16 February 2019

Here are Pakistan’s new strategies behind the Pulwama terror attack

C. CHRISTINE FAIR

On 14 February, Adil Ahmad Dar—a 20-year-old from Gundibagh village in Pulwama and former sawmill worker—mounted a vehicle-borne suicide attack on a CRPF convoy killing at least 38 jawans. Broadly speaking, Pakistan perpetrates these attacks in Kashmir and elsewhere in India because they help demonstrate that Islamabad has not been coerced into accepting the status quo.

However, this general expectation of Pakistani behaviour does not explain the particularly unique features of this attack. What are Pakistan’s strategic aims with this attack?

Calibrate the violence

The Pulwama attack reflects an interesting calibration of violence. There are three ways that Pakistan can escalate violence and the salience thereof. The first is the choice of geography. The least provocative venue is within Kashmir while the most provocative locations are the high-value urban targets like Delhi and Mumbai. In between are middle-tier cities beyond Kashmir such as Gurdaspur.

India Proposes Chinese-Style Internet Censorship

By Vindu Goel

NEW DELHI — India’s government has proposed giving itself vast new powers to suppress internet content, igniting a heated battle with global technology giants and prompting comparisons to censorship in China.

Under the proposed rules, Indian officials could demand that Facebook, Google, Twitter, TikTok and others remove posts or videos that they deem libelous, invasive of privacy, hateful or deceptive. Internet companies would also have to build automated screening tools to block Indians from seeing “unlawful information or content.” Another provision would weaken the privacy protections of messaging services like WhatsApp so that the authorities could trace messages back to their original senders.

The new rules could be imposed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government anytime after the public comment period ends on Thursday night. The administration has been eager to get them in place before the date is set for this spring’s national elections, which will prompt special pre-election rules limiting new policies.

Did the USA sucker China and India into the 1962 War?

MOHAN GURUSWAMY:

It is now well known that in 1971 as Indian forces were scything through Bangladesh, the Henry Kissinger met a high ranking Chinese official (believed to be Huang Hua) to urge the PRC to open a front with India to pressurize India from backing off. The Chinese did not bite. But in 1962 the USA might have conned the Chinese into taking action against India by its airdropping of Tibetan Khampa guerillas and making the Chinese believe it was India.

In his book on this, “JFK’s Forgotten crisis. Tibet. The Cia. And the Sino-India War.”, Bruce Riedel strips the mask of what happened prior to the 1962 War. Bruce Reidel has been a top CIA official and its in house expert on South Asia. He is now a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and the Director of the Brookings Intelligence Project.

Reidel writes with immense knowledge and access to hitherto top secret documents, but with eloquent brevity. He tells all and says all without using up many lines of wordage. He has an eye that can focus with hawk like precision on the relevant detail and keep looking at the big picture also. This is how we learn how the Chinese wrongly credited US’s Tibet policy of covert war to India.

Ending The War And Losing The Peace In Afghanistan – OpEd

By Tamim Asey*

The United States is actively exploring options to end its engagement in Afghanistan and withdraw its troops from the country and at best keep a residual counter terrorism force. To this end, it has engaged with the its seventeen year adversary, the Taliban movement, to explore a peace deal – often termed by historians and experts as a troop withdrawal plan – in the absence of its partner and ally, the Afghan Government, undermining its legitimacy and further polarizing the Afghan polity. This may very well pave the way for ending the American war but igniting a frozen Afghan conflict which has the potential to escalate to a full fledged civil war with spillover effects that could seriously undermine regional stability and global security.

Although Washington should not sacrifice Taiwan to placate Beijing, it must also refrain from using it as a stick for beating China.

by Eric Heginbotham Rajan Menon

With the U.S.-China relationship descending rapidly into acrimony and indeed frequently characterized as a new Cold War, Taiwan remains a particularly dangerous flashpoint. Although maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait has never been easy, it has now become even more challenging for several reasons. Taiwan’s economic prosperity and dynamic democracy have endowed it with increased confidence and an increasingly separate identity. The leadership in Beijing, for its part, has acquired an unprecedented measure of self-assurance, thanks to China’s growing economic and military power. The United States and China have come to view each other as “strategic competitors,” and the Sino-American trade war shows few signs of fading. To complicate matters, the U.S. Congress, reflecting a broader bid for foreign policy leadership, has inserted itself squarely into the Taiwan issue.

