tacticians act to achieve victory as part of a wargame setting. In natural social settings, a researcher lacks full control over the scheduling of experimental stimuli necessary in the true experiment, although such situations are recalled as quasi-experimental design (Campbell and Stanley 1966, 34). In this study, the wargame does not qualify to the level of the experiment. Therefore, it is viewed as quasi-experimental because of the lack of randomized samples including no control of how tacticians conduct their tactics. Internal validity refers to the extent a researcher is warranted in observing a causal relationship (Shadish et al. 2002, 53). In this study, internal validity refers to inferences about whether observed covariation between the tactical situation and tacticians’ decision-making reflects a causal relationship to achieve victory in the form of measuring their actionable results. If external validity does not interfere with internal validity, it is of high importance for any applied discipline. High external validity in qualitative studies stems from repeatability and a maximum of similarity in experimental situations (Campbell and Stanley 1966, 18).
Moreover, wargames are widely used to train officers and staffs and the game’s built-in “flaws” do not prevent conclusions from being drawn and being used in real conflicts and war. Although a wargame is an applicable construction and base for decision-making accepted in training, education, analysis of complex and dynamic military problems and dilemmas, it is commonly used. Finally, it is most unlikely that real opponents will sit down before a battle and play the scenario representing the real tactical settings in advance thus risking the revelation of their goals, assets, and causes of action. That is often why similarly educated tacticians from the same side conduct duels, and knowing each other as peers, create a wargame bias that risks generating predictable and not valid results.
Levels of victory in battle
According to Ardant du Picq’s classical definition, tacticians do not enter the battle to fight, but to win (Du Picq 1987, 69). Du Picq’s definition is reinforced by Storr’s argument that military thoughts must focus on the difficulties in winning battles (Storr, p. 8). In du Picq’s definition, it becomes important to visualize victory. William Martel (2011) points to the fundamental question of what victory means by confronting scholars and policy-makers. A complete understanding of victory is not to be found in the literature nor is it possible to answer Martel’s question without common agreement on the meaning and essence of victory (Martel 2011, 533). This study suggests that different levels of victory can be identified. Rotte & Schmidt argue that the outcome of a battle is interpreted in elements of victory, defeat, or draw. They also argue that negative or positive outcomes could vary in degree by implying, for example, a modest or an overwhelming defeat (Rotte and Schmidt 2003, 176). Levels of victory contain certain criteria, in order to be as thorough as possible to facilitate analysis, battle damage assessment or to establish the general outcome.
Collins suggests that a “ … victory or defeat is a social construction of the participants themselves”. He also points out that “in decisive battles, there is general agreement on both sides as to the outcome … ”. Furthermore, he argues, “some battles are indecisive, a stalemate with no victory announced”. “Victory and defeat are above all emotional conditions; although physical destruction contributes to a degree … ” (Collins 2010, 10). Measuring victory levels means taking into consideration both physical and non-physical parameters. By utilizing a computerized wargame in order to explore the tactician’s courses of action in a combat situation, the recording plays a vital part in analyzing every outcome of all battles. A pre-defined implication of victory was used to refine and emphasize differences in tactical military combat victory in order to manifest different levels similar to Bartholomees’s (2008) scale of success. In his conceptual scale of success, seven steps are used to grade different levels of success and victory. The seven steps are defeat, loss, no win, tie, no loss, win, and victory. Barholomees’ scales are very similar to those employed in this study, which by comparison were defined and conditioned in advance of the content. Being able to make an accurate assessment of the battle status at any given moment is a challenge. Casualties are one very important indicator and reveal the results of both sides’ losses. Levels of victory in battle is an attempt to grade levels of tactical victory in battle before performing an analysis of the explorative study. In addition, it is difficult to find a scientific grade system defining the levels and meaning of tactical victory. The definition of different levels of victory is as exciting in military history as it is in commercial wargames (e.g., Butterfield 1983; Herman 1990; Essig and Powell 1991; Astell and Gayler 1991); however, this study needs to formulate a detailed definition of what each level means for the participating tacticians to use. I have analyzed how the tacticians performed and from the recording of every battle evaluated how successfully the tacticians had completed their tasks, comparing a casualty ratio to their own estimation of victory level.
