Zach Montague
Of the many paradoxes surrounding China today, the trajectory of its massive Belt and Road Initiative has become one of the most puzzling. Even as the expansive plan has become essentially synonymous with Chinese foreign policy in general, it remains increasingly difficult to nail down with precision what, exactly, it is.
The Belt and Road Initiative today is most readily identifiable as an infrastructure development program, since media coverage tends to focus on flagship projects like ports and power plants, as well as the fallout when some of them go awry. But while Chinese Communist Party leaders hail the scheme in lofty economic terms, in practice, it has become something of a catchall for an almost catholic variety of loosely connected projects and initiatives overseas, all bearing its name.
The “Belt and Road” philosophy has recently been invoked in all sorts of development-adjacent projects, from Chinese NGOs seeking to build “stronger emotional ties” through AIDS prevention missions to foreign exchange programs for Chinese university students in Belt and Road member countries. At times, projects under the Belt and Road umbrella even appear to be at odds with one another; while some bodies, such as the BRI International Green Development Coalition, preach sustainable energy development, as of this year Chinese banks under the Belt and Road framework have reportedly funded as many as 140 coal plants worldwide.
The mission creep of the Belt and Road Initiative has caused so much confusion that even the Chinese Communist Party moved to better define its aims and scope earlier this summer. Along with this rebranding effort, analysts have noticed a related attempt by Beijing to rein in reckless lending for flashy projects and to take a more cautious approach when working with developing countries. This so-called Belt and Road “reboot” appears to emphasize minimizing Beijing’s reputational risk after several countries have defaulted on Chinese loans for big-ticket projects, and several more have scuttled deals with Chinese companies before projects get underway.
Yet while China’s leaders have begun to quietly pivot away from financing infrastructure megaprojects and refocus the Belt and Road Initiative’s goals, they have increasingly turned to other channels under its aegis, primarily those aimed at influencing media and academic circles abroad. This push comes at a time when China’s economy is slowing, and the perceived benefits of creating goodwill through soft power may be more appealing to China’s leaders than taking risks financing projects in politically or economically unstable countries.
China’s use of soft power tactics has been well documented for years, with state-funded organizations such as the Confucius Institute working to export a Communist Party-engineered image of Chinese history and politics to academic communities abroad. Likewise, state media has notoriously taken a similar approach, paying to place sponsored English language content in major newspapers including The Washington Post for some time.
However, as the Belt and Road has sprawled, this influence campaign has ballooned into a dizzying web of state-backed organizations and associations, all taking more aggressive steps to control the conversation about China internationally.
China scholars tend to agree that the Belt and Road Initiative has always been, at its core, a branding effort for China and a legacy project for Xi Jinping.A recent paper by China scholar Nadege Rolland, a former French government official now at the National Bureau of Asian Research, demonstrates just how much this web has grown. Within the past four years, the state has created such bodies as the Belt and Road Media Cooperation Union and the Belt and Road News Alliance to engage with foreign media companies in member countries. In real terms, this often amounts to funding scholarships and junkets for foreign journalists to visit China, and organizing forums and panels through which foreign journalists are delivered Chinese propaganda.
Beijing has also begun funding into its own media ventures abroad, pushing state news stories. This effort has become particularly pronounced in Africa, where Chinese state media companies have charged into television markets, often working hard to overtake local competitors and flood viewers with pro-Chinese coverage. Recent reports from both Foreign Policy and Der Spiegel have highlighted cases in which these companies declined to run negative coverage of China or used their platform to attempt to crowd out critical reporting from independent outlets.
This influence campaign in Africa has already raised alarm within top U.S. defense circles. According to recently disclosed Pentagon documents and statements by the former head of U.S. Africa Command, Chinese influence in Africa is being taken as a significant threat to U.S. security interests, especially with 39 of 54 African nations now involved in the Belt and Road Initiative as member states.
Other recent measures under the Belt and Road Initiative have sparked similar concern. The “Digital Silk Road” has become a cornerstone in the larger Belt and Road strategy, through which Chinese tech companies are actively exporting everything from internet infrastructure to facial recognition and surveillance technology to countries throughout Asia, in the Gulf, and across Africa. Even as the U.S. has fought back against Huawei’s efforts to bring 5G technology to much of the world, Chinese companies have steadily built inroads in other areas, laying undersea internet cables, and also building the groundwork to control landing points for internet cables at Chinese ports. The perennial fear in all these cases is that Beijing could ultimately exert its influence over this infrastructure to limit free expression and selectively siphon internet traffic wherever it felt the need.
China scholars tend to agree that the Belt and Road Initiative has always been, at its core, a branding effort for China and a legacy project for Xi Jinping, the most powerful Chinese leader in a generation. The massive development vision that informed the Belt and Road from its early days was always openly described as a way to integrate the world in a way that made China an economic nucleus, and enmeshed countries near and far more closely with Beijing.
Yet as China has been forced to face the limits of its ambition, and navigate the volatile global economic system, it appears to be betting that this particular path to global clout and influence may be costlier and riskier than softer methods. Its response seems to be to seek out quieter, craftier ways of burnishing its image abroad.
Beijing’s push to manage the narrative about China and its rise overseas may not be unprecedented or wholly manipulative yet. But it betrays a strategy of exploring novel ways of exerting control when economic development and stimulus fall short.
Zach Montague works in the Washington bureau of The New York Times. He covers breaking news and has previously worked in Abu Dhabi and Beijing. Follow him on Twitter @zjmontague.
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