China's Limited Role in the Indian Ocean

By David Brewster

Among the many questions raised by the massive modernisation and expansion of China’s Navy in the last few years is its future role in the Indian Ocean. China has gone from essentially zero presence in the Indian Ocean around a decade ago to a fairly sizeable fleet averaging perhaps four to five surface vessels (plus submarine deployments), although this number fluctuates during crossovers between transiting vessels. China now operates a naval base in Djibouti and no doubt has plans for additional bases in the region.

The geographical fact of (a potentially hostile) India, sitting in the middle of the Indian Ocean would make this an extraordinary challenge for China.

This expansion, together with the growth of China’s economic and political influence in the region, has led many to assume that China intends to displace the U.S. Navy as the predominant navy in the Indian Ocean.

China’s Digital Silk Road


Matthew P. Goodman: Good morning, everyone. My name is Matthew Goodman. I hold the Simon Chair in political economy here at CSIS. Delighted to welcome you here to our humble abode for this event on the Digital Silk Road. We’re delighted to have you. We’re also delighted to have, as always, our big online audience. Nice to have you with us as well. Hope this isn’t getting distorted because it’s loud.

Matthew P. Goodman: So we are here to talk about the Digital Silk Road. And I’ll introduce that in a second, and our – and our initial speakers, but let me just first do some administrative things. First, as usual, please turn off your phones, or at least mute them so they don’t disturb the discussion. If we have any kind of security event, I’m your warden, or just follow me basically – obviously we can go down front, if that’s appropriate, or there are emergency exits at either end here. There’s an alley in the back. And the rally point is by National Geographic down on M Street. Unlikely, we’ve never had such a thing, so.

Matthew P. Goodman: And finally, let me thank our sponsors, JETRO, the Japan External Trade Organization, which has been a supporter of us for a long time, and really appreciate their support that enables us to do this kind of programming. And we really appreciate it.

High-Tech Domination and the US-China Trade War: AI Is Cheapening Authoritarian Governance

By Stephen Nagy

China is pursing AI hegemony at the domestic and regional level. It will have consequential impacts for the consolidation of CPP and President’s Xi Jinping’s power. In particular, successfully deploying a nationwide AI-based technology will promote social stability in China. It will also facilitate the leapfrogging of China’s economic development. Simultaneously, pervasive AI-based monitoring significantly lowers the cost of authoritarian governance resulting in the consolidation of the CCP’s position as the central and enduring politic unit in China.

The long-term objective of AI’s nationwide deployment is to allow the CCP leadership to achieve its twin goals of realizing “socialist modernization” by 2035, and to “build a modern socialist country that is strong, prosperous, democratic, culturally advanced, and harmonious” by 2049.

Where Is China’s Foreign Policy Headed?

Zha Daojiong

In testimony last week before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats asserted that “China’s actions reflect a long-term strategy to achieve global superiority.” With China’s global influence and tensions between Washington and Beijing growing apace, what is the best way to understand how China envisions itself in the world? Some contend China’s leaders seek global preeminence; others, that they are principally focused on restoring China’s dominant position within the Asia-Pacific; and yet others, that the country’s engagement abroad is still primarily rooted in fulfilling domestic imperatives. Which conclusion is correct? Which documents, statements, and actions should observers pay attention to in rendering their judgments? —The Editors

What can China’s long-term foreign policy objectives be? An honest answer ought to be: “only time can tell.” But, for reasons practical and political, that can hardly suffice.

Russia and China Can Cripple Critical Infrastructure in United States

Nicole Lindsey

According to the new U.S. Worldwide Threat Assessment, a 42-page report prepared by top security and intelligence agencies in the United States, both Russia and China are capable of launching cyber attacks against critical infrastructure targets in the U.S. Moreover, say top U.S. intelligence officials, both Russia and China appear to be aligning their operations in cyberspace, primarily as a way to challenge U.S. geostrategic dominance in regions such as the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

Threats to critical infrastructure from Russia and China

Undefeated, ISIS Is Back in Iraq

Aziz Ahmad

Erbil, Iraq—Inside a prison in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, vanquished Islamic State fighters who once swept through much of the country now mill about sullenly on a bare, tiled floor, reflecting on a cause they insist will endure. Many spend hours in fierce debate, apparently undeterred by their movement’s apparent military defeat. Their cause, they say, remains divinely ordained. Their capture incidental. “Hathi iradet Allah,” they say. This is God’s will.

