8 March 2019

India’s Dogfight Loss Could Be a Win for U.S. Weapons-Makers

By Lara Seligman

The dilapidated state of the Indian Air Force was thrown into sharp relief last week when Pakistan shot down an Indian pilot flying a Russian-made MiG-21 Bison, a fighter jet first flown in 1956.

The pilot ejected safely into Pakistani territory and was captured by the Pakistan Army. Islamabad released the airman a couple days later in an effort to de-escalate a crisis that began when a Pakistan-based militant group killed more than 40 Indian security officers in a Feb. 14 suicide bombing in India-controlled Kashmir.

The loss of the jet shines a light on India’s aging military and may lend new urgency to New Delhi’s long-delayed fighter replacement program, analysts said. The renewed focus would be a boon for the U.S. aerospace giants Boeing and Lockheed Martin, which are eyeing the lucrative contract for more than 100 airplanes. In addition to the immediate cash value for whichever company wins the work, India’s fighter replacement also offers Boeing and Lockheed the opportunity to extend the production of legacy systems that are reaching the end of their service lives.

Modi Wave 2.0?

by Minhaz Merchant

The devastating air strikes on the Pakistani Army-backed Jaish-e- Mohammad terror group in Khy ber Pakhtunkhwa, deep inside-Pakistani territory, has changed the calculus of the 2019 Lok Sabha elections, making it the most unpredictable in decades.

Has Congress president Rahul Gandhi, meanwhile, made a tactical error by converting the general election into a quasi-presidential contest? Gandhi’s daily attacks on Prime Minister Narendra Modi, muted temporarily after the Pulwama terror outrage, could attract the law of diminishing returns. Modi has mastered the ability to turn personal attacks into political advantage.

United Progressive Alliance (UPA) chairperson Sonia Gandhi learnt that lesson the hard way. She was among the first politicians to spot Modi’s potential to pose an electoral threat to the Congress following the polarising events of 2002. Modi was then unknown in national politics. Yet Sonia Gandhi, with her well developed political antenna, saw him as a future national leader. In 2007, she called him maut ka saudagar. The remark led to two unintended consequences. One, it elevated Modi, until then regarded as a regional satrap, to the national stage. Two, it coalesced the fragmented Hindu vote around the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

IAF must reveal how many terrorists were killed


Air Chief Marshal Birender Singh Dhanoa, seen right, as President Ram Nath Kovind, supreme commander of the armed forces, presents colours to Air Force Station, Hakimpet, and 5 Base Repair Depot at the air force station, Sulur, Coimbatore, March 4, 2019. Photograph: Rashtrapati Bhavan

The political hue and cry over 'unproven' strike casualties over Balakot is understandable given the impending election season and the hyper sentimentality of the the argumentative Indian.

But what I fail to understand is the excuses given out by the establishment over the last week as to why confirmatory information on strike damage was not immediately forthcoming.

Like I mentioned on Saturday, not releasing the Battle Damage Assessment in time was a monumental error on the part of the establishment.

The whole impact of India's gutsy policy shift on terror is in danger of being unravelled on this account.

Ending the War in Afghanistan

by Christopher A. Preble 

The American people have had enough. It’s time for Congress to listen.

On March 4, Senators Rand Paul and Tom Udall put forward bi-partisan draft legislation that would end U.S. military involvement in the war in Afghanistan. The proposed joint resolution gives the Trump administration forty-five days to present a plan for the orderly withdrawal of U.S. military personnel from the country. In keeping with a tradition going back to the Revolutionary War, some three million men and women who have deployed in support of all wars launched after 9/11 will receive a cash bonus of $2,500. Lastly, the resolution stipulates that all U.S. armed forces will be withdrawn from Afghanistan within one year of its passage.

The case for such a move is simple and straightforward. The U.S. military has achieved its core objectives spelled out after 9/11. Bin Laden is dead. Al Qaeda is crippled. The Department of Defense reported last June: “The Al Qaeda threat to the United States and its allies and partners has decreased and the few remaining al Qaeda core members are focused on their own survival.”

Pakistan Arrests 44 Suspected of Involvement in Pulwama Attack

By Munir Ahmed

Pakistan’s Interior Ministry said Tuesday that authorities arrested dozens of suspects in the wake of last month’s suicide bombing in the Pulwama district of Indian-controlled Kashmir that killed over 40 Indian troops. Among the detained is the brother of the leader of the outlawed Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) militant group.

