By Captain Kevin Eyer, U.S. Navy (Retired)
History is replete with examples of nations suffering catastrophic military defeat to adversaries who were able to achieve surprise at the strategic level. In retrospect, it seems clear that all the critical warning signs were available in advance. In considering these events, the worthwhile question ultimately becomes this: Why was the essential, known information either ignored or discredited? How was it, for example, that the Russians in June 1941, the Americans in December 1941, the United Nations Forces in October 1951, and the Israelis in October 1973 failed to correctly perceive reality? And, if lessons can be gleaned from these and other historic examples, what conclusions might be drawn by U.S. leaders today—particularly as the nation faces increased competition with China?
In explaining the phenomenon of successful strategic-level military surprise it may be useful to consider Roberta Wohlstetter’s perspectives on “signal” versus “noise.” In 1965, she wrote: “In discussing this information it will perhaps be useful to distinguish again between signals and noise. By the signal of an action is meant a sign, a clue, a piece of evidence that points to the action or to an adversary’s intention to undertake it, and by noise is meant the background of irrelevant or inconsistent signals, signs pointing in the wrong directions, that tend always to obscure the signs pointing the right way.”
So, even though in each case there were those who correctly forecast the coming disaster, they were uniformly suppressed or ignored. Despite the danger, the larger institutional apparatus consciously rejected available warning signals and harbingers. Why? The answer may lie in Ms. Wohlstetter’s conviction that the necessary separation of “signal” from “noise” may sometimes be impossibly difficult, and for a variety of reasons.
A Matter of Perspective
To understand the surrounding world, individuals view events through a series of uniquely constructed “lenses,” each is developed based on a set of fundamental assumptions. These assumptions may be based in fact or belief. They may be true or false. They may be prejudices or pre-dispositions or preferences. For example, a person may understand dogs based on these assumptions: Little dogs are high-strung. Mutts are friendly. Herding dogs are exceptionally intelligent. Hounds are noisy. Problematically, some of these assumptions may be wrong or at least highly variable. Worse, once an individual develops a perspective on any particular topic, it can be very difficult to move them off their core beliefs. Even if there is evidence that their assumptions may be wrong, it often takes time for real change to take hold, and by then it may be too late to avert disaster. Nevertheless, it must be understood that these lenses are often necessary in that they allow individuals to think in a kind of short-hand, as they attempt to decode the world around them.
As far as nations are concerned, the stakes are much higher, yet the same phenomenon applies. Each nation supports a series of assumptions on any conceivable topic. And, just as with individuals, when a nation views the contemporaneous world though a faulty lens, the result may be disaster at a strategic level. Major wars occur when: both sides credibly believe they can win; both sides misunderstand the other’s key objectives (limited vs. unlimited); and at least one side cannot back down without facing regime change from internal elements. All three of these conditions exist between the United States and China today. To the Chinese leaders, any conflict involving Taiwan, Japan, or Korea is probably an existential threat to the Chinese Communist Party and must be won. The United States values the international system, more than most Americans know or admit, and an emotional/political decision by a U.S. president in response to aggression by China is not unlikely. (Consider President Truman in Korea, Reagan in Beirut, Clinton in Bosnia, and George W. Bush in Iraq).
A nation’s lenses—or what may be more accurately called thought-frameworks—on any given topic are developed over time, and constructed of a series of strategic assumptions, each believed to be true and enduring. These thought-frameworks are built—consciously or unconsciously—to help a nation more easily and quickly understand a topic. If new data arrives, and it can be accommodated sensibly through the set of core assumptions from which the existing thought-framework is built, that data is accepted to be true. If, on the other hand, it conflicts with these fundamental beliefs, it is often discounted as anomalous or incorrect.
This phenomenon explains military disaster after military surprise. If the framework of strategic military assumptions is faulty; if civil and military leaders become too attached to these assumptions; if they stubbornly value the core assumptions above any new data; if these strategic assumptions are not regularly reconsidered in depth, a recipe for disaster presents. The record is clear: In each case of strategic military surprise, it can be demonstrated that when new information was presented, regardless of its pedigree or import, if it was found to disagree with the specific set of closely held assumptions that informed the thinking of those nations’ civil and military leaders, it was rejected.
