8 October 2019

Afghans Want U.S.-Taliban Talks to Resume, But with New Approach

BY: Belquis Ahmadi

Just days before U.S.-Taliban talks were put on freeze earlier in September, I was in Istanbul for a negotiations workshop with 25 Afghan women leaders. These women were expected to play an integral role in intra-Afghan talks that would follow a U.S.-Taliban deal. Even though a deal seemed imminent that week, the Taliban intensified their attacks on Afghan civilians and security forces. Meanwhile, these women were hard at work strategizing for peace. But they, and other Afghans I spoke with in a subsequent trip to Kabul, revealed deep trepidation over what a U.S.-Taliban deal would mean for them, their hard-won rights, and the impact a begrudging peace could have on Afghan society.The opening session of the loya jirga, a yearly tribal assembly where some 30 percent of participants are now women, in Kabul, Afghanistan, April 29, 2019. (Jim Huylebroek/The New York Times)
Istanbul: Working for Peace as War Rages on at Home

The Unwanted Wars

By Robert Malley 

The war that now looms largest is a war nobody apparently wants. During his presidential campaign, Donald Trump railed against the United States’ entanglement in Middle Eastern wars, and since assuming office, he has not changed his tune. Iran has no interest in a wide-ranging conflict that it knows it could not win. Israel is satisfied with calibrated operations in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza but fears a larger confrontation that could expose it to thousands of rockets. Saudi Arabia is determined to push back against Iran, but without confronting it militarily. Yet the conditions for an all-out war in the Middle East are riper than at any time in recent memory. 

A conflict could break out in any one of a number of places for any one of a number of reasons. Consider the September 14 attack on Saudi oil facilities: it could theoretically have been perpetrated by the Houthis, a Yemeni rebel group, as part of their war with the kingdom; by Iran, as a response to debilitating U.S. sanctions; or by an Iranian-backed Shiite militia in Iraq. If Washington decided to take military action against Tehran, this could in turn prompt Iranian retaliation against the United States’ Gulf allies, an attack by Hezbollah on Israel, or a Shiite militia operation against U.S. personnel in Iraq. Likewise, Israeli operations against Iranian allies anywhere in the Middle East could trigger a regionwide chain reaction. Because any development anywhere in the region can have ripple effects everywhere, narrowly containing a crisis is fast becoming an exercise in futility. 

Overcoming Inertia: Why It’s Time to End the War in Afghanistan

By John Glaser, John Mueller 

Bottom Line: The war in Afghanistan has gone on so long not because of necessity, but inertia. Despite what some military and political leaders have said, there is no reason for the United States to remain in Afghanistan, nor is there a clear path to victory over the Taliban. Withdrawal and negotiations are the best thing for U.S. interests.

The war in Afghanistan has persisted in spite of decades of setbacks thanks in part to the framing of military officials.

After a successful invasion, the Taliban retreated to Pakistan and regrouped. By 2006, they were able to ignite a civil war in the region, and currently hold more territory than at any point in 2001. But the United States has remained in the region largely because military leaders want to, both to avoid real or perceived failure, and to prevent what they imagine would be a dangerous Taliban resurgence.

Military officials’ desire to maintain the conflict is rooted in the flawed assumption that a Taliban victory would pose a threat to the United States.

Afghanistan security adviser says hard-line Taliban members defecting to ISIS, merging with Al Qaeda

By Hollie McKay
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Trump cancels secret peace talks at Camp David after the Taliban admitted to a deadly car bombing that killed an American soldier in Kabul; chief White House correspondent John Roberts reports.

More than 18 years after U.S. forces entered Afghanistan and usurped the Taliban government from power, the country remains a patchwork of progress, pain, and bloodletting.

While the territorial dominance and perpetual attacks orchestrated by the Taliban remains at the forefront of the fragile nation’s woes, the presence of other insurgent groups and blatant threats to U.S. interests also lurk in the periphery.

“Many Taliban commanders, hardliners that did not want to join the peace process. We had intelligence that showed they are going to join ISIS. That threat may increase over a period of time,” Afghan National Security Adviser, Hamdullah Mohib, told Fox News on Tuesday. “For the time being, ISIS is not a strategic threat to us. We have been able to get rid of them in places they have taken hold. But if the peace process goes wrong and doesn’t really integrate all of the Taliban, the hardliners may join ISIS, which is when it will become a strategic threat to us and our international partners.”

