A War in Crisis! Afghanistan in Mid-2019

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By Anthony H. Cordesman 

The war in Afghanistan is at a critical stage. There is no clear end in sight that will result in a U.S. military victory or in the creation of stable Afghan state. A peace settlement may be possible, but so far, this only seems possible on terms sufficiently favorable to the Taliban so that such peace may simply become an extension of war by other means and allow the Taliban to exploit it to the point where it comes to control at least large parts of the country.

The Burke Chair at CSIS is issuing a survey of the key indicators now shaping the course of the war. It is entitled A War in Crisis: Afghanistan in Mid-2019. It is available on the CSIS web site here.

The survey presents a wide range of open source material drawn from U.S. government sources, NATO reporting, institutions like the UN and World Bank, and media sources as diverse as the Long War Journal and New York Times. It warns that after some eighteen years of conflict, the United States has not developed an approach to the war that can defeat the Taliban, ISIS, and the other threats in Afghanistan.

The war is close to a stalemate but is one that marginally favors the Taliban – and does so in spite of massive ongoing U.S. air, financial, and advisory support. The survey also warns that the U.S. has failed to help the Afghan government overcome its many critical military and civil limitations and is still unable to choose and implement some form of consistent U.S. strategy.

The data and metric indicate that:

Open source reporting on the course of the fighting is highly controversial – to the point where the U.S-led command seems to be cancelling reporting on Afghan government vs. Taliban control and influence and no longer reports on many aspects of ANSF operational capabilities. Excerpts from SIGAR, Lead IG, and Long War Journalreporting are particularly revealing.

There still is a critical lack of progress in key aspects of Afghan government forces, governance, and economic development and little reason to believe the situation will improve strikingly in the foreseeable future.

These problems in the war effort exist in spite of continued Afghan dependence on massive U.S military aid, major increases in the use of U.S. airpower, continued U.S. support of key Afghan ground forces, and forward U.S. train and assist support of other Afghan combat forces at the Kandak level.

Other metrics and data highlight long list of equally critical uncertainties, many of which raise further questions about U.S. capability to create a stable Afghanistan.

These are challenges that should have a major impact on U.S. strategy at a time when the U.S. has to make hard choices about staying, seeking a peace, or finding ways to withdraw even if a peace is not reached. At present, however, the U.S. has not openly addressed these issues or announced a clear strategy for the future. It instead seems to be pursuing a peace settlement largely as a first step in withdrawing from Afghanistan without openly stating its intentions to do, and to be doing so in ways that sharply limit participation by the Afghan government that the U.S is in Afghanistan to aid.

Reporting by SIGAR, the Lead IG, and the media reporting also raises growing questions as to whether the U.S. is classifying or altering some aspects of its open source reporting to disguise its lack of progress, and possible willingness to withdraw, even at the cost of a peace settlement that will not offer the Afghan government real security

The Afghan government has made its own attempts to define a peace settlement, but remains weak and deeply divided. If it holds a Presidential election in September 2019, there are doubts that its results will have broad Afghan support and/or improve about Afghanistan’s future

The military situation remains grim. Afghan forces may be making progress – and innovations like the Security Forces Assistance Brigades are having a positive impact – but serious questions emerge as to whether Afghan forces will be able to stand on their own without outside support for something like the next half-decade.

It is clear from the data presented in this survey that the Afghan government will not be able to survive without billions of dollars in annual financial aid from outside powers like the U.S. for years to come. It is also clear that Afghan forces would now suffer unacceptable military losses if the U.S. did not continue to provide massive amounts of air support, if the U.S. and its allies did not provide substantial train and assist help to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and if U.S. ground forces did not provide direct support to Afghan Special Security Forces and other elite units.

The survey does not examine the politics of Afghanistan or the current peace efforts in detail. These issues are too topical and volatile. It does, however, present data and metrics that show that while Afghanistan continues to pursue reform in many civil areas, its success is questionable at best. Sources like the World Bank, the United Nations, and the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction show just how badly governed and corrupt the country still is. They show how serious the challenges it faces in terms of poverty and development still are, and they document a growing dependence on a narco-economy.

Finally, the survey shows that Afghanistan has a deeply divided population that is growing at a rate that its domestic economy cannot properly support, and that it will face critical challenges in employing its youth even if it can achieve some meaningful form of peace, unity, and development. These civil problems are so critical that they raise serious questions as to whether the country can create a peace that brings it true stability and security, and can emerge out of its coming election with a successful enough government to either continue the fight or manage a peace. Afghanistan’s civil threats are as serious as its security threats.

These are challenges that should have a major impact on U.S. strategy at a time when the U.S. has to make hard choices about staying, seeking a peace, or finding ways to withdraw even if a peace is not reached. At present, however, the U.S. has not openly addressed these issues or announced a clear strategy for the future. It instead seems to be pursuing a peace settlement largely as a first step in withdrawing from Afghanistan without openly stating its intentions, and in ways that largely excludes any formal participation by the Afghan government that the U.S is in Afghanistan to aid. Reporting by SIGAR, the Lead IG, and the media reporting also raises growing questions as to whether the U.S. is classifying or altering some aspects of its open source reporting to disguise its lack of progress, and possible willingness to withdraw, even at the cost of a peace settlement that will not offer the Afghan government real security

The Afghan government has made its own attempts to define a peace settlement, but remains deeply divided. If it holds a Presidential election in September 2019, there are doubts that its results will have broad Afghan support and/or improve about Afghanistan’s future

Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He has served as a consultant on Afghanistan to the United States Department of Defense and the United States Department of State.