A Kurdish guard called for a captive, whom I will call Abu Samya—a brooding Baghdad resident kidnapped first by the Islamic State’s forerunner group, al-Qaeda in Iraq, and later by Shia death squads as sectarian lines hardened in 2006–2007. As he walked toward the guard, some fellow captives condemned him as “kha’in,” or traitor. Outside the walls, long before the caliphate crumbled, that charge carried a death penalty. The jaded jihadist shrugged it off.

The Strategy the U.S. Should Pursue in Iraq

By Anthony H. Cordesman

The future security and stability of Iraq is a vital United States national security interest. Iraq is a critical component to any kind of stability in the Gulf and to the secure flow of petroleum to the global economy. It is a key to containing Iranian influence, and enhancing the security of our Arab security partners and Israel. It is a key to countering the image that the United States invaded Iraq for the wrong reasons in 2003 and left it weak, divided, and unstable. And, Iraq is a key to countering the increasing fears on the part of our regional security partners that the U.S. is leaving or reducing its security role in the Gulf.

The U.S. cannot afford to leave a power vacuum in Iraq. It must deal with Iraq's remaining security problems and military weaknesses, and deal with its grave political divisions, problems in governance, and years without effective economic growth and development. At the same time, the U.S. needs to recognize that it faces very real rivals for influence in Iraq, and a nation that has a long and strong history of nationalism and sensitivity to foreign pressure – despite its deep sectarian and ethnic divisions

Ghani Suggests ‘Grand Consultative Jirga’ For Peace


President Ashraf Ghani on Monday called for a grand consultative Jirga, a traditional assembly, on the peace process in the country amid Washington’s marathon diplomatic efforts to facilitate direct talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban who has been fighting against Afghan and foreign forces over the past 18 years. 

Addressing the “National Consultative Meeting on Peace” at the Presidential Palace on Monday, Ghani said the decision to hold a Jirga has been made on the advice of delegates of today’s conference to help “dignified” peace in the country.

“At the Jirga, people will hold discussions on the nature of the peace talks and the post-peace government in Afghanistan,” said Ghani. 

The Fall of the Shah: 40 Years Later

By George Friedman 

Yesterday, on the 40th anniversary of the Iranian Revolution, we published an articleexplaining what the revolution can teach us about the economic and political problems facing Iran now. Today, I’d like to focus on the geopolitical implications of the revolution that saw the overthrow of the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and the rise of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. It was a formidable time for the country, but the existing geopolitics of the region remained largely intact.

Most observers didn’t expect the shah to fall, although many claimed afterward that they had predicted it. The shah, who was essentially installed by the United States and Britain, was used as a bulwark of the American containment strategy. He unseated democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, who the U.S. feared was aligned with the Soviets, and helped to block Soviet access to the Persian Gulf. He claimed to be the heir to the Iranian monarchy, but in reality, he sat on the throne because of a coup staged in 1925 by his father, Reza Shah Pahlavi, a military officer who himself had no connections to the long line of Persian monarchs.

The Syrian Civil War Is Russia’s Problem Now


Russia’s intervention in the Syrian civil war was never meant to be long-term. Now that Russia has been successful in saving the regime of Bashar al-Assad, what's next for Russia's Middle East strategy? Find out more when you subscribe to World Politics Review (WPR).

Russia's decision to intervene in the Syrian civil war in September 2015 was consistent with its belief that the Syrian state represents the only viable and legitimate actor in the country, and its forces are the only ones worth supporting. Moscow has always been willing to pay a political and military price to prevent a Syrian army collapse. 

From the outset, Russia’s intervention was a multilayered gambit, but its purpose was straightforward: changing the facts on the ground and imposing new realities to leverage a different political outcome in Syria, not necessarily at the expense of the U.S., but almost certainly at the expense of its allies in the region. 

How Venezuela Aligned the Western Hemisphere

By Allison Fedirka 

The U.S. finds itself aligned with the region. Can it capitalize on the opportunity? 