Jihad, history link Taliban to al-Qaida in Afghanistan

By: Kathy Gannon
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ISLAMABAD — The Taliban promised Washington during months of negotiations that the United States would never again be attacked from Afghan soil. Such a pledge would have included al-Qaida, which planned the 9/11 attacks from inside Afghanistan.

Yet jihad, or holy war, and a shared history continue to bind the two militant groups, and there’s no evidence of a break in relations between the long-time allies. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had said the Taliban agreed to cut ties with al-Qaida as part of peace negotiations, which President Donald Trump abruptly called off last week.

The al-Qaida leadership still vows allegiance to Taliban chief Maulvi Hibatullah Akhunzada, and al-Qaida has been growing stronger in recent years, according to analysts and experts. The group has overcome setbacks from the establishment of a rival Islamic State affiliate in eastern Afghanistan and from U.S. drone strikes that had reduced its numbers.

Afghanistan’s Taliban leaders agreed they wanted a deal with the United States, but some were in more of a hurry than others.

China Lifts the Veil on Its Advanced Weaponry


A formation of Dongfeng-17 (DF-17) hypersonic missiles rolls through the streets of Beijing during the military parade as part of the celebrations marking the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China.

A military parade through Tiananmen Square, part of the Oct. 1 celebration of the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, showcased some of the People's Liberation Army's never-before-seen weapons systems. With the display, China sent a clear message about how far along the development path its yearslong military modernization drive had taken it.

Among the equipment that was rolled through the streets of Beijing included public debuts of a number of strategic and tactical weapons and systems, from a new assault rifle on the lower end all the way to strategic nuclear weapons. The parade revealed the areas of focus for China in the military sphere.

How the Communist 1949 Victory in China's Civil War Changed America and the World

by Lyle J. Goldstein

On the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, there is much head-scratching going on Washington, DC. Why hasn’t Beijing’s economy imploded yet? Why hasn’t China crushed the Hong Kong protests? How did China get ahold of 5G technology before us? How do they build quality warships so fast?

Yet, the biggest questions seem to revolve around the policy of engagement that the U.S. adopted since the early 1970s. Why and how have we enabled China’s rise? How is it that China did not become pro-Western like Japan and South Korea once Chinese had finally tasted the fruits of capitalism? Why didn’t the same mechanisms that facilitated massive foreign investment into China also cause it to embrace the “rule-based order” on the world stage? Put in a somewhat less polite form, these China questions could be boiled down to: how were America’s China experts [中国通] duped so badly?

China's High-Speed Drone Is Rocket-Powered And All About Doing What Satellites Can't

BY TYLER ROGOWAY
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China's big 70th-anniversary parade marking the founding of the PRC has come and gone. There were a number of revelations, some of which we are still analyzing, but the biggest ones were in the unmanned space. In the days leading up to the parade, we had covered both of the most impressive unmanned vehicles that were to be displayed. It's time to follow up with our analysis now that we have seen them in far greater detail. We posted our analysis on the GJ-11 Sharp Sword UCAV earlier today, now here are my takeaways from the official unveiling of the WZ-8—also referred to as the DR-8—high-speed reconnaissance drone.

Before we get started, it's important to note that the two WZ-8s put on display for the parade appear to be real aircraft, not mockups. It is unclear how representative they are of the current maturity of the program, but they are indeed real aircraft. Considering that the WZ-8 has been around for some time, these could be early demonstrators or an early production configuration, we just don't know.

Xi’s embrace of false history and fearsome weapons is worrying


The most revealing moment of the national day parade through Tiananmen Square on October 1st lasted just a few seconds. It came as China’s fearsome new df-41 nuclear missiles, capable of striking any city in America, neared Chaguan’s press seat on the Avenue of Eternal Peace. Loudspeakers came to life as their camouflaged, many-wheeled carriers growled towards the grand gateway of the Forbidden City where President Xi Jinping and other Chinese leaders waited on a rostrum. Unseen voices explained how the weapons would ensure that China always retains a deterrent capability, thus safeguarding peace. Turning lyrical, the voices compared the missiles to large dragons that can hide in massive mountains or boundless seas before delivering earth-shaking blows. The hand-picked crowd erupted in spontaneous cheers.

