By Nick Danby
It all sounds pretty familiar; but these days, America’s mission in the Pacific has become far more dangerous as tensions between China and the United States rise in nearly all domains – economic, political, and otherwise. Responding to the recent U.S. operation, the Chinese Ministry of Defense labeled the act “navigational hegemony” and accused the destroyer of “trespass[ing] into waters…without permission of the Chinese government.” Such operations, commonly known as freedom of navigation operations, are designed by the United States to weaken, contest, and challenge China’s dubious maritime and territorial claims, especially as the rising Asian power seeks to militarize islands and expand its naval presence.
The influence of sea power upon Chinese foreign policy should come as no surprise to American foreign policy leaders or the rest of the world. In his final speech as Chairman of the Communist Party, Hu Jintao spent most of the time extolling years of economic growth at the 18th Party Congress. But before handing the reins of power over to his successor, then-Vice President Xi Jinping, Hu articulated potential challenges and their solutions for China in the twenty-first century. For the military to confront and victoriously overwhelm adverse actors, Hu proposed a strategy of active defense and preparedness while noting that China “should enhance our capacity for exploiting maritime rights, resolutely safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests, and build China into a maritime power.” Less than a year later, President Xi Jinping furthered Hu’s vision at a high-profile study session when he argued that China should take more of “an interest in the sea, understand the sea, strategically manage the sea, and continually do more to promote China’s efforts to become a maritime power.” Hu and Xi’s public statements were integral to the creation of China’s 2015 defense white paper, which stressed that “[t]he traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests.” The white paper further suggested that the construction of a “modern maritime military force” would align with China’s expansive and growing “national security and development interests.”
Seemingly, someone in the CCP has been reading Alfred Thayer Mahan, a famed nineteenth-century American naval strategist. But what does it all mean?
These statements seem to reflect a growing commitment among the Chinese political and military leadership toward amplifying and modernizing their country’s maritime power and exploiting the seas to protect and advance their maritime rights and interests—all under the umbrella of guaranteeing China’s overall economic and geopolitical development, achieving great power status, and actualizing Xi’s “China Dream.” These statements and actions all have serious consequences for the United States as well as China’s regional adversaries who typically double as America’s allies in the Pacific.
Rationale for Chinese Naval Modernization
The maritime aspect of Xi’s “China Dream” has been long in the making. Since the late 1980s, China’s naval strategy has shifted from a limited and defense disposition to one focused on global expansion and diverse geopolitical and geographical objectives. This change in mindset motivated the People’s Liberation Army Navy to mount a formidable presence in the Indo-Pacific region and conduct operations farther from China’s typical territorial reach. Both have these decisions have only been conceivable due to China’s persistent and comprehensive PLAN modernization program.
Most experts contend that the impetus for Chinese naval growth occurred during the 1991 Gulf War when Chinese officials were shocked by their disproportionate naval power compared to the United States and its allies. These same officials soon realized that China needed a vibrant navy to enforce and support China’s ambitious twenty-first century international economic and political interests and prevent other countries like the United States from thwarting those interests, all while maintaining China’s safety and national security. Consequently, an increase in the breadth and depth of Chinese interests was analogous to an increased demand for emphasizing and executing missions beyond China’s immediate periphery. The PLAN’s shift in focus from “offshore waters defense” to “far seas protection” demonstrates their interest in expanding their reach, influence, and control in order to protect their interests and become a superpower. The Chinese, however, realized that fulfilling this ambition could only come to fruition by modernizing, building, and funding their navy at extraordinary levels. And, for the past two decades, they have done exactly that.
In 1995, China had only 52 submarines (one strategic and 50 tactical with limited capabilities) and roughly 50 principal surface combatants (64 percent of which were low-grade frigates). Most of these naval assets were “old diesel-electric Soviet models.” The United States, at the same time, had 100 submarines—most of Los Angeles or Sturgeon class equipped with Tomahawks and Harpoons. The United States also had 137 principal surface combatants, which consisted of 12 aircraft carriers, 32 cruisers, and 46 destroyers—not to mention 49 Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates with guided missile systems.
