by Daniel R. DePetris
Many of the extremist group's fighters will now become insurgents but that is not something America can solve.
It took a lot more time, patience, and ordnance than expected, but after a two-month offensive in the dusty, Syrian border village of Baghouz, the U.S.-supported Syrian Democratic Forces finally made the announcement the world was waiting for: the Islamic State’s caliphate is history. For the millions of Iraqis and Syrians who were subjected to the group’s brutality and dogmatic extremism, the SDF’s final clearing operation in the Islamic State’s remaining speck of land in the Mediterranean must have come as a cathartic moment.
Governments the world over are gushing with celebration. President Donald Trump, who days earlier unveiled a map for reporters showing how little land the Islamic State occupied, will likely claim all the credit for himself. British prime minister Theresa May issued a statement calling the capture of Baghouz “a historic milestone.” German foreign minister Heiko Maas and French president Emmanuel Macron issued their own congratulations to forces on the ground. And the Kurdish fighters who did most of the fighting and the dying capped off their success in celebratory fashion, complete with a parade and a marching band, musical instruments in tow.
One can’t blame them for basking in their success. The road between the Islamic State and the defeat of the caliphate has been a long and windy one, with its fair share of rubble along the way. The four and a half years of combat against the caliphate entailed incredible sacrifices from the Iraqi soldiers, militias, and Kurdish fighters on the front-lines. Tens of thousands of them were killed in the combat and the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service—the Iraqi military’s cream of the crop—suffered 40 percent losses during the 2017 battle for Mosul, the most vicious urban combat since U.S. troops stormed Fallujah more than a dozen years prior. And then there were Iraq and Syria’s ethnic minorities, who were imprisoned, exiled, tortured, killed, and sold into sexual servitude. For all of them, the end of the caliphate could not have come soon enough…
Bottom Line Up Front:
For some odd reason, we continue to ignor the "root cause" of our "small wars" (see C.E. Callwell at my Item No. Two below); choosing, instead, to suggest that it is the "results" of our such small wars (see my Item No. One below) that, in fact, are the true "root cause." By mischaracterizing our "small wars" in this such manner, we likewise ignor what may actually be required to "fix" and or "deal with" same.
Explanation:
First -- Item No. One -- From our author above: A suggestion of the "root cause" of our "small wars:"
"In other words, none of the core reasons for the Islamic State’s very being—systemic corruption; horrendous public services; predatory and cruel security institutions; bloated bureaucracies that serve more as jobs-programs for the well-connected than public goods for the whole of society; political leaders who pit their nation’s ethnic and sectarian communities against one another in order to sustain themselves in power—can be fixed with the allocation of American military power. The Trump administration could theoretically deploy two million U.S. troops in the Middle East for eternity and it would still only have a marginal effect on the region’s central problems. Indeed, keeping the U.S. military in bases along the Iraq-Syria border indefinitely is the geopolitical equivalent of prescribing pain killers for a tumor; it may provide the patient with immediate relief, but it does nothing to stop the tumor from growing."
Next -- Item No. Two -- From C.E. Callwell: A suggestion of the "root cause" of our "small wars:"
"Small wars are a heritage of extended empire, a certain epilogue to encroachments into lands beyond the confines of existing civilization, and this has been so from early ages to the present time. Conquerors of old penetrating into the unknown encountered races with strange and unconventional military methods and trod them down, seizing their territory; revolts and insurrections followed, disputes and quarrels with tribes on the borders of the districts overcome supervened, out of the original campaign of conquest sprang further wars, and all were vexatious, desultory, and harassing. And the history of those small wars repeats itself in the small wars of to-day.
The great nation which seeks expansion in remote quarters of the globe must accept the consequences. Small wars dog the footsteps of the pioneers of civilization in the regions afar off."
https://www.amazon.com/Small-Wars-Their-Principles-Practice/dp/1438513887 (See Section II: Causes of Small Wars.)
Last -- Item No. Three -- From Emile Simpson: An explanation (agrees with Callwell?) of both (a) the general nature of our "small wars" (imperialist/imperialism?) and (b) our normal and expected responsibilities related thereto (imperial policing?):
"Ever since the Taliban government was toppled in late 2001, the heart of the strategic problem that has confronted the United States and its allies in Afghanistan has been the definition of victory: How does this end? We would all be better off if we first asked what 'this' is. While Afghanistan is a war of sorts, it is not the sort of war in which there is likely to be a decisive moment of victory. Rather, Afghanistan is best described as an armed policing operation. ...
The categorical distinction between internal and interstate war is straightforward. What is surprising, therefore, is how far the distinction is ignored in the expectation that decisive victory is nonetheless available in internal conflict.
In a domestic context, everyone understands that policing is a continual activity. The idea is constantly to maintain order. There is no moment of victory as such but, rather, an ambition to achieve and maintain relative “stability,” which is only ever a provisional state. ...
To think about the conflict in Afghanistan as an armed policing operation (in my book I call it 'armed politics,' but it’s the same business of enforcing the writ of a government over its own state) makes sense historically. Take for example the British experience of policing the other side of the lawless 'North-West Frontier' between what is today Pakistan and Afghanistan against rebellious Pashtun (then called Pathan) tribes. Virtually not a single year passed between 1849 and 1947 without some kind of large military expedition to quell unrest.
Bottom Line Thought -- Based on the Above:
Thus:
If we come to understand the "root cause" of our "small wars" more in "imperial" terms (see my Item No. Two above).
And, likewise, come to understand our continuing responsibilities ("imperial policing") in similar such terms (see my Item No. Three above),
Then, seen in this light, might we also come to understand (a) the "tumor" that our author describes above (see my Item No. One) -- and, likewise, the likelihood that such will continue to grow -- also from this such "imperial" perspective?
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