During the wargame, the highest level of victory is defined as decisive victory. In this study, decisive victory is defined as being when all enemy units have been eliminated or have surrendered; there are few or no own losses and there is no opportunity for the enemy to take back the initiative. The next level is major victory, defined as being when the majority of enemy units have been eliminated or have surrendered; there are some own minor losses and there is a marginal opportunity for the enemy to regain the initiative. The third level is defined as own minor victory, achieved when certain parts of the enemy’s units have been eliminated or have surrendered; own losses are fewer than the enemy’s but there is a possibility for the enemy to regain the initiative. The fourth level constitutes a draw, defined as being when smaller elements from both sides have units that are dissolved, eliminated, or have surrendered; own losses are equal to or less than the opponent’s and both sides have culminated. The participants could also choose to reverse their outcome and assess their own decisive loss, own major loss and own minor loss using the same definitions as if they had been successful.
The results from a total of 24 battles indicated that seven battles had ended in decisive or major victories, eight battles had ended as minor victories and, finally, that nine battles had ended without any indication of a clear victory for either side. Defining or fully recognizing enemy side losses proved to be a difficult task. During the wargame, only eliminated enemy units were shown on the screen as dead or dying. Fourteen out of 24 battles had none or only one deviation between the different levels of victory in both sides’ assessment. For example, one side assesses the result of the battle as an own major victory while the opponent assesses the same battle as an own minor loss. Five of 24 battles had two levels of difference in the assessment of the same battle and finally five battles had three levels in deviation. This seems to indicate the level of difficulty for the tacticians themselves in determining the outcome of a battle. This error is most likely attributable to a combination of under- and over-estimations in own performance, different points of view as to whether tasks have been completed, or emotional mechanisms denying or amplifying the result. Generalizing victory and defeat in battle is still poorly defined today (Storr 2018, 255) although this study suggests an actionable definition.
The order of battle
This scenario attempts to generalize land force-tactics in a known context for the participants and is in line with the literature. The fictitious countries of Blueland and Redland stood in opposition to each other and both sides were given a limited amount of intelligence on their opponent. The participants did not know whether their respective responsibilities were identical to each other. Tacticians performed tactics individually when playing the wargame. The Blueland order of battle consisted of one mechanized battalion, one brigade reconnaissance company, and one artillery battalion. Their task objective was to delay the opponent within their own area of responsibility for at least six hours (from the game’s start) in order to inflict major enemy losses and limit the opponent’s ability to control the large central town early. Blueland should also be prepared, six hours after receiving a new order, to defend a bridging area. In contrast to this, the Redland order of battle consisted of one Tank Battalion, one Mechanized Battalion, one Reconnaissance Company, and two Artillery Battalions. The task objective was to defeat enemy units within the assigned area by no later than six hours after the order (from the game’s start) to ensure their own mobility for a continued attack westwards. Redland was to be prepared, six hours after receiving their orders, to seize and defend the bridging area.
Figure 1 is from the server computer showing both sides at the same time. Each side only knew that an enemy battlegroup was advancing into its own predesignated area of responsibility but not the exact enemy order of battle. The strength ratio in Redland’s favor was 1.5:1 for tanks, 1:1 for combat fighting vehicles, 3:1 for artillery, and 1.3:1 for troops, although Blueland had an advantage with regard to different types of artillery ammunition. The next section examines the sample’s overall performance in action in relation to theory in order to answer the question of whether the use of knowledge of contemporary theories corresponds to whether tacticians achieve military tactical victory.
Figure 1. Illustrates deployment set up of Blueland in the west and Redland in the east, including areas of responsibility.
Tactical performance – an analysis
This analysis encompasses the battle events from deployment to eventual enemy organizational breakdown in an attempt to avoid only focusing on the beginning and allowing the participants to adjust and adopt their tactics. In the analysis, the researcher is the instrument scrutinizing the wargame recordings by comparing them to all elements.
Deployment
I start to analyse blue side’s deployment then the red side. Nine of 24 blue tacticians manage to create a combined arms deployment in keeping a main effort until the first contact with the enemy. Four of these nine end in a major or a total victory, one of nine render a minor victory and four of nine ended in draw. Twenty-two of 24 blue battlegroups had full cover from own artillery although two of 24 tacticians moved their artillery units too close before enemy contact. Five of 24 blue battlegroups succeeded in using an independent small unit deployment of which two of five later on ended as major victories, two minor victories, and one draw. Five of 24 tacticians conducted a dispersion deployment and ended in two own minor victories, two draw, and one minor loss. Deployment on red side and the use of combined arms was five of 24 red battlegroups advanced in a main effort on column ending in one minor red victory, two blue major victories, and two draw. All red battlegroups manage to be in the range of own artillery until the first enemy contact. Two of 24 tacticians used a small unit independent advance ending in two draws. Finally, two red battlegroups used dispersion as an approach rendering in two minor losses. Overall, a very short distance between the reconnaissance units and the manoeuvre units was maintained and in the first contact with enemy units’ own side manoeuvre companies were almost immediately involved in the same skirmish as their reconnaissance units.