The arrests were apparently aimed at easing tensions between Pakistan and India that escalated after the February 14 suicide attack.

In Tuesday’s statement, the ministry said authorities arrested 44 suspects, including at least two prominent members of the outlawed militant group, which claimed responsibility for the attack that pushed the neighboring countries close to an all-out war over contested Kashmir last week. Among those arrested were Mufti Abdul Rauf and Hamad Azhar, the brother and son, respectively, of JeM leader Masood Azhar.

The new Afghanistan will be built on ceasefire solutions and Taliban trade-offs

Christopher D. Kolenda (Ret. Col.) and Michael E. O’Hanlon

In Afghanistan, it is important to begin to think about what kind of basic trade-offs could satisfy the core demands—and mitigate the central insecurities and worries—of both the Afghan government and the Taliban, write Christopher Kolendra and Michael O'Hanlon. This piece originally appeared in The National Interest.

To his credit, U.S. envoy Zalmay Khalilzad has made remarkable progress in recent peace talks with the Taliban. It appears the latter group has now renounced any willingness to tolerate extremists from ISIS or al-Qaida on Afghan territory under any future government in which it may have a key role. The United States has correspondingly indicated a willingness to downsize its military presence over time, and perhaps ultimately end it altogether, when conditions are right. We hope credible assurances on human rights are addressed, too.

Can ‘Wi-Fi in the sky’ work outside of Afghanistan?

By: Adam Stone 

For more than 10 years the Air Force has relied on a unique communications technology to overcome geographic challenges and keep warfighters connected across Afghanistan’s mountainous terrain. Now the service is considering expanding the use of the Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) payload to other areas where communications may be difficult.

“A lot of people thought BACN would go away if we pulled out of Afghanistan. Now BACN is so popular, particularly with our ground users, that the Air Force is looking to move it to the base budget, to give it long-term sustainability,” said Lt. Col. Daniel E. Scherdt, commander of the 430th expeditionary electronic combat squadron at Kandahar airfield in Afghanistan.

The Air Force uses E-11A aircraft to deploy BACN, described by some as Wi-Fi in the sky. A combined communications relay and gateway system, the node helps to ensure that isolated warfighters aren’t cut off from others in the chain of command.

Ending the War in Afghanistan

by Christopher A. Preble 

The American people have had enough. It’s time for Congress to listen.

On March 4, Senators Rand Paul and Tom Udall put forward bi-partisan draft legislation that would end U.S. military involvement in the war in Afghanistan. The proposed joint resolution gives the Trump administration forty-five days to present a plan for the orderly withdrawal of U.S. military personnel from the country. In keeping with a tradition going back to the Revolutionary War, some three million men and women who have deployed in support of all wars launched after 9/11 will receive a cash bonus of $2,500. Lastly, the resolution stipulates that all U.S. armed forces will be withdrawn from Afghanistan within one year of its passage.

The case for such a move is simple and straightforward. The U.S. military has achieved its core objectives spelled out after 9/11. Bin Laden is dead. Al Qaeda is crippled. The Department of Defense reported last June: “The Al Qaeda threat to the United States and its allies and partners has decreased and the few remaining al Qaeda core members are focused on their own survival.”

U.S. and Taliban Talks Progress Despite Attacks and Regional Tensions

By Mujib Mashal

DOHA, Qatar — American negotiators and Taliban officials set to resume negotiations in the Qatari capital on Saturday expressed guarded optimism that they are getting closer to an agreement that could help end 17 years of conflict, America’s longest war.

During a two-day break from direct negotiations at a holiday resort in Doha, a series of small meetings continued around town to bridge the gap on core issues, such as withdrawal of American troops and prohibiting international terror groups from using Afghan soil, according to several current and former officials from all sides involved in the talks.

“There is progress,” Sohail Shaheen, a spokesman for the Taliban’s negotiating team, said in an interview on Friday. “The technical groups are working on the details of a draft agreement about troop pullout from Afghanistan, and also that Afghanistan’s soil must not be a haven for anyone to use it against other countries. We have moved the agreement forward, but we have not completed it.”

Familiar Issues Cloud the Prospects for Afghan Peace


Because Washington is seeking to exit Afghanistan — one of the Taliban's main demands — their talks will proceed, but various other outstanding issues will impede greater progress. Pakistan, the Taliban's primary external sponsor, will push the movement to remain in talks with the aim of ensuring that any U.S. withdrawal proceeds in an orderly manner. The collapse of the Afghan state would threaten Islamabad's economic and security interests. Even though the talks might not soon produce a breakthrough, yet regional powers like Iran, India, China and Russia will all prepare for the ramifications of a U.S. withdrawal.