Those cheers reflect two messages conveyed by the parade, which marked 70 years of Communist rule. The first is that China wields such firepower that no country may safely defy it. The second is that China is great again thanks to the Communist Party which is, and has always been, a force for good.

China is ready to play a bigger role in world affairs


A freight train leaves the Qingbaijiang Railway Port in Chengdu for Europe: China's Belt and Road Initiative will knit Eurasia together with transport and logistics. © Imaginechina/AP

The 70th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China on October 1 is an occasion to look back on the nation's momentous progress and consider what role it will play in the world over the next seven decades.

China has benefited greatly from embracing globalization and its institutions such as the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. As China's economy continues to expand, Beijing's role in the future will be to safeguard and enhance the international liberal order.

This commitment can already be seen in its contributions to U.N. peacekeeping and its establishment of new multilateral bodies such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

Why It’s So Hard to Defend Against Drones

Sarah Kreps

The attack on oil facilities in Saudi Arabia last month cut the country’s oil production in half, leading to a 20 percent spike in the price of oil and exposing the surprising vulnerability of the Saudi oil industry, which is vital to the global energy supply. It was all apparently the work of a handful of drones and cruise missiles.

It was just the latest incident, but certainly the most high-stakes geopolitically, of what is usually referred to as “suspected drone activity.” Interruptions to commercial aircraft have become increasingly frequent, when planes must be diverted to another location because a drone has entered restricted airspace; sometimes, flights are suspended altogether. In December 2018, hundreds of flights were cancelled at London’s Gatwick airport because of reported drone sightings, which prompted the deployment of military equipment to investigate. In July 2017, a drone that could be bought online for a few hundred dollars almost collided with an F-22 fighter jet that cost more than a quarter of a billion dollars, despite the base and the airspace around it being designated a “no-drone area.” ...

Why Saudi Arabia's Crisis Is a Sign that U.S. Foreign Policy Is Shifting

by Eldad Shavit Ari Heistein

The lackluster U.S. response to Iranian strikes against Saudi Aramco facilities highlight what is becoming an increasingly important trend in U.S. foreign policy: Washington’s declining willingness to invest military and economic resources in defense of its allies’ security. While President Donald Trump provided this shift with an ideology and a slogan, it did not originate with him but with President Barack Obama’s attitude toward “freeriders.” As many from both sides of the aisle in Washington today subscribe to different variations of this approach aimed at reducing U.S. responsibility toward allies, there could be significant implications for the global alliance system.

First, one cannot discuss U.S. desire to avoid foreign entanglements without referring to its long, costly, and thankless engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq. It has become difficult for Americans to discuss any potential military action, except maybe drone strikes against isolated terror groups, without referencing the possibility that mission creep or escalation will drag it into another quagmire. Options between full-scale war and taking no action at all appear to have largely evaporated from U.S. discourse, as the public and decisionmakers have little faith in the ability to contain operations. This binds the hands of U.S. decisionmakers and prevents the judicious use of military power, as anything that warrants an action somewhere between total war and no response cannot be treated appropriately. In turn, despite threatening rhetoric, the low credibility of those threats and the high U.S. threshold for what warrants a response have given bad actors far more room to operate.

Meet the the real leader: in Iran, Ali Khamenei towers above all


A rare interview conducted earlier this week with Qassem Suleimani, the highly-influential Iranian commander of the Revolutionary Guard’s Quds Force, has provided a fascinating insight into how his organisation manages relations between Tehran and its numerous proxies throughout the Middle East.

For outsiders, one of the perennial challenges they face is trying to work out who controls the levers of power in the Islamic Republic.

On one level there is the democratically elected government, which is currently headed by President Hassan Rouhani, who is answerable to the country’s majlis, or parliament, whose members are also elected at the ballot box.

On another there is the unique position of the country’s supreme leader who, under Iran’s unique concept of the Vilayat-e Faqih, derives his authority from Islam, and is therefore considered to have authority over the country’s democratically-elected bodies.

Opinion: Trump And Pompeo Have Enabled A Saudi Cover-Up Of The Khashoggi Killing

AARON DAVID MILLER
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In the weeks following the death of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, President Trump spent more time praising Saudi Arabia as a very important ally than he did reacting to the killing.Hasan Jamali/AP

Aaron David Miller (@aarondmiller2) is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former State Department Middle East analyst, adviser and negotiator in Republican and Democratic administrations. He is the author most recently of the End of Greatness: Why America Can't Have (and Doesn't Want) Another Great President.