Reconnaissance
Three of 24 blue sides’ reconnaissance companies found and exploited gaps resulted in one major victory and two draw. In total, blue side had five of 24 reconnaissance companies’ annihilated (more than 85 percentage losses) and the battles ended in one major victory, one minor victory, two draw, and one minor loss. Four of 24 red reconnaissance companies exploited gaps resulted in two minor victories, one draw, and own major loss. No annihilation of red reconnaissance companies occurred. Without any exceptions, the tacticians used their reconnaissance platoons as a vanguard until their first contact with enemy units. The three reconnaissance platoons, just minutes in front of their battle groups, often became feelers providing the tacticians with only a short timeframe to take new decisions as the first contact occurred as shown in Figure 2. Because of the short distance between advancing reconnaissance platoons and the bulk of manoeuvre units, the enemy was hit with massive force, which indirectly gained the function of reconnaissance. Reconnaissance units often successfully infiltrated into the enemy’s rear area and sometimes located “soft targets” (in this study defined as artillery and logistic units) to attack.
Figure 2. This screenshot reflects a common advance from both sides’ reconnaissance platoons just minutes before the first direct observed contact. (20–25 minutes into the wargame from the start point).
Manoeuvre and breakthrough
Blue side manoeuvre rendered in two infiltrations out of 24 battlegroups and resulted in one minor victory and one draw. Three of 24 tacticians outflanked the opponent resulted in one major victory, one minor victory, and one draw. Red side manoeuvre consisted of two infiltrations that resulted in one major victory visualized in Figure 3 and one draw battle. Only one of 24 red battlegroups manages to out-flank its opponent, which resulted in a minor victory. Twelve of 24 blue battlegroups reached breakthrough resulting in one total victory and one major and three minor victories. Five of these breakthroughs ended as draw. Ten of 24 red battlegroups gained breakthroughs leading to one major victory, three minor victories and four draws. Later on, red side suffered two major and two minor losses. On eight occasions, some of the tacticians tried to reach the enemy rear area in a deep manoeuvre by using more units than just reconnaissance platoons. The area consists of rich infrastructure, forests, open fields, swamps, and creeks. The dominant terrain in their area of responsibility was Uppsala3 (see map), referred to hereafter as the town, placed centrally and constituting a hub around which almost all fighting was conducted. The observation concerning manoeuvre noted that all participants used mechanized units in or near the town in order to gain ground and to repel enemy assaults. Often the high speed of advance was halted or slowed down directly after the first enemy contact. On some occasions, manoeuvre companies managed to breakthrough and engage enemy artillery and logistic units destroying as much as possible. These contacts often resulted not only in the pursuit of enemy “soft targets” but also in drawing enemy manoeuvre units in to defend their own artillery and logistics. Once a breakthrough was established, a new phase of the battle started. Heavy exchanges of fire often occurred during the first contact.
Figure 3. A screenshot from SSM reflects a rare moment of victorious combat where Redland divided Blueland forces and pursued artillery and logistics units in the Blueland rear area.