Editor's Note: This assessment is part of a series of analyses supporting Stratfor's upcoming 2019 Second-Quarter Forecast. These assessments are designed to provide more context and in-depth analysis on key developments over the next quarter.

Developing a mutually beneficial US-China economic relationship

Joshua P. Meltzer

The U.S.-China economic relationship has reached a critical juncture. Over the past year, the U.S. has imposed tariffs on $250 billion worth of Chinese imports and China has retaliated, raising tariffs on U.S. exports. At the G-20 leaders’ summit in November 2018, Presidents Trump and Xi agreed to resolve the trade dispute within 90 days—by March 1, 2019, though this deadline was just extended.

Until recently, the U.S. has supported China’s global integration based on a set of core expectations. Among these is the assumption that, as China benefited from the international economic system, including WTO membership, it would become a responsible stakeholder. In such a scenario, China was expected to work with the United States to, in the words of then deputy secretary of state Robert Zoellick in 2005, “sustain the international system that has enabled its success.”

However, this U.S. view of China has since evolved into seeing the country less as a partner and more as a competitor, culminating in the current bilateral economic tensions.

China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative

by Andrew Chatzky and James McBride

In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the launch of both the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, infrastructure development and investment initiatives that would stretch from East Asia to Europe. The project, eventually termed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) but sometimes known as the New Silk Road, is one of the most ambitious infrastructure projects ever conceived. It harkens back to the original Silk Road, which connected Europe to Asia centuries ago, enriching traders from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

Some analysts see the project as an unsettling extension of China’s rising power, and as the costs of many of the proposed projects have skyrocketed, opposition has grown in some participant countries. Meanwhile, the United States shares the concern of some in Asia that the BRI could be a Trojan horse for China-led regional development, military expansion, and Beijing-controlled institutions. Under President Donald J. Trump, Washington has raised alarm over Beijing’s actions even as it has abandoned some U.S. efforts to isolate China and deepen its own ties with economic partners in the region.
What was the original Silk Road?

Will MBS’ Defense of China’s Uighur Crackdown Backfire in Saudi Arabia?

Kyle Haddad-Fonda

Before Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman arrived in Beijing for a major visit late last month, he was the target of an intense lobbying effort at home and abroad. Members of the Uighur diaspora in Saudi Arabia and beyond hoped the young, powerful royal would acknowledge China’s nationwide crackdown on its own Muslim population. For the past year, a state-sponsored campaign against expressions of Islamic piety has roiled Muslim communities throughout China—especially in the northwestern region of Xinjiang, where analysts now estimate that more than 1 million ethnic Uighurs have been detained in so-called “re-education camps.”

Instead, as he was greeted warmly in Beijing, the crown prince affirmed his support for the Chinese crackdown. According to China’s Xinhua News Agency, he told Chinese President Xi Jinping that Saudi Arabia respects “China’s rights to take counterterrorism and de-extremism measures to safeguard national security.” Although MBS, as the prince is known, did not specifically mention Xinjiang or the Uighur minority, his statement parroted the vocabulary Chinese officials have been using to justify their program of mass detention.

Top French officer raps West's tactics against IS in Syria, faces punishment

John Irish

MUNICH (Reuters) - A senior French officer involved in the fight against Islamic State in Syria faces punishment after launching a scathing attack on the U.S.-led coalition’s methods to defeat the group in its remaining stronghold of Hajin, the army said on Saturday.

Colonel Francois-Regis Legrier, who has been in charge of directing French artillery supporting Kurdish-led groups in Syria since October, said the coalition’s focus had been on limiting its own risks and this had greatly increased the death toll among civilians and the levels of destruction.

“Yes, the Battle of Hajin was won, at least on the ground but by refusing ground engagement, we unnecessarily prolonged the conflict and thus contributed to increasing the number of casualties in the population,” Legrier wrote in an article in the National Defence Review.

Like It or Not in Iraq, U.S. Ties Are Here to Stay


As the United States begins to withdraw troops from Syria, maintaining a presence in Iraq will become increasingly important to countering terrorism and Iranian influence in the region. The economic threat of U.S. sanctions because of Baghdad's ties to Iran will continue to spark debate and fracture Iraq's dominant Shiite political elite. Some Iraqi lawmakers have been pushing to legally expel the United States from their country, though such legislation is unlikely to pass. Despite mounting anti-U.S. sentiment in the country, Iraq's pervasive security concerns will solidify its need to keep ties with Washington.