Richard Sokolsky, a nonresident senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, worked in the State Department for six different administrations and was a member of the secretary of state's Office of Policy Planning from 2005 to 2015.

It has been a year since Saudi journalist and Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi entered Saudi Arabia's Consulate in Istanbul where he was slain and dismembered. There is still no objective or comprehensive Saudi or American accounting of what occurred, let alone any real accountability.

The Complicated Geopolitics of U.S. Oil Sanctions on Iran

by Amy M. Jaffe

It is often said, perhaps with some hyperbole, that Iran’s nuclear deal with world powers was the best hope for conflict resolution in the Middle East. Its architect John Kerry argues instead that the 2015 deal’s limited parameter of closing Iran’s pathway to a nuclear weapon is sufficient on the merits. The Trump administration is taking a different view, focusing on Iran’s escalating threats to U.S. allies Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Those threats, which have included missile, drone, and cyberattacks on Saudi oil facilities, are looming large over the global economy because they are squarely influencing the volatility of the price of oil. One could argue that the U.S. decision to withdraw from the Iranian deal, referred to as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), has injected an even higher degree of risk into oil markets, where traders now feel that the chances of Mideast conflict resolution are lower.

But, the Trump administration could argue otherwise. From its perspective, the United States extended to Iran $6 billion in frozen funds, opened the door for a flood of spare parts to be shipped into Iran’s suffering oil and petrochemical sector, and looked the other way while European companies rushed in for commercial deals. In exchange, it’s true, Iran began to implement the terms of JCPOA, but as Secretary of State Pompeo laid out in a major speech on the subject, the nuclear deal has failed to turn down the heat on the wide range of conflicts plaguing the Mideast region.

Unless We Act Now, the Islamic State Will Rise Again


To Whom It May Concern: e, the undersigned, have devoted decades to the fight against terrorism. We have lost colleagues and friends. We have borne witness to the violent rise of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and ISIS. We have studied the conditions that brought those groups into being and allowed them to grow in strength. Today, 18 years since 9/11, we see some of the same conditions arising once again in Syria and Iraq, and we will not be silent while history repeats itself. 

ISIS may have been defeated on the battlefield; but thousands of Western fighters and their families remain in detention in Syria and Iraq. We do not expect terrorists to attract much sympathy. But the majority of detainees are not terrorists; they are children. At the largest detention camp, al-Hol in northeastern Syria, around two-thirds of the approximately 70,000 detainees are under the age of twelve. The Red Cross describes conditions there as “apocalyptic.” Children routinely die of malnutrition and hypothermia. Education, medical care, and trauma counseling are practically non-existent. Extremist indoctrination is rife. Most detainees at al-Hol are from Iraq and Syria, but some are from Western countries. Western governments, for the most part, have refused to take their nationals back. Some have revoked their citizenship. Others have called for an international tribunal based in Iraq, which amounts to another means of avoiding the tough, but necessary, responsibility of dealing with their own citizens. Their trepidation is understandable; by blocking the return of people they regard as dangerous, these states believe that they are protecting their citizens at home.

BACK IN THE FIGHT: DIVISIONS, CORPS, AND ARMIES IN COMPETITION AND CONFLICT

Nathan Jennings

In recent years the United States military has shifted focus toward great-power competition against a variety of potential state and nonstate adversaries. For the US Army, specifically, this means that following decades of counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is now posturing to compete and win against peer and near-peer opponents who feature advanced military capabilities designed to deny American influence and freedom of action. This shift in emphasis, which requires the service to rebuild and refine capabilities at theater army, field army, corps, and division echelons, is essential to its ability to achieve US objectives.

The evolving anti-access and area denial capabilities of potential adversaries like China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea present potent challenges to the Army’s ability to conduct expeditionary warfare at the operational level—where intermediate commands connect tactical actions to strategic aims. As belligerent nations strive to establish regional hegemony and undermine American credibility, their advances in establishing layered standoff and hybrid approaches have enabled marked increases in political and territorial aggression. The Army, as America’s primary landpower institution, has a responsibility to safeguard national interests against these threats in the land domain.