While the composition of the U.S. Navy has largely remained unchanged, China’s navy has undergone modernization at a rapid pace—mainly because it has shifted their focus from research to development. An article from The Diplomat argues that China acts as a second-mover in the naval sphere. Instead of researching and coming up with its own models, it simply purchases “foreign naval systems, push[es] licensed production well past contractual limits, and even engag[es] in cyber theft.” By essentially stealing years of research and development (R&D) conducted by the United States and other foreign countries, China can leap over pesky initial “startup” costs and focus on just building the actual ships. This gambit has paid off. In 1995, China had 52 submarines, 18 destroyers, and 32 frigates. Twenty years later, China had 70 submarines, 17 destroyers, 54 frigates, and 1 aircraft carrier.
These numbers can be deceptive. At first glance, the PLAN’s modernization can be confusing to onlookers since it has primarily been focused on improving the quality of its naval platforms and capabilities, not its size. While the number of surface combatants has remained relatively stagnant (and, in the case of destroyers, actually decreased) the aggregate combat capability has skyrocketed because the navy has replaced a larger quantity of older and technologically underdeveloped platform with a smaller, more elite quantity of modern and highly-capable platforms. Now that China has acquired and begun implementing this new technology, however, its navy has already begun increasing the number of ships commissioned each year.
According to Ryan Pickrell at Business Insider, China commissioned 18 and 14 ships in 2016 and 2017, respectively. In that same timeframe, the U.S. Navy only commissioned five and eight ships. By 2018, China had approximately 300 more ships than the U.S. Navy. At this rate, the PLAN could become “the world’s second largest navy by 2020.” More alarming, China could become “a combat fleet that in overall order of battle is quantitatively and even perhaps qualitatively on a part with that of the U.S. Navy by 2030.”
As one looks into the future, this present trend persists, especially when looking at specific warship development. The PLAN’s missiles (e.g. coastal defense cruise, ASBM, SBM, ASCM, submarine-launched torpedoes, and naval mines) allow them to counter an enemy invasion or intrusion with high-intensity attacks. The lethality of these missiles only increases when attacks are closer to China’s coast—essentially securing their anti-area/access-denial (A2/AD) superior capabilities, which prevent any foreign country from operating too close to China’s territorial and maritime borders. The PLAN has also prioritized the modernization and nuclearization of their submarine force. It already has five nuclear-powered attack submarines, four nuclear-powered ballistic missiles, and 54 diesel-power attack submarines. The majority of these platforms were built in the last 16 years and, in the next decade, China will continue to build nuclear-armed submarines that will contribute to PLAN’s ASW capability, nuclear deterrence, and power projection. As of now, China has a new facility that produces one SSN a year and one SSBN every two years—meaning there will be eight more SSNs and about four more SSBNs by 2030. Above water, China has also raced to improve the quantity and quality of its surface combatants, which will aid PLAN’s air defense abilities as it plans for operations beyond the scope of its immediate-range air defense systems and develop its blue-water naval capabilities in order to execute revanchist missions far from China’s shores. From 2010 to 2018, 24 destroyers were commissioned in China compared to the 10 destroyers produced from 1990 to 2010—a twenty-year period. As of now, China is ramping up production of its 055 and 052D class destroyers and will begin producing the 055 class destroyer by the early 2020s. Lastly, China’s first aircraft carrier, Liaoning, will play a dominant role in increasing China’s distant operability and power projection along with engaging more Humanitarian Aid/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) missions, Search and Rescue (SAR), and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft. And, once again, China is already making more. China’s second aircraft carrier is still undergoing sea trials—but does have some issues. China is also working on its third aircraft carrier, which will allegedly be far more advanced by enabling “additional fighter aircraft, fixed-wing early warning aircraft, and more rapid flight operations.”