Editor's Note: This assessment is part of a series of analyses supporting Stratfor's upcoming 2019 Second-Quarter Forecast. These assessments are designed to provide more context and in-depth analysis on key developments over the next quarter.

The Iranian Foreign Minister's Resignation Reveals a Political Struggle in Tehran


Iran's president did not accept Foreign Minister Javad Zarif's resignation, but if he had, it would have had significant implications for the country's politics and foreign policy. Zarif's decision could be part of a political ploy designed to push back against his rivals and strengthen his ministry's role in key foreign policy matters. Up until this point, Iranian foreign policy has held steady, but if hard-liners get their way and supplant more moderate figures like Zarif, that could change.

Confusion reigned in Tehran following the surprise resignation of Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif late Feb. 25. The decision, which he announced on Instagram, came a day after Syrian President Bashar al-Assad visited Tehran, apparently without Zarif's knowledge. Zarif noted Feb. 26 he was quitting in protest, in part to "protect the integrity" of Iran's Foreign Ministry, which he added should "return to its rightful place" in foreign policy.

The Big Picture

Six Guidelines for Enhancing America's Security

by Raymond Smith

What is America’s ultimate objective?

America’s ultimate objective should be a stable international order. This is not a matter of altruism, but of self-interest. In any system, since those at the top secure a disproportionate share of the system’s valuables, their fundamental interest is in maintaining system stability . The challenge is to develop a strategy for achieving that objective in today’s world. This in turn requires questioning some of the assumptions people tend to make about the nature of the international system.

There is a substantial body of theoretical literature, primarily from scholars who describe themselves as realists, that attempts to describe the operation of the international system. Realists come in a variety of flavors , but share the fundamental proposition that the international system is anarchic. That anarchy may be as expressed by Thucydides’ Athenians—the strong do what they can and the weak bear what they must—or in Hobbes’ state of nature—the war of all against all. Unlike Hobbes’ men, however, who trade freedom for security by establishing powerful ruling institutions, states trade security for freedom by refusing to permit the establishment of governing institutions. They accept no bounds on their activity other than those forced on them by stronger states. There is no escape from the state of nature in the world of the realists.

What the Hanoi Summit Tells Us About North Korea’s Nuclear Intentions

By Christopher J. Watterson

The second U.S.-North Korea summit was a bust, with Kim and Trump leaving Hanoi without any mutual concessions or even a joint statement. In a post-mortem press conference Trump stated that the sticking point was sanctions: “Basically they wanted the sanctions lifted in their entirety, and we couldn’t do that. They were willing to de-nuke a large portion of the areas that we wanted, but we couldn’t give up all of the sanctions for that”. Importantly, according to Trump, North Korea was willing to denuclearize some ‘areas’ but not others of interest to the U.S.: “They wanted sanctions lifted but they weren’t willing to do [denucleazise] an area we wanted. They were willing to give us areas but not the ones we wanted. … he [Kim] wants to just do [denuclearize] areas that are less important than the areas that we want.”

Whoever Predicts the Future Will Win the AI Arms Race

By Adrian Pecotic 

The race for advanced artificial intelligence has already started. A few weeks ago, U.S. President Donald Trump signed an executive order creating the “American AI Initiative,” with which the United States joined other major countries pursuing national strategies for developing AI. China released its “New Generation Plan” in 2017, outlining its strategy to lead the world in AI by 2030. Months after that announcement, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared, “Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin declared, “Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.”

But it’s less clear how much AI will advance, exactly. It may only be able to perform fairly menial tasks like classifying photographs, driving, or bookkeeping. There’s also a distinct possibility that AI will become as smart as humans or more so, able to make complex decisions independently. A race toward a technology with such a range of possible final states, stretching from banal to terrifying, is inherently unstable. A research program directed toward one understanding of AI may prove to have been misdirected after years of work. Alternatively, a plan to focus on small and achievable advances could be leapfrogged by a more ambitious effort.

Trump Doesn’t Want to Play Peacemaker

By James Schwemlein

Pakistan’s return of the captive Indian Air Force pilot Abhinandan Varthaman to India on March 1, two days after his plane was shot down over Pakistani territory in a dogfight, has been welcomed as the potential beginning of the end of the latest violent flare-up between the two countries. But the crisis may not yet be over, and the sudden possibility of war between two nuclear powers has highlighted the risks posed by the Trump administration’s recusal from the United States’ past role as global leader and peacemaker.

