The proliferation of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and uninhabited aerial vehicles to non-state actors in the Middle East represents a future challenge for national militaries, explores Timothy Wright.
Ongoing wars in the Middle East are setting a worrying precedent, revealing a proliferation in the region not only of ballistic missiles, but also cruise missiles and improvised stand-off munitions in the form of low-cost uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs). Iranian ballistic- and cruise-missile technology has been ‘supplied’ to Ansarullah in Yemen, while Iranian-sourced weapons in Hizbullah arms depots in Syria continue to be attacked by the Israeli Air Force.
The latest round of Israeli airstrikes against alleged Iranian missile depots in Syria and recurrent missile attacks by the Houthis against a variety of targets in southern Saudi Arabia underscore the extent of the proliferation of precision-guided missiles and associated missile technology to non-state actors in the Middle East.
Ansarullah and Hizbullah
Ansarullah’s use of ballistic and cruise missiles and UAVs – the latter deployed as improvised stand-off munitions – is an attempt to begin to offset the Saudi-led coalition’s air power in Yemen’s civil war. The group’s ability to strike back, however limited, has propaganda value in this regard.
Ansarullah has therefore claimed that its missile attacks against Saudi targets have demonstrated the defensive weaknesses of the kingdom despite its status as the world’s third-largest defence spender. Ansarullah has showcased a subsonic cruise missile, the Quds-1, UAVs and short-range ballistic missiles, some emblazoned ‘Made in Yemen’, to accentuate the group’s claimed indigenous missile-production capabilities and ability to strike a variety of targets in southern Arabia by different means. The majority of these weapons are almost certainly Iranian in origin.
Ansarullah’s missile arsenal and capabilities have developed in part along the contours of the civil war in Yemen. Early attacks in 2015 typically utilised captured Yemeni equipment, such as Soviet-made 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab) and 9K72 Elbrus (SS-1C Scud B) short-range ballistic missiles. The group has also used anti-ship cruise missiles, likely including the Chinese-made C-802 (CH-SS-N-6), against the maritime forces of the United States and United Arab Emirates.
More recently and most notably, the group claimed responsibility for the coordinated drone and cruise-missile attack against two Saudi Aramco plants in September 2019. This claim lacks credibility, with the US and Saudi Arabia pointing the finger at Tehran. Considering the ranges to the targets and the level of coordination that would be required, the attack would appear to have needed greater capabilities than Ansarullah possesses. That said, Ansarullah’s launches of ballistic missiles on trajectories towards Riyadh – well beyond the ranges of systems known to be in Yemen’s arsenal – have fuelled reports that longer-range missiles have been smuggled to the group.
Since 2006, Hizbullah’s arsenal has expanded from roughly 15,000 rockets to perhaps as many as around 120,000. Hizbullah’s initial arsenal consisted of unguided short-range rockets, but this has now grown in sophistication to include the Fateh-110, a short-range ballistic missile. The latter has inertial guidance, greatly reducing the inaccuracy of the missile when compared to the earlier rockets. The group has also received anti-ship missiles from Iran.
Hizbullah’s approach is to try to impose costs on Israel’s civilian population in any conflict as one counter to Israeli military action. During the 2006 Second Lebanon War, Hizbullah fired an assortment of nearly 4,000 rockets at Israel – a six-fold increase from the number of rocket attacks during the 1996 conflict – killing 44 civilians.
Consequences
If this is the start of the proliferation of cruise missiles to non-state actors, then it represents a notable change in their capabilities and a future challenge for national militaries. The attack against the Saudi Aramco plants in September 2019 demonstrated the vulnerability of facilities that lack dedicated defence systems, and the potential physical and reputational damages incurred from a successful targeting.
Aware of this threat, in a conflict scenario states will likely prioritise the destruction of these systems prior to launch, as well as associated storage and manufacture sites. This could strain aerial reconnaissance and targeting capabilities and cause civilian casualties if these sites are located in urban areas. Expected targeting also raises a ‘use it or lose it’ dilemma for both state and non-state actors, which may further drive escalatory conflict dynamics.
In addition, the potential growth in capability and scale of the missile inventories of some non-state actors – both acquired and improvised – adds to the challenge of creating effective integrated missile defence.
This analysis originally featured on the IISS Military Balance+, the online database that provides indispensable information and analysis for users in government, the armed forces, the private sector, academia, the media and more. Customise, view, compare and download data instantly, anywhere, anytime. The Military Balance+ includes data on ballistic and cruise missiles and UAVs by type in armed forces worldwide.
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