By Anthony H. Cordesman with the assistance of Grace Hwang
There is no simple or reliable way to define Russian gray area or hybrid civil and military operations that affect U.S. strategic interests. Many Russian low-level operations, claims, and political acts can have such an effect, but they are only reported as serving commercial interests, reflecting local claims or interests, or supporting Russia’s broader security needs.
The impact of gray zone operations on Russia’s strategic competition with the United States may be highly indirect, and the motives behind Russian actions may be highly uncertain. Many activities are described, in terms of their impact on U.S. strategic partners, other states, and non-state actors, to not have an impact on competition with the United States. Other activities may not be reported in open source literature or may not be described accurately. Even when some Russian actions clearly involve gray area or hybrid operations, the motives behind such actions might be very different.
Much of the available reporting also is written in ways that highly compartmentalize civil and military activities, or activities within each category. Military exercises involving air, land and maritime claims are often described in very different ways. The motives behind investments and major civil projects may only be viewed in terms of their commercial merit or benefits, and not their strategic impact.
The Contents of this Chronology
This chronology is a rough working attempt to illustrate the range and depth of Russian activities. Many of the entries are uncertain or ambiguous. Many more have almost certainly been omitted or have never been reported. A full analysis would involve a wide range of country experts and military experts. It also would require substantial intelligence analysis at classified levels to be truly comprehensive.
This working chronology does still, however, illustrate the broader patterns of Russian activity that can impact Russian competition with the United States, and it serves as a starting point for a far more comprehensive analysis.
An additional analysis of U.S. and Chinese strategic competition is provided in a separate Burke Chair analysis, entitled U.S. Competition with China and Russia: The Crisis-Driven Need to Change U.S. Strategy. This report is available on the CSIS website here.
Comments and Suggested Additions and Corrections
This is a rough working paper. Please send comments and suggest additions and corrections to Anthony H. Cordesman, Burke Chair in Strategy, CSIS, at acordesman@gmail.com.
This report entitled, Chronology of Possible Russian Gray Area and Hybrid Warfare Operations, is available for download at https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/20200518_Burke_Chair.Russian_Chronology.GH9_.pdf
Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He has served as a consultant on Afghanistan to the United States Department of Defense and the United States Department of State.
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