In the Western Hemisphere, it’s Venezuela versus just about everybody. The fallout from the country’s crisis has evolved beyond a confrontation with the United States over sanctions to a hemispheric – even global – melee. The most notable result has been the emerging political and diplomatic alignment against Caracas among states throughout the Americas, including the U.S. Washington has historically strong-armed its policies into practice across the region, fostering resentment toward the U.S. throughout Latin America. But in Venezuela’s demise, the U.S. and other American countries have found common ground, and it has resulted in a remarkable shift in how the U.S. relates to Latin America, at least for the time being. Alignment on Venezuela may open the door for further U.S. alignment with the region – as long as Washington can avoid alienating itself once again.

Japan Drafts a Delicate Approach to U.S. Trade Talks


When Washington begins trade talks with Tokyo in the upcoming months, its primary aim will be to pry open access to the Japanese market. Japan is likely to offer the United States the same access for some goods that Tokyo granted to the European Union and CPTPP countries in recent trade deals. Tokyo could also agree to address currency manipulation and accept a provision requiring prior consultation before its signs any trade deal with China, since a concession on that front would not be too onerous. But even if Japan is cooperative, it is unlikely to secure solid guarantees that protect it from U.S. automotive tariffs — although it could gain exemptions.  Editor's Note: This assessment is part of a series of analyses supporting Stratfor's upcoming 2019 Second-Quarter Forecast. These assessments are designed to provide more context and in-depth analysis on key developments over the next quarter.

New role for Japan


Japan emerged from World War II as a crushed survivor of its own ambition and cruelty, despised by the Asia it described as a “partner” in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Asia was a very junior “partner” indeed.

The Japanese military that fought World War II is remembered for the rape and pillage not only of Nanking but in the sacking of Manila, “the Pearl of the Orient” that Douglas MacArthur had declared an open city and evacuated his army to save it. Japanese troops leveled it to a smoking ruin.

When the war was over, the new Japan, under the tutelage of MacArthur, declared never again, and adopted a constitution, still in force, that abjures all military force. But that’s only part of the story. Tokyo, encouraged and further tutored by the United States, now commands one of the most powerful military establishments in the world. Its weapons research development sets the pace in some areas.

Russia Reset Redux Not the Answer to Increased Chinese-Russian Cooperation

By Bradley Bowman & Andrew Gabel

The Director of National Intelligence warned in his annual Worldwide Threat Assessment last month that China and Russia are “more aligned than at any point since the mid-1950s” and are expected to further deepen their relationship in 2019. In response, prominent analysts have suggested that the United States should pursue yet another reset of its Russia policy to woo Moscow away from Beijing. Overlooking Russian President Vladimir Putin’s litany of offenses will not drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing. Worse, it would undermine core U.S. interests and invite more aggression from Moscow. Instead of a misguided Russian reset redux, the U.S. should reinforce and expand its alliances in Europe and Asia and build greater combined military capacity to deter aggression by our great power rivals.

China and Russia are revisionist and authoritarian powers that seek to dismantle a U.S.-led international order that has benefited Americans and people around the world. Putin has long railed against this order, calling it “pernicious” and “unacceptable.” Shared opposition to this order represents a central aspect of how Beijing and Moscow understand their interests—incentivizing both governments to subordinate differences and work together. Indeed, despite a fraught bilateral history, a shared border, and numerous disputes, Russia and China ultimately loathe the U.S.-led world order more than they distrust one another. 

Oil Markets Appear to be Taking a Longer View on Venezuela, for Now ...


Three weeks ago (January 23), Juan Guaidó, the newly elected leader of Venezuela’s National Assembly boldly invoked Article 233 of the country’s Constitution and assumed Venezuela’s presidency on an interim basis, pending new elections. Aided by massive public demonstrations and international support from both regional and global powers—including the United States, the European Union, and a cadre of Latin American neighbors—Guaidó has been able to unify previously fragmented opposition to reigning president Nicolás Maduro and raise hopes for a transition in Venezuelan governance. Buoyed by the imposition of sanctions from the United States, including on oil and PDVSA, a state-owned oil company, and the expectation of an influx of humanitarian relief, the confrontation and simultaneous existence of two presidents has set in motion a combination of economic and geopolitical events with far-reaching consequence.