Three elements of this crisis highlight the growing risks of conflict in the region—and the worrying absence of the United States.

A French Officer Speaks the Truth about the War in Syria

BY GIL BARNDOLLAR

America’s military leaders do not like to rock the boat. Whether testifying before Congress or writing in professional journals, our modern major generals, and the colonels and majors who dream of wearing stars on their collars one day, have been largely unwilling to criticize either the strategy or the tactics of our failed post-9/11 wars. Though there have been honorable exceptions, our combat leaders mostly keep their opinions to themselves, even in retirement. So we owe thanks to our oldest ally for boasting an officer with the moral courage to put himself in the line of fire back at home.

Col. Francois-Regis Legrier, who leads the French artillery supporting Kurdish forces in Syria, recently excoriated the anti-ISIS coalition for its risk aversion and the resulting destruction of civilian areas. “Yes, the Battle of Hajin was won, at least on the ground, but by refusing ground engagement, we unnecessarily prolonged the conflict and thus contributed to increasing the number of casualties in the population,” Colonel Legrier wrote in France’s National Defense Review.

Russia’s New ‘AI Supercomputer’ Runs on Western Technology

BY SAMUEL BENDETT

Russia’s latest supercomputer is unique in some ways — it is the country’s first to be devoted to “solving problems in the field of artificial intelligence” — but not in others. Like some other Russian defense and dual-use projects, the Zhores computer is built on Western technology.

Its development began in 2017 at the Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology, an 8-year-old private institute founded in partnership with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In January, Skolkovo engineers told state media that Zhores had reached computing speeds of about one petaflop, making it Russia’s sixth-fastest supercomputer. (The country’s fastest supercomputer is about 50 times more powerful — and it’s ranked just 77th in the world.) 

The good, the bad, and the ugly at the US-North Korea summit in Hanoi

Jung H. Pak

The summit meeting between Kim and Trump ended early. And there was no joint statement, as widely anticipated. Thousands of bewildered journalists who had camped out to capture the spectacle packed up and left, and Kim’s motorcade left quickly, as members of his entourage scrambled to jump into moving cars. The media has been ablaze with speculations about what happened, as pundits weigh in with declarations that the summit was a failure or a success. It was neither. And it was both.

Kim was offering a bad deal and the president was right to reject it.

First, the good. Kim was offering a bad deal and the president was right to reject it. According to the North Korean foreign minister who held a rare press conference the day after, Pyongyang offered the permanent dismantlement of a portion of nuclear material production facilities at Yongbyon Nuclear Research facility in exchange for a “partial lifting” of sanctions, namely the 2016 and 2017 sanctions on the North’s export industries that also limited petroleum imports. The removal of these sanctions would have amounted to billions of dollars in sanctions relief, revenue that could be funneled back into the proscribed programs that we are trying to stop. Given the metastasis of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, the covert facilities, and the range of ballistic missiles, offering Yongbyon for the removal of these most effective sanctions, on its face, was a grossly disproportionate trade.

The Hanoi Summit Was Doomed From the Start

By Ankit Panda and Vipin Narang

It should come as no surprise that the Hanoi summit between the United States and North Korea ended in failure. The two countries’ incompatible demands made reaching a new agreement—not just on North Korea’s nuclear program but on anything—almost impossible. Washington called on Pyongyang to unilaterally surrender its entire nuclear weapons program before it would make any concessions. Despite intial reports that the United States was ready to move negotiations forward by first seeking a partial freeze on production of fissile material, it instead went after the whole program—everything old and new—in one swing. Pyongyang unsurprisingly refused, demanding that Washington lift almost all sanctions before it would discuss any further “denuclearization steps.” The United States considered that too high a price for anything short of Pyongyang’s total unilateral disarmament, and talks collapsed. The gulf between U.S. and North Korean demands—not to mention a lack of agreement on what terms as central as “denuclearization” or “corresponding measures” actually meant—had been deftly papered over in the months since the historic first summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Singapore last June. But the bill finally came due in Hanoi.

WHAT WENT WRONG

After Hanoi: North Korea, the US and Japan

By George Friedman

As the United States alters its strategy, the others will follow suit.

