Larry Kummer
Summary: Since Korea, our military has proven itself unable to win wars. We cannot win even against foes with little training and less equipment. We cannot win even when the US fields large armies fueled with almost unlimited funds against foes having neither. As we walk on the verge of war with Iran, we must ask “why?” There are a thousand and one answers. But we should look first at our leaders, often the difference between victory and defeat.
To understand why our military consistently fails to win, a fun place to start is one of the best books by one of the greatest science fiction’s authors: Starship Troopers
by Robert Heinline (Lt, US Navy, retired – Annapolis 1929, ranked fifth in his class academically). It describes the “Mobile Infantry” (MI), an ideal version of the Army. In it, he describes the challenge of developing leaders for a fighting force.
by Robert Heinline (Lt, US Navy, retired – Annapolis 1929, ranked fifth in his class academically). It describes the “Mobile Infantry” (MI), an ideal version of the Army. In it, he describes the challenge of developing leaders for a fighting force.
“To fill each necessary combat billet, one job to one officer, would call for a 5% ratio of officers – but 3% is all we’ve got.
“In place of that optimax of 5% that the M. I. never can reach, many armies in the past commissioned 10% of their number, or even 15% – and sometimes a preposterous 20%! This sounds like a fairy tale but it was a fact, especially during the XXth century. What kind of an army has more “officers” than corporals? (And more non-coms than privates!) An army organized to lose wars – if history means anything. An army that is mostly organization, red tape, and overhead, most of whose “soldiers” never fight. …
“{T}he M. I . never commissions a man simply to fill vacancy. In the long run, each boot regiment must supply its own share of officers and the percentage can’t be raised without lowering the standards.”
Heinlein accurately describes a key structural feature distinguishing effective from ineffective armies. For an expert’s analysis coming to the same conclusion, see the presentation below by Donald Vandergriff. In it, he compares our Army with others – past and present, effective and ineffective. Here is the grim bottom line. Officers comprised 3.0% of the 1940 German army and 6.0% of the 1967 Israeli Army. These are armies that won battles, often against high odds, by operational excellence.
Compare those numbers with those of the US Army, where officers were 9.4% during WWII. 14.9% during Vietnam – and are 18.9% now (roughly). See this ugly trend in a graph from “Star Creep: The Costs of a Top-Heavy Military” by Ben Freeman.
The Number of Officers Per 100 Enlisted Personnel from 1901-2013.
The bloat is worse at the higher ranks. There are an incredible 1.5 three- and four-star generals and flag officers for every 10,000 troops. Since the Cold War ended (~1991), no DoD personnel group has grown at a faster rate. For more about this problem, see The cost of too many generals: paying more to get a less effective military by Ben Freeman (Project on Government Oversight).
For those interested in military reform, the path to America again winning wars, Don’s presentation is essential reading. See his bio below and, at the end of the post, information about his newest book.
No comments:
Post a Comment