The government of Iran has shut off access to the internet in most of the country amid recent protests, a tactic also used to control civil unrest in India, Ethiopia, Iraq and Sudan. Such restrictions are aimed at preventing protesters from organizing, halting the spread of misinformation, quelling communal violence and even obstructing communications among coup plotters. Governments are likely to continue to use internet blackouts for the foreseeable future, especially as they gain more control over internet and mobile networks.
Editor's Note: This security-focused assessment is one of many such analyses found at Stratfor Threat Lens, a unique protective intelligence product designed with corporate security leaders in mind. Threat Lens enables industry professionals and organizations to anticipate, identify, measure and mitigate emerging threats to people, assets and intellectual property the world over. Threat Lens is the only unified solution that analyzes and forecasts security risk from a holistic perspective, bringing all the most relevant global insights into a single, interactive threat dashboard.
Amid the recent bout of nationwide protests in Iran, government-enforced blackouts have taken more than 90 percent of the country's internet offline and blocked most Iranians from communicating with the outside world. The move has drawn substantial international media attention, and #Internet4Iran has been a worldwide trending topic on Twitter. Tehran blocked the internet during protests in late 2017 and early 2018, but the scale of the current blackouts is unprecedented in Iran. The government has been working toward greater control of its networks by building an intranet, similar to what China and Russia have done or plan to do. With it, Tehran can also block external influence. Such internal networks give governments more power when shutting down internet connections — permitting local services to continue while cutting off access to external networks and channels.
Iran isn't the only country that has limited or cut internet access in response to domestic unrest. Government attempts at control have ranged from the shutdown of social networks such as Facebook and WhatsApp to the blockage of all online activity. The restrictions are aimed at preventing protesters from organizing, halting the spread of misinformation, quelling communal violence and even obstructing communications among coup plotters. Though governments can use their control over networks for other corrupt purposes, including economic espionage, the use of that power to black out the internet has been particularly disruptive and pronounced during 2019. Some examples include:
India used internet blockages to quell communal violence during its elections in May 2019.
Ethiopia used them during a regional coup in June 2019, the latest instance of many by the government.
Iraq implemented partial and complete internet shutdowns in Baghdad and much of southern Iraq during strong civil unrest in October and November.
Sudan used them during a crackdown by security forces in June 2019.
Governments are likely to continue to use internet blackouts for the foreseeable future, especially as they gain more control over internet and mobile networks. The internet restrictions create problems for travelers and businesses by blocking communication with others within a country and, notably, with partners outside a country. Moreover, businesses that rely on the mobile internet — such as ride-hailing services (Uber, Careem, Lyft) — are unable to function, disrupting a significant portion of road traffic. Multinational companies reliant on internet access are unable to process transactions, and roadside stalls and other local businesses that need to process credit card transactions are also unable to operate.
The restrictions are aimed at preventing protesters from organizing, halting the spread of misinformation, quelling communal violence and even obstructing communications among coup plotters.
The following measures can help businesses and travelers anticipate and mitigate internet outages:
Understanding the local political climate and whether significant events, such as elections, are likely to trigger such measures.
Gauging whether the government has the capability and intent to impose such a blackout — for example, authoritarian governments are more likely to use them, countries that have imposed them are likely to do so again and nations with their own intranet face fewer internal disruptions from cutting external connections.
Developing contingency plans for operations to continue in the event of an internet blackout.
Securing alternative means of communication, particularly devices that aren't reliant on an internet connection.
No comments:
Post a Comment