Space Wars: Military Satellites Will Be Armed 'With Lasers And Guns' By 2030

Zak Doffman

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Last September, the French government accused Russia of an "act of space espionage," when Moscow's signals-intelligence satellite Luch-Olymp was steered "a bit too closely" to France's military communications satellite Athena-Fidus. “It got so close," France's Armed Forces Minister Florence Parly reportedly said at the time, "that we might have imagined it was trying to intercept our communications—trying to listen to your neighbors is not only unfriendly, it’s an act of espionage."

Last week, Parly announced details of a new "defense space strategy" at the Lyon-Mont Verdun air defense operations base. "Having a reinforced space defense is absolutely essential," she said, "it is our freedom of appreciation, access and action in space that is at stake." France's Le Point reported that in the summer of 2019, space has finally become "a field of action."

France's defense minister painted a picture of cameras, machine guns and lasers on "sensitive satellites," able to watch for threats and then fight back. "This can be achieved," Le Point reported, "by submachine guns capable of destroying the solar panels of an enemy satellite, or by lasers blinding or destroying it entirely." The minister also wants to see swarms of low-orbit nano satellites "placed around the most strategic objects," and "short-notice replacements for satellites destroyed by the enemy."

The plans also envisage additional services from France's aerospace and defense giants ArianeGroup, Airbus and Thales. In making the announcment, Parly committed an additional €700 million ($780 million) to the €4.3 billion ($4.8 billion) already committed to the military space budget by 2025.

There is an acknowledgment in these latest developments in France (and elsewhere), that the rules of engagement in space are set to change dramatically. And while the French government has been at pains to stress that these moves are entirely defensive in nature, the physical attack on a foreign space asset is currently outlawed. 

Earlier in July, French President Emmanuel Macron announced the creation of a "Space Command," essentially expanding the remit of the country's Air Force. "The new military space doctrine," he said, "ensure our defense of space using space weapons."

France's establishment of a Space Command follows the U.S. doing the same, as announced by U.S. President Donald Trump late last year. Space is no longer a new frontier, but one that is critical to today's battlefield communications and surveillance ecosystem. There has been a hasty realization in recent years that investments by China and Russia in offensive space capabilities—especially on the cyber front—has left the U.S. and its allies on the backfoot. 

"Although United States space systems have historically maintained a technological advantage over those of our potential adversaries," the new directive signed by the president in February stated, "those potential adversaries are now advancing their space capabilities and actively developing ways to deny our use of space in a crisis or conflict."

Earlier this month, I reported that new research suggested that U.S. and NATO command and control systems are already open to compromise because of vulnerabilities in the satellite systems carrying mission-critical data. Cyber attacks on satellites "have the potential to wreak havoc on strategic weapons systems and undermine deterrence by creating uncertainty and confusion." Given the critical reliance on space assets to direct modern warfare, and the vulnerability of those assets, "it would be prudent to assume that an adversary is already active in these networks and focus on resilience measures—with increased urgency for advanced techniques... to identify and respond to modern threats."

According to Florence Parly, "active defense is not an offensive strategy—it's self-defense. When a hostile act has been identified, it is acceptable within international law to respond in an appropriate and proportionate manner. The law does not exempt self-defense, it does not prohibit militarization, it does not prevent weaponization."

Dr. Laura Grego, a spokesperson for the Union of Concerned Scientists, responded to the U.S. Space Command directive by warning that "President Trump has called space a new warfighting domain—we need to take care of space. If concentrating authority in a space force creates an incentive for nations to build space weapons that increase the likelihood of conflict, it would be a profoundly bad idea. There are much better ways to protect satellites. Space security cannot be achieved unilaterally or solely through military means. It will require coordination and cooperation with other spacefaring nations. That means diplomacy."

Fifty years after the moon landing, the latest shift in France suggests that—despite all such warnings—we are now set for a space race of a very different kind.