The contact lured other units into a skirmish and away from the participant tactician’s objective and plan. After the initial contacts, reconnaissance units were sometimes used as mechanized combat platoons. The implication of this was that further intelligence gathering in depth was negatively and directly affected. This premature fight resulted in weak or indifferent reactions and surprised almost all of the participants. Several battles ended with a winner after reaching a breakthrough. Although not all breakthroughs ultimately led to a decisive or major victory, five of 24 did. Tacticians that did not find any enemy “soft targets” after gaining a breakthrough redirected their units towards the nearest fight or in some cases, started to advance towards a secondary task instead of pursuing “soft targets”. Engagements were directed towards reconnaissance units who had manoeuvre-companies very close behind them, and who consequently were unable to change direction. Instead, these units had to face full engagement with the nearest enemy unit. Some of the breakthroughs occurred through the infiltration of reconnaissance platoons or a single company. In some cases, a breakthrough was reached at an early stage but was ignored or not fully exploited. Tacticians use the road network to develop the highest possible speed, because their opponent was already in their own area of responsibility. High speed initially gained them some ground but this was halted abruptly almost immediately after the first manoeuvre companies came into contact. At the moment of the first contact, the baptism of fire, some tacticians were successfully able to engage targets with the right combined arms, indirect fire and even withdraw from disadvantaged situations. Some tacticians did not manoeuvre their units but accepted the firefight because of their previous manoeuvre. In those cases, results depended on massive firepower and how quickly they could bring indirect fire down onto the opponent. By using roads as speed avenues, it became obvious where the main effort was. After the first “clash of armour” in or near the town, small differences were spotted such as new fire positions and reinforcements in how micro manoeuvring was conducted, often in adaption to the current fight. Even successful micro manoeuvring led to breakthroughs after some fighting. Speed often leads to full engagements in disadvantageous areas such as a large town or when the distance between friendly units is too close within the battlegroup. A smaller force can defeat a much larger one, and major victories can be won with relatively few casualties on the winning side (Collins 2010, 4). Blueland forces were smaller but won six out of seven decisive or major victories. Levels of minor victories or draws were divided more equally between the sides in their outcome. In the comparison of whether the theories correspond to successful tactical victory through manoeuvre and breakthrough or not, observations reveal an unambiguous relationship.
High tempo and surprise
Analyzing tempo in four of 24 blue battlegroups controlling the town of Uppsala achieving one total victory, one major victory, and two draw. Six of 24 blue battlegroups acted linearly, passive, and static and used an attrition approach that resulted in one major loss, two minor losses, two draws, and one minor victory. Red side had nine of 24 battlegroups controlling the town of Uppsala, which resulted in one major victory, one minor victory, five draws, one minor loss, and one major loss. Analyzing surprise achieved through direct fire and unexpected timing and direction against enemy artillery units occurred in six of 24 blue cases. The result later become one total victory, one major victory, two minor victories, and two draws. Red side managed to reach surprise by disrupting 12 of 24 battles resulting in one major and three minor victories, five draws, but also one major loss, and two minor losses. To keep up a high tempo, decisions concerning ongoing engagements are at least as important as those decisions concerning infiltration and encirclement using surfaces and gaps. Although the tactician’s priority was to maintain a high tempo, less fortunate tacticians found that their artillery units on the roads became overt targets, which were easy to attack and pursue. In addition, it is important to avoid surprise and have the ability to hold on to control of a “movable box” when delaying the enemy by constantly shifting weapon systems and having mortar fire successfully supporting the delaying action. Surprise effects can be expected if an attack is unexpected in time and/or direction and if different means and methods are used. The high tempo created a fragmented battlefield, having units from both sides bypass each other without coming into contact. The high tempo was also combined with the shortest distance to their objectives. Instead of using a manoeuvre that could surprise the enemy, a head-on approach was often adopted. Due to the high tempo, tacticians gained important ground but this was often quickly reduced during the first contact to take up fire positions. High tempo transformed quickly into static fire positions seconds after the first skirmishes and the momentum and pace gained was heavily reduced in combination with a lack of reserves to exploit or break off the fight.
High tempo was observed initially as a fast acceleration up to high speed, heavy bombardment, and successful infiltrations at the same time. After the first contact, the high tempo was usually reduced quickly and severely decelerated in order to defend and make new decisions. The choice to continue to fight after the first contact occurred almost in every battle. At the same time, new fights arose out of new contacts in combination with minor successful infiltrations. All the participants had multiple fights running concurrently. Tempo increased with the number of minor multiple firefights and infiltrations. Surprise was observed as a reaction to the first contact, with reconnaissance units over-compensating with the use of artillery fire. As a result, a majority of the participants were running out of artillery ammunition before the wargame ended. Reserves were uncommonly divided in order to reduce or amplify surprises. After being surprised, the participants compensated for the lack of reserves by withdrawing units from engagements. The use of high tempo and surprise must be considered success factors when all seven of the 24 battles with a decisive or major victory utilized these tactics against an opponent acting passively or trying to win by attrition.