UPDATE 1-Gulf military chiefs say attacks on Saudi flew through GCC airspace


DUBAI, Oct 3 (Reuters) - Gulf military leaders on Thursday condemned the use of their countries' airspace to carry out attacks last month against a Saudi crude processing plant, a statement that indicated oblique backing for a U.S./Saudi account blaming Iran for the attack.

Attacks on Sept. 14 hit major oil processing facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais belonging to Saudi oil giant Aramco, causing a spike in oil prices, fires and damage that halved the crude output of the world's top oil exporter.

Yemen's Houthi group claimed responsibility for the attacks but a U.S. official said they originated from southwestern Iran and Riyadh blamed Tehran. Iran, which supports the Houthis in Yemen's war, has denied any involvement in the attacks.

Chiefs of Staff of the militaries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which includes Saudi Arabia and five of its smaller neighbours, met on Thursday at Riyadh's request.

They condemned last month's attacks and other prvious strikes on Saudi oil infrastructure, and earlier attacks on shipping in the Gulf.

Are air defense systems ready to confront drone swarms?

By: Seth J. Frantzman

JERUSALEM — The attack on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities on Sept. 14 served as a reality check for countries struggling to define the level of the threat posed by drone swarms and low-altitude cruise missiles.

Now, in a region where that threat is particularly acute, countries are left to reexamine existing air defense technology.

According to the Saudi Defense Ministry, 18 drones and seven cruise missiles were fired at the kingdom in the early hours the day in mid-September.

The drones struck Abqaiq, a facility that the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank had warned the month before was a potential critical infrastructure target. Several cruise missiles fell short and did not hit the facility. Four cruise missiles struck Khurais. Saudi and U.S. official blame on Iran, but the government there denies involvement.

What is clear is the failure of existing air defense systems to stop the attack.

Pentagon's Next-Gen Missile Defense Plan Could Leave U.S. Poorly Protected For Years

Loren Thompson

Nuclear attack is the biggest military threat to the security of the United States. A single megaton-size nuclear warhead aimed at a major American city could kill or maim over a million people. A handful of nuclear weapons aimed at several cities could collapse the national economy.

It is widely believed that a stable deterrence relationship exists between the U.S. and the other two major nuclear powers, Russia and China. North Korea, however, is not part of that relationship and it has recently tested missiles capable of reaching U.S. territory. Intelligence reports indicate the North Korean regime is working to wed nuclear warheads to its long-range missiles.

Iran may follow, with similarly unpredictable consequences. And even in the case of Russia and China, there is the danger of accidental or unauthorized launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Russia’s Advances in Electronic Warfare Capability

By Roger McDermott

Since the reform of Russia’s Armed Forces began in late 2008, Moscow has developed a credible conventional military capability. Among the subset of capabilities over the past decade are the critically important advances in combat support offered by Electronic Warfare (EW) (see EDM, April 17, 2018). A recent review of progress in this area in Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye considers the use of EW in the Russia-Georgia conflict in August 2008 compared to its extensive usage and experimentation during Russia’s military operations in Syria. These advances are also seen in the development of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology, as well as in recent air and ground tactical exercises in the Central and Eastern military districts (MD) (Vzglyad, September 27, 2019).

Colonel (retired) Anatoly Tsyganok, a member of the Russian Center for Political-Military Studies, asserts at the outset, “To start a war without controlling the electromagnetic spectrum is tantamount to defeat”; and crucially, he adds, “The West still does not believe that in ten years, Russia’s use of Electronic Warfare equipment in the war in Georgia in 2008 and in Syria in 2018 really and radically changed the situation. Russia will not fully disclose its capabilities in conducting Electronic Warfare (offensive and defensive in nature), so that the adversary does not fully recognize its capabilities.” Tsyganok then details the somewhat limited exploitation of Russian EW assets during operations against Georgia in 2008, before turning to the obvious advances in its use in Syria. In particular he asserts that EW was not sufficiently used to suppress Georgia’s air defenses. Additionally, EW assets were not used to cover advancing forces against attack, there were insufficient numbers of jammers and they spent too little time creating jamming zones, and there was a lack of EW activity for group defense from battle formations (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, September 20).