What of China?
In 1941, though anticipating an outbreak of war, the U.S. military found the prospect of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor to be highly unlikely. The thought-framework simply would not allow an attack on Pearl Harbor to be an acceptable conclusion. Not only did General George Marshall refer to the Island of Oahu as, “the strongest fortress in the world,”1 but it was a common conviction that if and when a Japanese attack did come, it would come in the Far East or perhaps even Panama.2 At the tactical-level, Pearl Harbor was (incorrectly) thought to be too shallow to employ air-launched torpedoes. These assumptions were incorrect, and the result was strategic surprise.
Today, what strategic assumptions are included in the U.S. thought-framework regarding the possibility of war with China? Policy makers' assumptions seem to include:
The United States and China can coexist in a world where the Western-designed international system sets the rules. (To be fair, this assumption appears to be changing with the current U.S. National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy focused on peer-level competition with China.)
We can "impose costs" on China that will deter their aggression or force them to take "off ramps."
Regional powers can and will band together to act in ways that will deter Chinese aggression.
War is a binary concept and is inherently military in nature; you are either at war, or you are not. Our current status with China is "competition."
War with China is unlikely due to our economic interdependencies.
In the unlikely event of a war, it will be regional and focused on objectives that are limited and not existential for either side.
In the event of a war, nuclear weapons put an upper boundary on how big it can get.
China would signal in advance of military action and negotiate to avoid a fight.
The United States will be able to control escalation and drive the pace of a conflict.
The United States has an intelligence advantage that ensures it can avoid major strategic surprises.
U.S. military advantages would allow it to win a conventional fight.
Regional nations would back the United States, and U.S. allies will join the fight, to include access to bases and logistics support.
If the United States does not attack the Chinese mainland, China will not attack CONUS.
China would not undertake a war with the United States prior to achieving economic and military parity, and this will not happen for some years.
India and Russia will abstain from the conflict.
Are these assumptions correct? Is it not possible that the correct assumptions might be closer to these?
The Chinese do not believe they will ever be given the respect, rights, or influence they deserve under the current international system. So, the United States and its regional partners and allies must either acquiesce to Chinese revisions or be ready to fight to maintain the current system by force.
China’s leaders and people value social stability above all else because of longstanding cultural tradition and having seen the terror that accompanies instability.
China's leaders are rational but use very different strategic calculus, much of which is opaque to U.S. decisionmakers.
To the Chinese, war is not binary and is not limited to military action. China is at war with the West, and the U.S. in particular, right now; they hope to win without kinetic military action but may seek military conflict to demonstrate strength and gain prestige.
Military conflict with China is more likely than most people believe.
Anything the United States could do to "impose costs" (short of military action) has already been included in China's calculus. To stop them from achieving an objective, the United States will have to give them something they value more or take the action necessary to deny them.
Nuclear weapons might, or might not, prevent the use of nuclear weapons. Everything will be on the table.
If China decides to attack, it will do so quickly and without warning.
Attacks may be limited to U.S. targets (to prevent stimulating others to join the U.S. side), seek to overwhelm, cripple, and embarrass (i.e. - be focused on iconic targets), include substantial deception efforts, and include heavy use of cyber and electronic warfare.
If the United States or others continue to fight, China will escalate and expand quickly. They have watched the U.S. "way of war" over the past 20 years and will not allow the United States time to recover, replenish, build a coalition, or amass force.
Regional powers will remain neutral in a conflict until it is clear who is going to win and then they will side with the apparent victor.
The problem of warning is inseparable from the problem of decision. Foresight cannot be guaranteed, but the chances of acting on signals in time to avert or moderate a disaster can be improved. The framework of assumptions must be explicit, grounded in reality, and tested rigorously and often. If new observations do not fit into the framework, analysts and decisionmakers must ask why. A measure of skepticism and flexibility in matching tactical observations to strategic assumptions is required. Only then will responses fit the ambiguities of information and minimize the risks of error and inaction.
No comments:
Post a Comment