Exploitation
Eight of 24 blue battlegroups exploited the breakthrough in enemy rear area and these ended with one total victory, one major, and two minor victories and four draws. On the red side, 10 of 24 battlegroups exploited the enemy rear area and resulted in one major victory, three minor victories, four draws, and two major losses. Exploitation occurred after minor breakthroughs, often with surviving reconnaissance units or manoeuvre units infiltrating through the enemy advance. Through the number of observations, the pattern of exploitation indicates some different lines of approach. The first line was observed through the involuntary bypassing of enemy units and the discovery of enemy artillery positions more by chance than on purpose. The second line of exploitation was achieved by infiltrating enemy lines after only a short engagement with enemy units. When this kind of breakthrough occurred, most commonly involving only a few manoeuvre units, the exploitation of fanning out was limited. The third line of exploitation is through a massive first blow on the enemy resulting in the elimination of the enemy or forcing enemy units to withdraw from the unfavourable situation, providing the attacker with a gap. Common for all the different exploitation situations was that the tacticians did not know what to do with the advantage once it had been gained. In the most successful narratives, the side that achieved exploitation also pursued enemy rear units for a longer period, forcing the enemy to not only withdraw engaged units but also support or protect those being pursued by reinforcing them. The breakthrough and exploitation made it possible to seize the secondary area before gaining control over the primary target area and some of the tacticians used that opportunity. In the essence of exploitation, a successful attack is followed by utilizing enemy weaknesses or collapsed enemy defences. This can turn a small tactical victory into a large-scale operational success (Leonhard 1994, 155). These unsuccessful exploitations occurred when no “soft targets” were found or when contact was lost while pursuing the enemy. Sometimes the main body of a battlegroup advanced through an enemy front line and was able to attack large concentrations of enemy units with full effect. Shock effects mainly reduce the attacking side’s casualties and deprive the defenders of any organized coherent defence. However, the comparison and investigation of whether theory corresponds to how tacticians successfully conduct military tactical victory through exploitation and the creation of chaos and shock indicates a less clear relationship.
Accomplish enemy organizational breakdown
Exploring the last element, six of 24 blue battlegroups ended in an enemy organizational breakdown divided into one total victory and five major victories. One red battlegroup reached a final stage of an enemy organizational breakdown in achieving a major victory. Seven of the 24 battles achieved the level of major or decisive victory. In these battles, the destruction of an enemy force was not only dependent on fast and deep manoeuvre but also the combination of different weapon systems and temporary contact resulting in manoeuvre companies being tied down. If the rear units were at an early stage of disruption or being pursued, negative effects affected the possibility to combine artillery with manoeuvre units. Overall, an interesting phenomenon was observed in that heavy losses did not affect the participants’ performance in achieving their objectives. On the contrary, almost all tacticians struggled and did not reveal their inner thoughts, while playing during silence, until the wargame was over, even though they could regroup, withdraw, and change modus or even surrender. The findings concerning enemy organizational breakdown correspond well to the theories as small, scattered, pockets of resistance without any possibility of regaining the initiative, no artillery capability or manoeuvre companies without casualties were observed. The organizational breakdown was observed through attrition, in combination with a clear breakthrough dividing the opponent into small pockets of resistance.
In sum, no side having a decisive or major victory did so without the use or achievement of a minimum of three elements. Although no tactician manages to achieve all elements in the same battle, six of seven decisive or major victories had more elements present than the losing side. Moreover, in four of the battles, the losing side did not use any of the elements. One battle had an opposite result when only three elements were used and achieved by the winner while five elements were used by the losing side. We observe a similar trend in all the eight minor victories and losses. In six of these eight battles, either side used or achieved at least one element. Tacticians winning a minor battle all had more representations of elements than the losing side. When scrutinizing all the items of focus in this study and comparing them to the result of seven decisive and major victories, we find some elements more used or achieved than others. The element of deployment was present in five of seven victories. The element of reconnaissance was present in two of seven victories. The element of manoeuvre was observed in one of the victories, while the elements of tempo and breakthrough were found in four of seven victories. Both surprise and exploitation were found in three of seven victories and finally, in six of seven victories we found enemy organizational breakdown.
Measuring victory
Levels of victory provided an interesting and vital result that included the tacticians’ own estimation and all battles being replayed in an analysis to measure the outcome of a battle. I consider loss ratio to be important, when measuring the contemporary theories, in determining the most successful tactician during battle. Reaching the ratio 1.70:1 or more in losses indicates an unambiguous decisive or major victory in this study. The ratio between 1.70:1 and 1.35:1 was a mix of decisive, major, and minor victories shown in Figure 4. This finding provides a measurable loss ratio and facilitates the assessment of a battle. On one occasion, the level of major victory was reached although the loss ratio was a draw due to skilful manoeuvring and not through the elimination of enemy units. Six of seven decisive and major victories ended in huge losses on the losing side. The seventh battle had an equal loss ratio, considered to be a major victory achieved by excellent manoeuvring, including the division of enemy side units into small pockets scattered all over the battlefield.