The Hanoi talks ended in deadlock. Both sides – represented by U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un – showed their anger by refusing to shake hands. The media labeled the talks a failure. But I’ve been involved in a number of negotiations in my life, and I see this as a normal part of the process. At some point, all parties will take positions designed to test the other side’s hunger for a deal, and prudent negotiators know that showing hunger can be devastating. So, ending the negotiation, particularly with a show of anger, is routine. At the same time, mutual rejection can be genuine, and now each side is trying to figure out how serious the other is. Establishing that you are prepared to walk away from the table is important – but sometimes the deal falls apart as a result.

Where Things Stand

Tanzania's 'Bulldozer' President Risks Flattening His Country's Reputation and Revenue


As Tanzania’s 2020 general elections approach, President John Magufuli and his ruling party will not modify their controversial domestic policies due to their popular support. As a result, Tanzania’s relations with the European Union and other Western powers will likely remain weak for the foreseeable future, cutting the country off from Europe's foreign aid in the process. Other countries such as China are unlikely to step in and fill the funding gaps left by Tanzania's eroding relationship with Europe.

Editor's Note: This assessment is part of a series of analyses supporting Stratfor's upcoming 2019 Second-Quarter Forecast. These assessments are designed to provide more context and in-depth analysis on key developments over the next quarter.

Caught in the Middle, Europe Attempts to Balance Hostile U.S.-Iranian Relations


Despite the United States' pleas for Europe to follow suit and withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Continent will continue to ensure Iran stays within the framework. Although Washington has a laundry list of issues when it comes to Iran, nuclear proliferation in the Middle East remains the European Union's biggest concern.
In an attempt to balance U.S. demands, however, Brussels will subtly increase pressure on Iran in areas outside of the country's nuclear program — namely, activities related to terrorism financing and Tehran's ballistic missile program. This is a non-commital strategy, though, and will ultimately fail to appease either side, leaving Europe in an even tighter spot between Washington and Tehran. 

Editor's Note: This assessment is part of a series of analyses supporting Stratfor's upcoming 2019 Second-Quarter Forecast. These assessments are designed to provide more context and in-depth analysis on key developments over the next quarter.

The Case for a Cyber Deterrence Plan that Works

by Sandeep Baliga 

U.S. strategy has not kept pace with the evolving cyber threat. Recent proposals ignore key strategic features of the cyber domain, resulting in overly narrow policies. We must take a global approach to cyber-deterrence, and we must blend aggressive retaliation when the origins of attacks are clear with forbearance when they aren’t.

Here’s a scenario that should trouble America’s political leaders:

Top-secret plans for a next-generation fighter jet are stolen from a U.S. defense contractor’s computer. It appears the intrusion originated in China. Then again, it’s easy for other actors to make it look as if the culprit is China. Also, some signs point to North Korea. Ultimately, the United States blames China. It launches a retaliatory cyber strike that paralyzes Chinese military computer networks for a week. U.S. diplomats tell their counterparts that they’ve been warned against future incursions, but the move backfires.

4 Observations From Recent Surveys About The State-Of-Artificial Intelligence (AI)


What is the state-of-AI at the end of February 2019?

We are getting used to AI but are not sure if it’s good for us
53% of consumers say AI is making their lives better, up from 34% in 2017 (Genpact).

78% of media executives, senior editors and digital leaders believe investing in artificial intelligence will help secure the future of journalism (Reuters).

54% of consumers would be willing to let AI access personal data if it improves their customer experience, up from 30% in 2017 (Genpact).

68% of U.S. adults think it is unacceptable for companies to collect large quantities of data about individuals for the purposes of offering them deals or other financial incentives (Pew).

68% of Millennials and younger (18-37), 55% of Generation X (38-53), and 42% of Baby Boomers and older (54+) are very/fairly comfortable letting AI access personal data to improve their customer experience (Genpact).

Should the Pentagon help protect private networks?

By: Mark Pomerleau 

The Pentagon’s 2018 cybersecurity strategy provides clarity for an issue the Department of Defense and strategic thinker have struggled with: What role does it have in defending the nation in cyberspace?

The much awaited strategy articulates how the DoD will combat strategic competitors such as Russia and China.

In the physical world, defense of the nation is very clear; however, in cyberspace questions regarding what role DoD has in protecting non-government entities from nation-state level threats has been less clear, especially since most networks are not government owned.

“What the 2018 strategy did is drive consensus that ... our comparative advantage in this space is by projecting power, defending forward, shaping the environment and addressing threats before they come to the homeland,” Madeline Mortelmans, principal director for cyber policy within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, said during a Feb. 27 event hosted by the Atlantic Council in Washington.