Rachel Furlow
After months of standoffs and halting negotiations, Yemen’s internationally recognized government signed a power-sharing agreement with southern separatists that, as the International Crisis Group put it, “has averted a war within Yemen’s civil war, at least for the time being.” The deal, brokered by Saudi Arabia and signed in Riyadh on Nov. 5, lays out the terms of a cessation of hostilities between President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi’s government and the separatist movement known as the Southern Transitional Council, or STC. Whether the agreement holds—let alone precipitates an end to Yemen’s devastating civil war and a new way forward for its southern movement—depends primarily on if its ambitious reforms can be fully implemented.
The breakthrough seeks to bring an end to armed confrontations in recent months sparked by longstanding tensions between Hadi’s government and the military wing of the Southern Transitional Council. The two groups have found themselves both strategic allies and wary adversaries throughout the course of Yemen’s civil war, a complicated dynamic that is rooted in a longer history of separatism in southern Yemen, which was an independent state until 1990.
In August, a missile launched from territory controlled by Houthi rebels near Sanaa hit a military parade in Aden, killing dozens, including an influential southern commander. The attack triggered widespread anger in southern Yemen, with the STC blaming it on Islah, a Hadi-affiliated Islamist political party. Four days of clashes ensued between the STC military wing, which is backed by the United Arab Emirates, and Hadi government forces, which are backed by Saudi Arabia, with the separatists reclaiming control over all government and military outposts in Aden. The STC takeover of Aden—which Hadi’s government fled to after the Houthis took Sanaa in 2015—not only exposed the growing rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE as supposed coalition partners in Yemen, but also threatened to thrust the country into an even more intractable conflict pitting the Hadi government against southern separatists, in addition to Houthi rebels in the north.
Fortunately, the signing of the Riyadh Agreement has temporarily avoided that fate. It stipulates that the STC must halt attempts for southern secession until the conclusion of the civil war against the Houthis—a major concession for the separatists—and that a new Cabinet based in Aden must be formed within 30 days, with 12 members each from the north and the south. Additionally, there must be a full withdrawal of troops from both sides that entered Aden and surrounding areas in August, and military personnel from all parties will be integrated into a unified force under the Ministry of Defense.
The deal is a glimmer of hope after an alarming turn of events. First and foremost, the cessation of hostilities avoids an outbreak of further conflict—for now—between Hadi’s forces and the STC’s military wing, known as the Security Belt Forces. The withdrawal of troops around Aden is a constructive step toward reducing tensions and limiting the presence of Hadi’s security forces in the south.
Although much of the Riyadh Agreement sounds good on paper, its vague language and tight timelines could set it up to stall, if not break down altogether.Additionally, the agreement makes significant strides in recognizing the STC as a legitimate political body and including it in future U.N.-brokered political negotiations to end the five-year war. This is no small feat. The government of Yemen has long denied recognizing the STC as a political movement and often vilifies it as an Emirati proxy. Hadi’s delegation to the peace talks in Riyadh was not even willing to engage in direct negotiations with the STC delegation, preferring instead to mediate through Saudi officials. Although tensions remain between the two parties, the inclusion of the STC in negotiations could represent a significant step in involving often-marginalized voices in political decisions—something that has long plagued peace talks in Yemen.
Nevertheless, although much of the agreement sounds good on paper, its vague language and tight timelines could set it up to stall, if not break down altogether. Take the stipulation of both forming a new government and implementing the security reforms within 30 days. That is already a tall order, especially in southern Yemen. To complicate matters, the deal fails to provide any additional details on whether the new government will precede the security reforms or vice versa. While this may seem trivial, there will likely be immediate disagreement between the Hadi government and the STC on how to proceed, with Hadi prioritizing the demilitarization of the STC and the STC preferring to form a new government first.
The agreement also contains a concerning lack of specificity about who will be filling the 24 Cabinet positions. Other than that the seats will be split evenly between northerners and southerners, there is no indication of which political parties the ministers will come from, or whether southerners or northerners will primarily occupy the more critical positions such as prime minister, defense minister and interior minister. These unanswered questions hark back to the issues that quickly contributed to calls for southern secession after Yemen’s shaky unification in 1990. The unification agreement had stipulated that government seats would be evenly split between the north and south. But the actual allocated Cabinet positions allowed more influence to northerners, which sparked resentment and partially fueled a civil war in 1994. Until the Hadi government and STC agree upon an even allocation of Cabinet seats, the Riyadh Agreement is likely to suffer a similar fate.
The responsibility of implementation falls almost entirely on the shoulders of the deal’s broker: Saudi Arabia. The withdrawal of its coalition partner, the UAE, from its position of influence in southern Yemen in July has already led to an increased Saudi presence in and around Aden. Many of the agreement’s articles rely on Saudi Arabia to maintain its position as mediator between the Hadi government and the STC in order to be implemented. The military units newly unified under the Ministry of Defense, for example, will take marching orders from Riyadh, rather than the Hadi government or STC leadership. Additionally, the appointment of ministers in the new Cabinet will be supervised by a Saudi committee. For Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, tying Saudi Arabia’s name to this power-sharing agreement is a risk for the kingdom, which has already paid a heavy reputational price in Yemen.
Even if the Riyadh Agreement holds, the question of southern autonomy will only be postponed until an elusive peace deal with the Houthi rebels is reached. While it may represent some progress given the grim circumstances, this agreement ultimately does nothing more than delay inevitable decisions over Yemen’s enduring southern question.
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