Figure 4. Different levels of victory identified by loss ratios.
The comparison and analysis correspond with how tacticians successfully achieved military tactical victory when accomplishing enemy organizational breakdown. It was confirmed in those six battles that the casualty ratio was 2.5 higher on the losing side. Although the findings in this study clearly indicate the necessity of operating in line with the theories in order to achieve a successful outcome of a battle, we need to remember that only 30% of all battles were assessed as decisive or major victories while 70% of all battle outcomes were viewed as minor victories or draws. In those 70%, the tacticians were neutralized by equal opponents whose behaviour could be as aggressive and skilful as in the more successful battles but without achieving any success. In 30% of more successful battles, there were also tacticians who lost due to static and passive behaviour. We understand and perform tactics differently, some more, some less, skillfully as observed in each wargame battle. This is no small endeavour for the participants who won a decisive or major victory mainly by their understanding of the feedback from the screen to sharpen new decisions and use the elements more skillfully. Successful battle was measured through the elements of deployment, reconnaissance, manoeuvre and breakthrough, high tempo and surprise rendering in shock, and finally enemy organizational breakdown. Some of the elements formed a logical sequence while others shifted in frequency.
Conclusions
Why does someone win in a wargame battle? This study contributes to the discussion on victory and defeat by observing the role of modern contemporary theories and the relationship in how tacticians act and their outcome in wargame battles. In particular, I analyze eight tactical elements with regards to the wargames. These are deployment, reconnaissance, manoeuvre, breakthrough, tempo, surprise, exploitation, and enemy organizational breakdown. Fourteen of 15 victories, from decisive to minor, indicate a comparatively higher presence of the eight elements. Although no victory had all elements present, 6 of 15 lost battles had no presence at all. Wargames do not represent reality. However, the results of these 48 battles still mirror decisions from tactical wargaming situations. These decisions have been analyzed herein as computer clicks. Moreover, 1/3 of all wargame battles ended in a major or decisive victory. The observed results indicate differences in how tacticians used their skills and resources but also how different individuals define victory. During the 48 wargame battles, the elements clearly affected decision-making processes. Even though the Simple Surface warfare Model (SSM) wargame used in this study does not exhaust real-life situations, the players still reveal recorded patterns aimed at achieving victory. Each battle begins with deployment, including creation of a balanced combined arms force using manoeuver, and attrition to gain the initiative by using surprise. After successful breakthrough, collapse occurs as an organizational breakdown. Some of those elements exist more or less during the battle and some do not. The elements suggest a reasonable line of interdependent events in order to achieve victory in combat. In addition, the study suggests that reconnaissance, combined arms, high tempo, and manoeuvre are present as fluctuations and when breakthrough occur (or not). If not recognized in a timely fashion, these advantages disappear unexploited. However, this issue demands further research as breakthrough was difficult to identify, even though when it was, a moment of triumph opened to be used or lost.
Victory in this study is divided into different levels of success helping tacticians reach a common understanding of the battle’s total sum. Victory levels in the wargame rank tacticians’ performances and value their results. Victory would be relatively easy to define if only considering losses, but both Collins and Storr argue that victory includes emotions and subjective opinions, make thus precision somehow wicked, reflected in almost half of all estimated outcomes. How well do tacticians master tactics? In a survey that accompanied each game, the tacticians themselves assessed their own performance. Around 60% of the participants were correct in their assessments while 40% were more or less wrong.
In conclusion, this study shows that particular aspects of tactical victory are possible to measure through war games. Moreover, modern theories regarding victory in battle are useful tools to better understand battle mechanisms. Herein I have focused on recorded clicks and the patterns they form in wargame situations, to interpret and decode such mechanisms. My results illustrate that it is difficult but not impossible to measure details of victory as part of war game situations. This should not be taken to indicate that the elements under scrutiny are always valid in real-life situations. However, my results do illustrate that tacticians tend to relate to and employ the theoretical elements in order to win tactical duels.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
No comments:
Post a Comment