Putting Naval Power To Use
China’s naval modernization program seems destined to fulfill the “Chinese Dream.” By building more ships and expanding its resilient A2/AD capabilities, China can transition from a regional and technologically-inadequate navy to one that is global, upgraded, and capable of multiple missions far from China’s ports. As the United States shows signs of wavering when it comes to defending its allied commitments in the Pacific or remain a pivotal power in the Indo-Pacific region, China is waiting to swoop in and fill the power vacuum the United States will inevitably leave open. As Sam Roggeveen at the Australian National University so aptly noted, “China is building a surface fleet not so much to challenge the United States as to inherit its position.” Of course, China may help push the United States to cede such superpower responsibilities over time. As Americans wish to “return home” and not spend so much money and manpower defending the Pacific, China will concurrently bolster its A2/AD system, grab more islands for air bases, and aggregate more power than any other historical power in the region. When the American defense budget and people can no longer match China’s growth and personal ambitions, the United States will slowly, ever so slowly, recede from the region. At a certain point, the Chinese will make a dangerous power play against one of America’s allies in the region. And when the American leadership runs a cost-benefit analysis and finds that their position as the Pacific hegemon is simply not worth getting into a war with China over a menial matter, China will become the superpower of the Pacific. America’s reign will be over.
Yet to achieve and ensure a dominant strategic posture, China needs far more than an A2/AD-oriented military. It requires surface naval assets to do two things: induce the United States not to fight and control the Pacific once the United States leaves. With their technologically-adept and modernized submarines, destroyers, and carriers, China would be able to sway local disputes in its favor, with no foreign power to stop them.
If the Monroe Doctrine proclaimed the Western Hemisphere to be “America’s backyard,” the Xi Doctrine seeks to make the Asia-Pacific region “China’s backyard” and it relies on the PLAN’s ability to deter any rival power from mounting a challenge. Under this doctrine, the South China Sea will no longer be in dispute—it will simply be the South China Sea.
A Pragmatic American Response
As Captain James Fanell (USN) told the U.S. House Intelligence Committee on May 2018, this modernization “position[s] China’s military forces…as the arbiters of a new global order—one that stands opposed to U.S. national interests and values.” Future estimates substantiate this hypothesis. As Stratfor Worldview concluded in 2018, “By 2030, the Chinese will likely be the dominant naval force up to an initial island chain that encircles the Yellow, East China and South China Seas” while also enjoying “significant advantages out to a farther limit running roughly from Japan to Indonesia through islands such as Guam and Palau.” Whether China forces the United States to recede from its superpower status in the Pacific either slowly or quickly, the United States should re-double its commitment and efforts in the region.
As American naval officials monitor the gap between American and Chinese naval capabilities, they have set “an expansion target of 355 combat ships by the end of the 2050s,” but leaders acknowledge that the United States “can’t build ships fast enough right now to keep up with the Chinese.” As the United States tries to come close to achieving parity with Chinese naval assets in terms of capability and capacity, it should work with its allies to keep China’s ambitions at bay.
The best recommendation so far has been Michael Beckley’s proposed “active denial” strategy, where the United States abandons “its efforts to command maritime East Asia” and pivots to “helping China’s neighbors deny China sea and air control in the region.” The strategy works by maintaining deterrence against China by “denying [them] the possibility of a decisive military victory while enhancing crisis stability by reassuring China that it will not suffer a massive attack on its homeland.” While I disagree with Beckley’s assessment that the United States needs to assuage China that it lacks the capabilities to swiftly invade their homeland, given the constraints of American naval modernization and funding, I believe an “active denial” strategy is a realistic solution.
The growth of China’s navy keeps me up at night, but I am most wracked by what the Chinese could do with this new navy. Annex Taiwan once and for all? Control the South China Sea in its entirety? Expand its territorial claims and prevent unfriendly foreign ships from navigating through these waters? I am reassured, however by the notion that if the United States works with its allies in the region, it can expand and utilize its A2/AD forces (just like China) to deter the Chinese from any revanchist behavior. To accomplish such a strategy, the United States should provide its allies “with loans, arms, training and intelligence” as well as create “buffers between U.S. and Chinese forces by stationing most U.S. forces in hardened bases scattered around the East Asian periphery, where they could be called upon in the event of war but otherwise kept beyond the reach of most of China’s forces.” For that to happen, however, the United States must come to terms with the fact that its previous decade of naval laggardness in the Pacific means it can no longer resolutely or effectively defend the East Asian sea close to China’s shores. It must, instead, help defend its closest allies.
The fear of future Chinese naval dominance seems to be a recurring American nightmare—and self-fulfilling prophecy. China is still a long way from challenging the American navy on equal footing. But what China lacks in ships it makes up for in determination and strategy. If the United States wants to remain a global superpower and ensure the safety and security of its allies in the Pacific, it can stop China by reiterating its commitment and acting on it.
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