Yossef Bodansky
On 30 December 2019, the PLA celebrated the fourth anniversary of its newest branch - the Strategic Support Force (SSF).1 The PLA SSF is equal in institutional hierarchy to the likes of the PLA Rocket Force, PLA Air Force, and PLA Navy. The SSF was officially established in late 2015. During 2019, the profile of the SSF rose prominently in Beijing. For the first time, a large contingent of SSF troops marched in the PLA’s great parade on 1 October, wearing uniforms of ground troops, navy personnel and air force troops, along with a large variety of combat vehicles with diverse electronic warfare systems. On 12 December, the recently appointed Commander of the PLA Strategic Support Force Li Fengbiao was promoted by Xi Jinping to the rank of full General (4 stars) as part of the start of Xi Jinping’s modernizing and streamlining of the Chinese High Command.
The PLA SSF is responsible for both the Chinese space operations, including space warfare, and the wide and not clearly defined electronic/cyber operations (including information operations). A primary mission of the SSF is providing the Forbidden City with strategic intelligence from all-source technical means - from satellites to hacking. The analysis and delivery of the collected intelligence is done through the Intelligence Bureau within the PLA’s Joint Staff Department that controls the country’s most leading think tanks and research institutions who conduct the pertinent analysis and make policy recommendations.
It was the marked expansion in the SSF’s electronic/cyber operations that brought the praise and high-profile during 2019. Back in December 1929, during the Gutian Conference (that received immense political attention stressing its clairvoyance and enduring relevance in December 2019), Mao Zedong asserted that “the Chinese Red Army is an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution” in order to “establish revolutionary political power.” Implementation is undertaken in the context of the “Three Warfares” - the broad umbrella definition of political warfare. The first of the “Three Warfares” is the struggle for influencing media and public opinion; the second is influencing foreign decision-makers and their China policies; and the third is shaping the legal context of Chinese actions and intentions. More recently, the PLA embraced the “Unrestricted War” concept, introduced in early 1999, that includes wreaking havoc on the Internet among the instruments and methods of “semi-warfare, quasi-warfare, and sub-warfare, that is, the embryonic form of another kind of warfare.” Presently, the PLA SSF is the combat arm most adapt for the conduct of the non-kinetic elements of the “Three Warfares” and “Unrestricted War” concepts.
The PLA SSF is responsible for both the Chinese space operations, including space warfare, and the wide and not clearly defined electronic/cyber operations (including information operations). A primary mission of the SSF is providing the Forbidden City with strategic intelligence from all-source technical means - from satellites to hacking. The analysis and delivery of the collected intelligence is done through the Intelligence Bureau within the PLA’s Joint Staff Department that controls the country’s most leading think tanks and research institutions who conduct the pertinent analysis and make policy recommendations.
It was the marked expansion in the SSF’s electronic/cyber operations that brought the praise and high-profile during 2019. Back in December 1929, during the Gutian Conference (that received immense political attention stressing its clairvoyance and enduring relevance in December 2019), Mao Zedong asserted that “the Chinese Red Army is an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution” in order to “establish revolutionary political power.” Implementation is undertaken in the context of the “Three Warfares” - the broad umbrella definition of political warfare. The first of the “Three Warfares” is the struggle for influencing media and public opinion; the second is influencing foreign decision-makers and their China policies; and the third is shaping the legal context of Chinese actions and intentions. More recently, the PLA embraced the “Unrestricted War” concept, introduced in early 1999, that includes wreaking havoc on the Internet among the instruments and methods of “semi-warfare, quasi-warfare, and sub-warfare, that is, the embryonic form of another kind of warfare.” Presently, the PLA SSF is the combat arm most adapt for the conduct of the non-kinetic elements of the “Three Warfares” and “Unrestricted War” concepts.
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