On the heels of the imposition of Iran sanctions and announced cutbacks by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and their non-OPEC counterparts, a combination of supply challenges in Nigeria, Libya, and Canada, and infrastructure and refiner requirements in the United States, the impending loss of heavy, sour Venezuelan crude has raised alarms of potential price spikes and fuel shortages as refiners and marketers scramble for alternative crude feedstocks.

Iran Holds off on Retaliating to Israeli Strikes in Syria



Iran's limited military capabilities in Syria have tempered its reaction to Israeli airstrikes there. While unlikely to occur, a stronger Iranian reaction could escalate into a major conflict with Israel, which might spill over into Lebanon and Iraq. Only a major development could alter the thinking behind Iran's restraint.

Editor's Note: This security-focused assessment is one of many such analyses found at Stratfor Threat Lens, a unique protective intelligence product designed with corporate security leaders in mind. Threat Lens enables industry professionals and organizations to anticipate, identify, measure and mitigate emerging threats to people, assets and intellectual property the world over. Threat Lens is the only unified solution that analyzes and forecasts security risk from a holistic perspective, bringing all the most relevant global insights into a single, interactive threat dashboard.

EU: Mergers To Create Megacompanies Will Have To Wait


Germany and France are looking to protect European companies from the competition — particularly from global superpowers such as China and the United States — and prevent foreign companies from gaining access to critical sectors of their economies. As a result, the two countries are pushing for greater state protections against foreign takeovers and the creation of large European "champions" in key economic sectors. However, these plans will have to wait until the European Union selects new members for its main policymaking institutions.

What Happened

France and Germany's push to create large European companies that can go toe-to-toe with global competitors has hit a wall. On Feb. 6, EU Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager said that Brussels would block a planned French-German merger between rail companies Alstom and Siemens, arguing that the plan is incompatible with the bloc's antitrust rules and could lead to higher prices for European consumers. In response, German Economy Minister Peter Altmaier called for Europe to better defend its interests against global competition. French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire said Vestager's decision was an economic mistake that would benefit China, where companies often have deep links with the state and regularly receive significant state backing.

Russia to disconnect from the internet as part of a planned test

By Catalin Cimpanu

Russian authorities and major internet providers are planning to disconnect the country from the internet as part of a planned experiment, Russian news agency RosBiznesKonsalting (RBK) reported last week.

The reason for the experiment is to gather insight and provide feedback and modifications to a proposed law introduced in the Russian Parliament in December 2018.

A first draft of the law mandated that Russian internet providers should ensure the independence of the Russian internet space (Runet) in the case of foreign aggression to disconnect the country from the rest of the internet.

In addition, Russian telecom firms would also have to install "technical means" to re-route all Russian internet traffic to exchange points approved or managed by Roskomnazor, Russia's telecom watchdog.

Less Than Zero Can Carbon-Removal Technologies Curb Climate Change?

By Fred Krupp, Nathaniel Keohane, and Eric Pooley

Most Americans used to think about climate change—to the extent that they thought about it at all—as an abstract threat in a distant future. But more and more are now seeing it for what it is: a costly, human-made disaster unfolding before their very eyes. A wave of increasingly destructive hurricanes, heat spells, and wildfires has ravaged communities across the United States, and both scientists and citizens are able to connect these extreme events to a warming earth. Seven in ten Americans agree that global warming is happening, according to a 2018 study conducted by the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication. About six in ten think it is mostly caused by human activity and is already changing the weather. Four in ten say they have personally experienced its impact. And seven in ten say the United States should enact measures to cut greenhouse gas emissions, including prices and limits on carbon dioxide pollution, no matter what other countries do.

What Do Cognitive Biases Mean for Deterrence?

By Iain King

Humans make poor decisions—not just sometimes, but systematically—and new insights into these cognitive biases have implications for deterrence. To illustrate just how important these can be, consider the curious case of Abraham Wald, a respected Columbia academic who, in 1943, was selected by the U.S. War Department for an important task.[1]

The United States Army Air Forces were losing too many bombers over Europe to anti-aircraft fire and were considering adding armour plating to the aircraft, but the extra metal made the aircraft heavier, reducing performance and bomb loads. So, armouring the whole plane was impossible. Where could extra armour be placed effectively?

