What is Iran's next move?

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The nature of US–Iran hostilities has changed, so what happens next? In the wake of Soleimani’s killing, Iran is likely to double down on the doctrine most closely associated with him that has served it so well, explains John Raine.

Iran’s missile attack on US targets in Iraq in retaliation for the killing of Qassim Soleimani may be the end of this round of hostilities. But behind the visible tit for tat, Iranian rhetoric and doctrine suggest that this exchange marks for Iran a new phase of hostilities with the US. Regardless of who drew the knife first, the nature of the fight has now changed. 

Washington is likely to continue with its attempts to isolate and pressure Tehran through non-military means first, but with a clear readiness to use lethal force. But what will Iran do next?

Balance of effective force

Tehran’s performance in other theatres is relevant. Over four decades, Iran has developed a doctrinal method of fighting. It relies on a combination of third parties, calibrated escalation and minimal exposure to casualties. Whilst Iran has been heavily outmatched by its principal adversaries in terms of conventional arsenals, this capability, highly adapted to complex regional conflicts and so far without any successful counter measure, has tipped the balance of effective force in Iran’s favour. It will not be straightforward to use this against the US directly, not least to avoid catastrophic escalation, but it has become Iran’s weapon of choice.

Qassim Soleimani took this capability to a new level and his death will temporarily impair Iran’s strategic, if not operational, performance. But the machine he built was bigger than him. It was determined as much by the hard facts of Iran’s cultural and strategic position, its experiences of the war with Iraq and the confrontation with Israel, as by any central design. Both because it has been successful in multiple theatres and because it is a function of the doctrine and nature of the Islamic Republic, Iran is unlikely to abandon it. Despite the shock of Soleimani’s killing and the clear message it has sent about US tolerances, Iran is more likely to double down on the doctrine most closely associated with him.

A confederated effort

Iran relies on an outer cordon of partnerships to defend its interests and project its power. In Lebanon, Yemen, Syria and Iraq it has armed partners with whom it shares a range of interests – from the immediate to the profoundly cultural – and who are used to operating with the support and in some cases direction of Iranian IRGC officials. This strategic and operational compatibility makes ‘Iran’ now more of a confederation than a single state. Not all of its partners will respond unquestioningly to commands from Tehran, but few will refuse to take the fight to the US both over the assassination of Soleimani, their patron and military leader, but also for their own strong, local reasons. Public demonstrations of grief and defiance have already taken place in Sana’a. An assortment of militia flags already flanks Iranian officials when facing the media.

Campaigns rather than operations

Iran prefers campaigns to operations. Although Iran will mount high-impact operations, its preference and aptitude is for campaigns run over time during which it can steadily accumulate strategic influence through persistent presence and messaging. It does not expect rapid, decisive outcomes from operations. Instead it sequences operations within campaigns for long-term strategic benefit.

It is possible that Iran will embark on a new campaign focused on achieving a long-avowed objective to remove the US military presence from the Middle East. In practice, the scope of such a campaign would likely cover Iraq and the Levant, but may, should opportunities arise, extend to the Gulf. What will be new is the deployment of IRGC resources against this objective over a long period of time. Given US historic resolve not to be dislodged, Iran may aim and settle for less, such as a campaign of low-level operations, including demonstrations and threats that raise the ambient alert level to the point where the US presence is limited to fixed locations and its non-official presence disappears. 

Highly adept at exploiting its victimhood, Iran will seek to use its narrative as a call to arms within Shia communities and across the Islamic world more widely, where existing anti-US sentiment provides a fertile recruiting ground. Iran will also seek to draw support away from the US, many of whose strategic partners will be at least ambivalent about the killing of Soleimani. Neither the Europeans nor the Gulf states will want to see, let alone be party to, a hot war with Iran. It will be supported by Russia in building international opposition, if not condemnation, of the US. 

For the US, creating a coalition for escalation against Iran may be difficult. That may not concern Washington in the short term, but in the long term it may deepen its own isolation rather than that of Iran: a policy of ‘maximum pressure’ that includes targeted killings may just be too much.

Popular mobilisation

A key feature of campaigns led by the IRGC Quds Force is popular mobilisation beyond the borders of Iran. This has its roots in the original domestic mobilisation, the Basij, raised inside Iran to secure the Revolution. The Quds Force has continued to use the concept, adapting it to local circumstances within Iran and beyond, as seen in both Syria and Iraq.

This has operational value in increasing Iran’s available manpower and geographic reach, as well as propaganda value in making its agenda appear a shared one with other actors. Appeals over the heads of governments to the wider Iran-affiliated communities across the Islamic world could, as Iran will intend, result in operational initiatives against US targets that are not directed by Iran and provide, technically at least, a degree of plausible deniability for Tehran.

Risk and calibration

Iran calibrates its operations to fall below the threshold that would trigger retaliation and endanger the survival of the regime or its most valued asset, Hizbullah. That has been most evident in its long skirmishing with Israel. This restraint will be complicated by the strength of emotion over Soleimani’s killing and by the difficulty Tehran may have in controlling responses amongst its partners, a role ironically that Soleimani played. But Iran will, despite the fiery rhetoric, draw edges around its campaign. It will fight but it will aim, above all, to survive.

A formidable, yet asymmetric adversary

Iran has demonstrated a number of hard, war-fighting capabilities in the past five years. The IRGC has operated in multiple theatres simultaneously through a range of partners, from Russia to the para-state of Hizbullah to small local militias. Its role in successful military operations, as well as its ability to mobilise indigenous groups, has left Iran with a reserve of military power of far less technical potency than that of the US, but of more practical use in fighting asymmetrically. Whatever Iran’s next move, the need to find the elusive combination of techniques, capabilities and diplomacy to counter its formidable powers has suddenly become more pressing for the US.