Because it's unlikely that Iranian-allied militias will stop their harassment of U.S. targets in Iraq, U.S. forces and assets there remain at risk.
The escalation will strain U.S.-Iraqi relations and could result in a legal petition seeking to force the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. This will leave the government in Baghdad with a dilemma over how to maintain valuable U.S. security assistance while also asserting sovereignty.
The U.S. military response against an Iraqi paramilitary group closely affiliated with Iran has further increased the risk that an escalatory pattern of violence between Iran (and its proxies) and the United States will develop. Three U.S. airstrikes on Dec. 29 targeted positions in Iraq where the Iranian-backed militia Kataib Hezbollah has a presence; concurrent airstrikes hit two of the militia's positions in Syria near Qaim, an Iraqi border city. The airstrikes came in retaliation for a Dec. 27 rocket attack against the K-1 base near Kirkuk that killed a U.S. civilian contractor and wounded four U.S. military personnel. The United States blamed the militia group, one of Iraq's Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), for carrying out that assault.
The Big Picture
Iraq depends on both the United States and Iran to help it maintain its security. As tensions between those security partners increase, Iraq will find it harder to maintain its balance between them. U.S. airstrikes on Iranian-allied militias in Iraq mark the latest escalation between Washington and Tehran that will increase the pressure on the Iraqi government to justify continuing dependence on U.S. security support to its citizens. The airstrikes also increase the risk of a further military escalation between the United States and Iran within Iraq.
The contractor's death marked the first U.S. casualty in 2019 as a result of an Iranian-linked PMU attack in Iraq or Syria. Likewise, the deaths of dozens of Kataib Hezbollah members in the retaliatory bombings also marked a significant escalation in U.S. operations against Iranian-linked units in the two countries. These latest deadly incidents had been presaged by rising tensions between Iran and the United States and an increasing willingness on Iran's part to use its proxies to challenge Washington. According to U.S. defense officials, for instance, the barrage of about 30 rockets fired at K-1 represented the 11th attack since October by Iranian-backed PMUs that targeted areas where U.S. personnel in Iraq were based.
Iran's Growing Tolerance for Risk
Iran's extensive links with militia groups in both Syria and Iraq provide Tehran with a means by which to strike at U.S. forces by proxy. Given its larger dispute with Washington amid the U.S. sanctions campaign that has stifled its economy, Iran has become increasingly willing to use that option. But as the U.S. counterstrike illustrates, a proxy attack still carries with it the real possibility of a further escalation of attacks and counterattacks by both sides. Immediately after the airstrikes, the United States asserted that they were a direct retaliation over the attack on K-1, characterizing them as an effort to deter future militia operations against its forces. This fits in with Washington's preferred strategy of leaning heavily on sanctions, including those put in place in December against Iraqi militia leaders, to cripple Iran while seeking to avoid a military escalation to full war.
The United States is also aware that given the operating environment in Iraq and Syria, its forces dispersed in the two countries are vulnerable to attacks from Iranian-linked militias. For its part, Iran is cognizant of the risks that military escalation with a country as powerful as the United States carries, but pressure from the economic sanctions has left Tehran more willing to absorb those risks as it seeks ways to push back.
Beyond risking a fight with the United States that could spread to Iran itself, an escalation of violence at a time when Iraqi street protesters are decrying the Iranian influence in their country could also backfire on Tehran. But even with those risks hanging over their heads, Iran's deteriorating economy and the eagerness of some of its PMU proxies to confront U.S. forces could tempt Iranian leaders to act. Even if a large-scale Iranian counterattack over the U.S. strike on Kataib Hezbollah does not materialize, the rocket attacks on U.S. positions in Iraq and Syria are not only likely to continue, they may even increase in intensity.
Iranian proxies could also use other means of attack, such as with improvised explosive devices. This means that there is a continued high likelihood of further U.S. casualties at the hands of Iranian-linked militias Those, in turn, could lead to further rounds of U.S. strikes. At this stage in their confrontation, a rapid escalation of violence between Iran and the United States is hardly inevitable. However, the potential for more incidents will remain elevated as long as the political acrimony between the countries remains in its current state.
The Iraqi Government's Dilemma
The violent exchanges further complicate the already chaotic political situation in Baghdad and will strain Iraq's relationship with both Iran and the United States. Many Iraqi PMUs have been directly funded and equipped by Iran — and thus are accurately viewed by Washington as direct tools of Iran. But the fact that the militias comprise Iraqi fighters gives Iran a degree of political protection from the Iraqi government over their continued use in Iraq, as well as some plausible deniability as it uses the militias to bolster regional hegemony.
Iraqi politicians who have ties with both the United States and Iran have issued measured condemnations of the airstrikes, but have stopped short of calling for the withdrawal of U.S. forces. This underscores their desire to not antagonize either country, both of which are powerful security backers and necessary economic partners for Baghdad. On Dec. 29, for example, Iraqi President Barham Salih called the U.S. airstrike unacceptable, and the same day, the powerful Dawa party issued a statement condemning the use of Iraq as a site for the United States and Iran to settle scores. The Iraqi prime minister's office, which had been informed that the airstrikes would occur about half an hour before they happened, said it "strongly rejected" the actions. Meanwhile, leaders of Iraq's Iranian-allied PMUs, including commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, called for U.S. forces to withdraw from Iraq. He also threatened further retaliation, a threat that carries considerable weight.
Given that the fighters among the PMU's ranks are Iraqi, Baghdad will be forced to distance itself publicly from direct cooperation with future U.S. actions against them.
Beyond the condemnations, the Iraqi government's lack of control over U.S. or Iranian actions in Iraq opens the likelihood of some diplomatic deterioration between Washington and Baghdad. Given that the fighters among the PMU's ranks are Iraqi, Baghdad will be forced to distance itself publicly from direct cooperation with future U.S. actions against them, and even despite Baghdad's own (mostly failed) efforts over the years to rein in some of the aggressive actions by the PMUs. A strategic framework agreement between Iraq and the United States facilitates close coordination between Iraqi security forces and the estimated 5,000 U.S. troops in the country. While it has proved valuable in increasing Iraqi security, the agreement has come under increasing political pressure from Iranian-allied politicians in parliament who want U.S. forces to leave Iraq. Iraq's security council said on Dec. 30 it would "reconsider" the relationship between Iraq and the U.S.-led coalition fighting the Islamic State, reflecting Baghdad's tricky position.
The airstrikes will add fuel to the ongoing debate, even though the Iran-allied PMUs themselves remain unpopular among many Iraqis because of their penchant for quasi-legal violence and because their presence makes Iraq a vulnerable proxy theater. A further factor in Baghdad's political decision-making will hinge on the reaction by Iraq's protest movement, especially if demonstrators demand that U.S. operations in Iraq be reined in. Given the limits of Iraq's current caretaker government to respond to emboldened demonstrators, the re-evaluation of the strategic framework agreement that has been stalled in parliament will accelerate if Iraqi protesters demand it.
Moving forward, Iraq will remain a highly volatile site of confrontation between the United States and Iran, damaging Iraq’s diplomatic relations with both countries. But the ball is currently in Iran's court, and the extent of the response by Iranian-linked militias to the U.S. airstrikes will determine whether a cycle of escalation takes hold in Iraq.
No comments:
Post a Comment