On the Horizon: A Collection of the Papers from the Next Generation


Meeting the security challenges of the future will require a sustained effort over the long-term by a multidisciplinary cadre of nuclear experts who are equipped with critical knowledge and skills. The Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) runs two signature programs – the Nuclear Scholars Initiative and the Annual Conference Series – to engage emerging nuclear experts in thoughtful and informed debate over how to best address the nuclear community’s most pressing problems. The papers included in this volume comprise research from participants in the 2018 Nuclear Scholars Initiative and the PONI Conference Series. These papers explore such topics as the impacts of emerging technologies and capabilities, deep-diving on nuclear strategy and national policies, proposing paths forward for addressing proliferation challenges, and enhancing arms control in contentious environments.

PONI would like to express gratitude to our partners for their continued support, especially the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Department of Defense, and the National Nuclear Security Administration.

WHY THE US NEEDS A STRATEGY FOR AI


IN 1964, CONCERNS about increasing automation led the federal government to establish the National Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress. The commission was tasked with studying the impact of technological and economic change. Even more than half a century ago, leaders foresaw a world where technology could lead to a new era of economic prosperity—but only if we met the challenge head on.

Michael Kratsios is the Deputy Assistant to the President for Technology Policy at The White House. He advises the President on a broad range of technology policy issues, including the development of emerging technologies in the United States.

TRUMP’S PLAN TO KEEP AMERICA FIRST IN AI


THE US LEADS the world in artificial intelligence technology. Decades of federal research funding, industrial and academic research, and streams of foreign talent have put America at the forefront of the current AI boom.

Yet as AI aspirations have sprouted around the globe, the US government has lacked a high-level strategy to guide American investment and prepare for the technology’s effects.

More than a dozen countries have launched AI strategies in recent years, including China, France, Canada, and South Korea. Their plans include items like new research programs, AI-enhanced public services, and smarter weaponry.

The US joined that list Monday, when President Trump signed an executive order creating a program called the American AI Initiative. It doesn’t include new funding or specific AI projects. But it orders the federal government to direct existing funds, programs, and data in support of AI research and commercialization.

Four ways the oil and gas industry is partnering with today’s big tech companies

Source Link

The 4th Industrial Revolution is here: Innovations in connectivity, storage, and artificial intelligence are blurring the line between the digital and physical worlds, making people smarter, more productive, and increasingly connected. These trends are a tailwind for the oil and gas industry.

Oil industry execs say that production, geological exploration, and drilling are the top three areas that digital technology will transform, according to a 2017 survey. The embrace of these new technologies will be key to the industry working smarter and more efficiently.

All Services Sign On To Data Sharing – But Not To Multi-Domain

By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR.

Interservice comity on display at CSIS. Left to right: CSIS moderator Kathleen Hicks, Army Secretary Mark Esper, Navy Secretary Richard Spencer (who also oversees the Marines), Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson.

WASHINGTON: The four armed services are cooperating better than ever in a lots of ways, including a landmark agreement to buy compatible networks so they can actually share data in battle made public today. But the Navy still won’t officially sign on to the battle concept on which the Army and Air Force have staked their future: Multi-Domain Operations.

That contradiction was on full display this morning at a joint appearance by the three service secretaries: Heather Wilson for the Air Force, Mark Esper for the Army, and Richard Spencer for the Navy and Marines. I can’t remember any of their predecessors ever doing this together, but this trio has done this twice in 12 months (both this time and last time at the Center for Strategic & International Studies).

The Army is testing net grenades to stop drones

By: Kelsey D. Atherton

A grenade is not the best way to stop a drone, but a grenade launcher might be. This week, the Army was granted a patent for a net-carrying grenade-sized weapon, designed to work in a standard 40mm launcher, that can ensnare a drone. Formally a “scalable effects net warhead,” the net grenade could finally provide a countermeasure to cheap drones that’s almost as inexpensive as the drones themselves.

Ensnaring a robot in a net is perhaps the opposite of lethality, but here that’s a selling point — stopping the drone means immediately disabling it and possibly doing a forensic investigation on the drone’s innards afterwards. Bullets can stop drones, but it’s a hard task even at sport shooting competitions and in a real-life application bullets still have to fall somewhere, risking injury to friendly forces and bystanders. Anti-air missiles like the Patriot can also intercept drones, but drones can be as cheap as a few hundred dollars and missiles like the Patriot can cost a few million dollars. Both more-kinetic options can ruin the drone’s circuitry, obliterating any useful clues as to who may have launched the drone.