What should the agenda be for U.S.-China military relations, and what obstacles need to be overcome?
While the U.S. national security strategy has asserted for the first time that we are in a great power competition with China, our approach to military-to-military relations has seemingly not changed. On January 28, Admiral John M. Richardson commented positively about his recent visit to China, stating that he has “a good working relationship with [his] counterpart” and that he “had a very rich visit.” Our talking points remain the same: encouraging China to embrace professionalism in its military activities and to abide by international law. More specifically, the U.S. goal is to establish personal relationships to facilitate risk reduction.
But China has become more aggressive under Xi Jinping and is relying more and more on military tools to, for example, push its agenda in the South China Sea. The Chinese military’s number one objective is to “prepare for military struggle,” with its mostly likely opponent being the United States. This means we have to shift the focus of the military relationship accordingly.
Specifically, the goal of these exchanges should be to learn more about the operational capabilities and procedures of the People’s Liberation Army (P.L.A.). Even with all of the Pentagon’s resources, there are still things the U.S. does not know or understand about China’s military. This should be the focus of our military-to-military relationship. Not on establishing personal ties, which are short-lived and probably not as strong as we think they are, nor about risk management—China engages in risky behavior intentionally to signal its resolve on maritime disputes. Instead, we should be asking to see how their personnel is trained, how their command and control system functions in crises and wartime, and what impact the anti-corruption campaign has had on the P.L.A., by meeting with people from China’s Inspection and Discipline Committees.
The bottom line is: both the U.S. and Chinese militaries are tools of power that their national leaderships will wield as they see fit. Our exchanges are unlikely to impact broader U.S.-China relations. Thus, we need to move away from the symbolic and towards devising agendas that help the U.S. better prepare for contingencies in East Asia.
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