Pentagon's Next-Gen Missile Defense Plan Could Leave U.S. Poorly Protected For Years

Loren Thompson
Source Link

Nuclear attack is the biggest military threat to the security of the United States. A single megaton-size nuclear warhead aimed at a major American city could kill or maim over a million people. A handful of nuclear weapons aimed at several cities could collapse the national economy.

It is widely believed that a stable deterrence relationship exists between the U.S. and the other two major nuclear powers, Russia and China. North Korea, however, is not part of that relationship and it has recently tested missiles capable of reaching U.S. territory. Intelligence reports indicate the North Korean regime is working to wed nuclear warheads to its long-range missiles.

Iran may follow, with similarly unpredictable consequences. And even in the case of Russia and China, there is the danger of accidental or unauthorized launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

We Are in Uncharted Territory

By Susan E. Rice

President Trump, his Republican sycophants in Congress, and the right-wing media are working overtime yet again to distract and manipulate the American public. To downplay Mr. Trump’s transgressions, they are drawing a false equivalence between his July phone call with President Zelensky of Ukraine and former Vice President Biden’s efforts in 2015 to encourage the replacement of the Ukrainian prosecutor general.

Don’t be confused. These two cases have almost nothing in common. While I was President Barack Obama’s national security adviser, Mr. Biden took repeated steps — at the president’s behest — to advance a widely supported, completely overt United States government policy to encourage Ukrainian officials to aggressively combat endemic corruption and bolster Ukraine’s nascent democracy.

Mr. Biden’s pressure on President Petro Poroshenko to remove his poor-performing prosecutor general, including by threatening to withhold additional aid, was fully consistent with American interests. It was also a policy fully supported by the International Monetary Fund and our European partners, who along with the United States were providing billions in economic assistance to support the newly elected Ukrainian government.

Russia’s Advances in Electronic Warfare Capability

By Roger McDermott

Since the reform of Russia’s Armed Forces began in late 2008, Moscow has developed a credible conventional military capability. Among the subset of capabilities over the past decade are the critically important advances in combat support offered by Electronic Warfare (EW) (see EDM, April 17, 2018). A recent review of progress in this area in Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye considers the use of EW in the Russia-Georgia conflict in August 2008 compared to its extensive usage and experimentation during Russia’s military operations in Syria. These advances are also seen in the development of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology, as well as in recent air and ground tactical exercises in the Central and Eastern military districts (MD) (Vzglyad, September 27, 2019).

Colonel (retired) Anatoly Tsyganok, a member of the Russian Center for Political-Military Studies, asserts at the outset, “To start a war without controlling the electromagnetic spectrum is tantamount to defeat”; and crucially, he adds, “The West still does not believe that in ten years, Russia’s use of Electronic Warfare equipment in the war in Georgia in 2008 and in Syria in 2018 really and radically changed the situation. Russia will not fully disclose its capabilities in conducting Electronic Warfare (offensive and defensive in nature), so that the adversary does not fully recognize its capabilities.” Tsyganok then details the somewhat limited exploitation of Russian EW assets during operations against Georgia in 2008, before turning to the obvious advances in its use in Syria. In particular he asserts that EW was not sufficiently used to suppress Georgia’s air defenses. Additionally, EW assets were not used to cover advancing forces against attack, there were insufficient numbers of jammers and they spent too little time creating jamming zones, and there was a lack of EW activity for group defense from battle formations (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, September 20).

JUST IN: Marine Corps Using Modeling, Simulation to Define Future Force Structure

By Mandy Mayfield

Analytics from ongoing modeling and simulations will help shape the Marine Corps' future force structure, the service’s commandant said Oct. 3.

Wargaming and experimentation will also inform what tomorrow's force looks like, Gen. David Berger said during a speech at the Heritage Foundation think tank in Washington, D.C.

“We have right now I think [an] 80 to 85 percent picture of what the Marine Corps will need a decade out. But this last step [of using data gathered from modeling and simulation events] is so important because now is when we run that force against a peer threat 10 years out, over and over and over again to develop the analytical base,” Berger said.

“That is the foundation ... we need to justify that [future] force" construct, he added.

The national defense strategy, which was released last year, demands all the services adapt to meet the challenges of a new era of great power competition, Berger noted. The document identifies China and Russia as peer competitors who are developing advanced military capabilities to thwart the United States.