11 January 2020

Over five years of Russian hybrid warfare against Ukraine provide lessons how to make Ukraine stronger


Using the hybrid warfare model to advance its goals, Russia exploited strategic ambiguity through a blend of soft and hard power. In particular Russia flooded the region with illegal weapons. It used mercenaries to destroy regional infrastructure. It weakened the local economy and blocked state functions such as law enforcement, justice and social welfare. It caused a refugee crisis. In particular, it exploited social media and employed information warfare. This hybrid approach has been reinforced by the threatened use of conventional and even nuclear weaponry. Russia pursued its objectives through a combination of local sympathizers and Russian troops that consisted of low-footprint special operations without insignia to keep the narrative of local resistance alive as long as possible. Obviously, this approach worked well in the Crimea as it was in part supported by local population. In the Donbass in worked less well. Ukrainian military success against the separatists needed to be stopped by Russian military. Four principal factors have contributed to the Russian efficiency. 

• Thorough conceptual and operational preparation to include respective training and exercises; 

• The lack of respective preparation, capabilities and resilience on the Ukrainian side; • A lack of trust in the own government (due to corruption and weak governmental performance) and consequently a lack of societal resilience on the Ukrainian side; 


• The strategic surprise of the Russian intervention and respective unpreparedness of international partners to support the Ukraine with adequate means. In my judgement, all four factors apply until today. Of course, the surprise is gone. But not the insufficient international preparedness. 


2. Did Russia plan its hybrid warfare activities against Ukraine since the early 1990s? Not from my perspective. Of course, there has been discomfort with the separation of the Ukraine from Russian perspective. Obviously, a couple of important aspects such as Russia´s dependence on agricultural products from Crimea and from Ukraine´s military industry have been of strategic relevance. Yet, Russia had plenty of own problems in the early 1990s. I have been professionally dealing with these and recall food problems in St. Petersburg, shoot outs in major industries, mafia controlling banks and ten thousands of scientists tempted to leave Russia and taking their competencies and knowledge about weapons of mass destructions for good money to places such as Libya.

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