As ISIS Regroups, the U.S. Is Forgetting the Lessons of Counterinsurgency – Again

by Judah Grunstein - World Politics Review

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… For the U.S. military, rejecting COIN reflects its historical preference for the more clear-cut principles of conventional warfare, where victory and defeat between armed adversaries can be clearly discerned, over the softer edges and politically determined outcomes of counterinsurgency. For American voters, rejecting it expresses the frustration and anger over two decades of squandered lives, resources and power in pursuit of an ill-conceived adventure that was oversold and under-resourced. 

But if the U.S. has given up on fighting terrorism, it’s not sure whether the reverse is true, as al-Baghdadi’s video declaration makes clear. And regardless of the debates over the effectiveness of COIN, the next generation of violent extremists will almost certainly be inspired by the rubble left behind by the U.S.-led war against the Islamic State, if they don’t emerge directly from it. Moreover, even if the Islamic State can’t successfully launch attacks against the U.S. and Western Europe, the Easter bombings in Sri Lanka demonstrate how easily the group and its acolytes can destabilize countries outside the West. 

In many ways, the logic guiding counterinsurgency has not grown any less compelling. Predatory governance can drive popular grievances over the line to violence, and fragile states and ungoverned spaces provide extremist groups with fertile ground to incubate. Counterinsurgency didn’t solve those problems. Ignoring them won’t either.